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Risk engineers conduct comprehensive risk assessments for many types of large 
projects, often singularly focused on the technical assessment and its value to the 
technical engineering team.  Limiting or excluding community stakeholder 
involvement from the assessment process increases stakeholder skepticism, 
apprehension, and mistrust regarding safety, health and welfare of those stakeholders 
living or working nearby.  Social experts have repeatedly documented connections 
between perception framing, communication processes, and risks.  This research 
considers the connections between stakeholder perceptions and communication plans 
associated with risks listed in the risk register, and communication plans designed 
based upon including social expert suggestions for six projects:  three biosafety 
laboratories; two levee system assessment projects; and one Superfund site.  The 
project risk assessment value is researched through the lens of risk perception and 
 
communication planning via the risk register.  The concept of a Risk Perception 
Management (RPM) Plan developed in collaboration with social science experts and 
integrated with the risk register is presented.  This research shows how the RPM 
concept iteratively captures stakeholder perceptions to build associated 
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 Introduction Chapter 1:
Risk assessment for large projects is expensive, time consuming, and 
practiced inconsistently by federal agencies.  Studying six public projects and risk 
assessment approaches led to researching risk assessment processes.  Public agencies 
use a variety of practices regarding uncertainty treatment, risk characterization, risk 
communication, and stakeholder perception management.  Different approaches 
changes the decision-making value of the risk assessment process.   
Analyzing six public cases of high-impact, low-frequency risks shows the 
decision-making value of each risk assessment.  Each case is introduced through 
identification of the initial conditions of the risk assessment and associated risk 
management decisions.  The analysis describes subsequent risk assessment and 
management changes, connecting how the risk assessment(s) informed the project 
risk management decisions.  The concept of a Risk Perception Management (RPM) 
plan is introduced as a component to increase the decision-making value of the 
assessment process.  The suggested RPM process iteratively captures stakeholder 
perceptions through the risk register to enable communication plan development for 
large, controversial projects, thus improving project stakeholder engagement.  
1.1 Background 
We talk about economic risk, health risk, accident risk, project risk, and 
weather risk (i.e. will I need an umbrella today?).  Risk assessment and risk 
management occupy significant space across the social, news, and local media 
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outlets.  Often the hazards identified in complex projects are related and dependent, 
although in practice many engineering risk assessments assume independence in the 
interest of reducing complexity. 
Complex hazards necessitate comprehensive risk assessments.  Risk 
assessment in federal agencies employs experts from a variety of fields assessing 
potential risks to the populace from natural, human health, environmental, ecological 
and economic hazards.  Complexity of the hazards and their mitigation involves 
experts from multiple scientific disciplines.  Risk assessment practice includes 
identifying hazards from a variety of sources, estimating their potential to occur, and 
developing plans to manage outcomes in the event the hazards materialize.  
Comprehensive risk assessments include experts from engineering, decision theory, 
economic theory, epidemiologic theory, ecologic theory, healthcare theory, and social 
and psychological theory.   
Assessing hazards originated within the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), the federal agency established by the passage of the 1970 National 
Environmental Protection Act.  During the ensuing decades, risk assessment and 
management practice expanded across federal agencies responsible for human health, 
the environment, ecological management and federal facility projects. Independent 
reviews of federal risk assessments pervade the literature.  Reviews of risk 
assessments describe common fundamental concerns unchanged since the early days 
of risk assessment within the federal government.   
Problems identified within risk assessment critiques depend upon the nature of 
the hazard and consequences under evaluation.  Common risk assessment issues 
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include varied treatments of uncertainty, limited risk engineering technology, 
narrowly focused hazards, limited expert resources and lack of available data 
(Machina, 1990; NRC, 1983; NRC, 1994; NRC, 2008).   
The literature suggests solutions for risk assessment problems.  Suggested 
solutions include involving stakeholders from the project initiation; presenting the 
uncertainty associated with the probability of hazards; collaboratively developing 
consistent risk assessment practices across agencies; iteratively assessing the 
hazard(s); considering the manner in which options are presented; and including the 
human tendencies regarding making arduous decisions (Anderson, 2003; Dourson & 
Patterson, 2003; EPA, 2000; Finkel, 1993; McClellan & North, 1994; Kleindorfer, 
Kunreuther, & Schoemaker, 1993; Hoch, Kunreuther, & Gunther, 2001; Morgan, 
Henrion, & Small, 1990).   
1.2 Motivation 
The variety of risk assessment processes of high-impact, low frequency 
hazards frequently contributes to project schedule delays.  Experts suggest 
improvements to federal agencies regarding risk assessment methodology, processes, 
communication, and characterization, including specifically articulating subjective 
elements associated with uncertainty (Presidential/Congressional Commission on 
Risk Assessment & Risk Management, 1997; NRC, 1983; EPA, 2000; EPA, 2003; 
NRC, 1994; NRC, 2008).  Unfortunately, adoption of these suggestions remains 




The repeated reviews of risk engineering assessment methods, 
implementation, practice, and skill within federal agencies motivates studying risk 
assessment processes utilized within six large, complex projects.  High-impact, low-
frequency hazards associated with these projects contributed to their selection for 
analysis.   
1.3 Purpose of the Study & Research Questions 
A valuable risk assessment informs complex decision-making.  
Communication and perceptions associated with assessing complex hazards impact 
decision making.  Neglecting communication and perception management is 
analogous to solving half the problem.  This study shows the connection between risk 
assessment processes and decision-making value for six large projects.  Including risk 
communication management and perception management into the assessment process 
improves decision-making value.   
Connecting original decisions to the initial risk assessment determines the 
initial value.  The original risk assessment and associated risk management decisions 
are referenced by the term “initial conditions” in the context of this research.  The 
initial conditions reflect whether the project risk assessment informs decision-making.  
Experts suggest iterating the project risk assessment serves to improve decision-
making, with the caveat that the problem is articulated correctly at the outset (NRC, 
1994; NRC, 2008). 
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1.4 Case Study Approach 
Studying risk assessment approaches among diverse projects led to 
examination of the changes.  Evaluating risk assessment changes, and the associated 
decision changes, led to selecting the case study research method.  The case study 
enables a reflective, historical comparison between varieties of risk assessment 
approaches.  The common processes in the cases include risk assessment iterations, 
subsequent independent evaluation and feedback of each iteration, and whether the 
updated risk assessment incorporated the recommendations, capturing stakeholder 
perceptions and communicated the risk assessment and analysis appropriately. 
The research articulates the risk assessment approach for six large, complex 
projects.  Each approach aligns to established risk assessment practice in varying 
degrees.  Alignment to a process determined whether the approach informed initial 
decision-making for the project, establishing decision-making value of each 
approach.  Table 1 Chronological Risk Assessment Reports chronologically lists the 
risk assessment processes germane to this study.  Evaluating iterations of each project 
risk assessment, and whether the iterations incorporated reviewer feedback 
establishes risk assessment value.  Development of a Risk Perception Management 
(RPM) plan involves establishing a risk perception register to capture stakeholders’ 
perceptions associated with the hazards, increasing risk assessment decision-making 
value. 
 
Date Title Author/Publisher Objective 





Approach to Risk 
Analysis 
risk assessment approach and 
capability; review the feasibility of 
an agency-wide risk assessment 
practice; and recommended risk 
assessments improvements. 
2008 Science and Decisions NRC Update to the 1983 Red Book  
2000 Risk Characterization 
Handbook 
EPA Articulated the qualities of good 
risk characterization:  Transparent 
process, resulting in Clear, 
Consistent and Reasonable 
(TCCR) assessments informing 
policy. 




Commission on Risk 
Assessment and Risk 
Management 
Broadened the definition of risk 
management.  Articulated an 
iterative six-step framework for 
risk management 
1996 Understanding Risk:  
Informing Decisions in 
a Democratic Society 
NRC Recommended an analytical-
deliberative risk characterization 
process  
1994 Science and Judgment 
in Risk Assessment 
NRC Balanced, critical analysis of EPA 
and the risk assessment methods 
inconsistently employed across the 
agency.   
1993 Issues in Risk 
Assessment  
NRC Studied carcinogenic assessment 
and also a conceptual framework 
of ecological risk assessment. 
1992 Framework for 
Ecological Risk 
Assessment 
EPA Similar to the ecological risk 
assessment framework in NRC 
1993 with definitions and 
terminology differences. 
1989 Improving Risk 
Communication 
NRC Discussed risk communication 
processes, messages, and 
improvements for communication.  
1983 Risk Assessment in the 
Federal Government: 
Managing the Process 
NRC The Red Book outlined a four-step 
process for assessing health risks. 
Table 1 Chronological Risk Assessment Reports 
 Review of the Literature Chapter 2:
The risk engineering analysis process within the federal government spans 
years of time and thousands of scholarly pieces contained within hundreds of 
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publications.  Simply searching the risk engineering assessment literature returns tens 
of thousands of opportunities for study.  The sheer magnitude of the literature 
suggests the depth and breadth of the risk engineering assessment field.  The literature 
encompasses human health, environmental, ecological, infrastructural, natural, and 
man-made hazards across engineering, biological, societal and a litany of other fields.  
Risk engineering assessment literature relative to large, complex projects within the 
federal government bounds this study.  The literature reviewed here illuminates the 
risk engineering assessment approach and risk analysis processes within federal 
agencies relative to large projects.   
Passed in 1970, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) established 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and required EPA to conduct an 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for carcinogenic hazards to human or 
environmental health (EPA, 1970).  In the decades since 1970, the practice of 
developing an EIS expanded across other agencies.  Current EIS development occurs 
in a variety of contexts describing a litany of hazards and their potential impacts 
across federal agencies.  Each agency employs varying depths of risk analysis, 
assessment and management skills for making decisions under uncertainty.  The 
resulting risk analyses differ widely across agencies.    
2.1 Definitions 
Risk assessment practice contains terms of art:  risk, uncertainty, probability, 
and risk assessment.  These terms require defining because engineers misinterpret the 
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definitions.  Misunderstanding the terms of art contributes to issues within risk 
assessment. 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “risk” as both a noun and verb.  
Oxford defines the noun as the “possibility of loss, injury, or other adverse or 
unwelcome circumstance”, and “chance or situation involving such a possibility” 
(Oxford University Press, 2013).  The authoritative English language resource 
couples a hazard with its associated probability of occurrence.  Oxford leaves little 
room for capturing the uncertainty associated with the probability of a hazard’s 
occurrence.   
Turning again to Oxford for the definitions of “uncertainty” and “probability” 
further illuminates the problem associated with risk assessment practice.  Oxford 
defines uncertainty as, “The quality of being uncertain in respect of duration, 
continuance, occurrence, etc.; liability to chance or accident. Also, the quality of 
being indeterminate as to magnitude or value; the amount of variation in a numerical 
result that is consistent with observation” (Oxford University Press, 2013).  
According to Oxford, understanding the concept of uncertainty is connected to the 
frequentist view of risk assessment.  Few project stakeholders have motivation to 
count the observed occurrence of levee breaches, pathogen releases, hurricanes, or 
terrorist attacks.   
Oxford defines probability as “the property or fact of being probable, esp. of 
being uncertain but more likely than not; the extent to which something is likely to 
happen or be the case; the appearance of truth, or likelihood of being realized, which 
a statement or event bears in the light of present evidence” (Oxford University Press, 
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2013).  Further, Oxford provides the familiar definition of probability, “Math. As a 
measurable quantity: the extent to which a particular event is likely to occur, or a 
particular situation be the case, as measured by the relative frequency of occurrence 
of events of the same kind in the whole course of experience, and expressed by a 
number between 0 and 1” (Oxford University Press, 2013).  Oxford describes the 
probability of an event as a measurable quantity.  The connection between a 
probability and its likelihood is referred to as obsolete in Oxford’s definition.  
Referring to Oxford as a guide for risk assessment practice, therefore, the term 
“likelihood” should be avoided.  
Probability contains associated variation.  Oxford defines “variability”, “1. 
The fact or quality of being variable in some respect; tendency towards, capacity for 
variation, or change. 2. spec. a.The fact of, or capacity for, varying in amount, 
magnitude, or value. b. Biol. Capability in plants or animals in variation or deviation 
from a type.”  Risk assessment practice utilizes the definition of 2.a. with respect to 
variability of the probability associated with a hazard’s occurrence. 
The authority of the English language circularly references probability to its 
likelihood, without considering connecting uncertainty and probability.  The missing 
defined connection between uncertainty and probability, coupled with the obsolete 
connection between probability and likelihood, contributes to misunderstanding of 
risk engineering analysis among experts, practitioners, project stakeholders, and the 
public community.   
Hazards and their associated probabilities contain uncertainty regarding the 
probability.  Practitioners struggle to understand differences between variability and 
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uncertainty associated with hazard probability.  Experts understand these concepts a 
little more.  Risk managers’ limitations in understanding these concepts complicate 
selecting options.  Hazard complexity further limits understanding.  Complete 
understanding the probability of a hazard’s occurrence coupled with the associated 
uncertainty and variability supports informed project decisions. 
Definitions as Terms of Art (NRC, 1993; NRC, 1983; NRC, 2008; NRC, 
1994): 
1. Risk Engineering Process – the objective or subjective methods 
undertaken to identify and assess hazards, quantify the associated 
impacts, and describe mitigation options. 
2. Risk Assessment – technical analysis of hazard probability, usually in 
estimated as a frequency, percentage, or probability between 0 and 1, 
and the associated hazards impacts.  Risk Assessment should include 
uncertainty and variability of the assessment quantities. 
3. Risk Management – process of decision-making among the variety of 
hazards mitigation options. 
4. Aleatory Uncertainty – statistical probability associated with a 
hazard’s occurrence, valid for high-frequency hazards and large 
sample sizes 
5. Epistemic Uncertainty – degree of belief regarding the probability 
associated with a hazard’s occurrence, especially associated with low-
frequency hazards 
6. Variability – the range associated with a frequency or probability 
2.2 Genesis of Risk Assessment within Federal Agencies 
In 1962 Rachel Carson authored the book Silent Spring, gaining recognition as 
a catalyst for raising public awareness regarding environmental hazards (Carson, 
1962).  In 1970 the Clean Air Act was passed, followed by the Clean Water Act two 
years later (EPA, 2014; EPA, 2014).  EPA published risk assessment frameworks for 
hazardous environmental sites, water, air, and chemicals (EPA, 1987; EPA, 1989; 
EPA, 1992; EPA, 2000; EPA, 2003; EPA, 2004a).  As a result, during the 1970’s 
11 
 
awareness regarding carcinogenic human health hazards, air and water environmental 
hazards, and potential hazards within product and food supply chains increased.   
The practice of engineering risk assessment has its roots in Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (PRA) originally developed by NASA during the Apollo space program, 
after the fire in January 1967 which killed three astronauts (Bedford & Cooke, 2001).  
The roots of risk assessment practice originate within three contentious hazard 
sources:  nuclear reactor safety; air pollution and ozone depletion (Morgan, Henrion, 
& Small, 1990).     
 Nuclear Reactor Safety 2.2.1
The initial public application of PRA occurred within the nuclear industry to 
assess nuclear power plant safety.  The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission asked 
Norman C. Rasmussen, an MIT nuclear engineering professor, to assess the safety of 
light-water reactors.  Dr. Rasmussen and a team of approximately 60 experts used 
event fault trees to develop reactor failure event sequences for two types of 
commercially available reactors.  The probabilities of the log-normal distributions 
were estimated using stochastic simulation.  The modeled consequences overlooked 
the inherent uncertainty within the models and assessment process.  The resulting 
report became known as Wash-1400. 
The scientific community of the mid-1970’s reviewed the release of the 
Wash-1400 reactor safety study in 1975 study both favorably and critically (USNRC, 
1975; Bedford & Cooke, 2001; Morgan, Henrion, & Small, 1990).  Bedford and 
Cooke (2001) describe the reception of the study as “turbulent” within the scientific 
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community.  EPA, the Union of Concerned Scientists, and other experts extensively 
reviewed the final draft, leading many scientists of the mid-1970’s to publicly 
discount the application of PRA practice, and to question modeling uncertainty 
associated human behavior choices in the event of an accident (Bedford & Cooke, 
2001).  In 1975, Professor Harold Lewis led the American Physical Study of Wash-
1400, questioning the validity of absolute probabilities in the report, and suggesting 
research into PRA methods (Morgan, Henrion, & Small, 1990).  The Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission assessed Wash-1400 as an unreliable predictor of a reactor 
accident (Bedford & Cooke, 2001).   
In 1977 Congress established a panel of nuclear experts, also led by Dr. 
Lewis, to review the study.  The panel’s report balanced validation of PRA practice 
against deficient treatment of probabilities within the Wash-1400 report.  The 
resulting analysis concluded understatement of the uncertainty, and endorsed 
subjective probability methods contained within Wash-1400 (Bedford & Cooke, 
2001).   
Development of Wash-1400 as the authoritative source for PRA origination 
occurred over several years.  Wash-1400 contributed to the application of risk 
assessment process within regulation of the nuclear industry.  Additionally, Wash-
1400 laid the foundation for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to develop 
probabilistic safety objectives and safety goals which have continued to be utilized as 
practice of assessing U.S. nuclear power plants.  Interestingly, in 1980, Dr. Lewis 
reported the root causes of the Three Mile Island accident were originally predicted 
within Wash-1400 PRA:  human error, small accidental coolant losses, and transients 
13 
 
(Morgan, Henrion, & Small, 1990).  The missing piece remains the inclusion of 
human uncertainty within the quantitative analyses (Bedford & Cooke, 2001). 
 Air Pollution 2.2.2
The Clean Air Act required the U.S. EPA to set and update standards for the 
quality of clean air, including setting criteria for air pollutants (Morgan, Henrion, & 
Small, 1990).  EPA’s original approach to compliance with the Act involved agency 
personnel reviewing the applicable literature within atmospheric and biological 
arenas and applying a “seat-of-the-pants” approach to make judgments about complex 
health issues (Morgan, Henrion, & Small, 1990, p. 9).  Extending the approach to 
include expert elicitation regarding uncertainty resulted in controversy of 
questionable science associated with assessing pollution hazards (Morgan, Henrion, 
& Small, 1990).  
Therefore, EPA established the Committee on Health Risk Assessment charged 
with developing an appropriate approach for air quality assessment.  The resulting 
approach included expert elicitation developed by experts through contract work.  
EPA avoiding applying expert elicitation to policy decisions, instead using the 
approach to revise the assessment for airborne lead.  EPA submitted the resulting 
assessment for review to the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee.  Favorable 
review by the Committee enabled EPA to move forward with ozone risk assessment, 
although in smaller steps and at a slower pace.  EPA maintains a backlog of 
assessments regarding air pollutants due to the controversy associated with subjective 
expert judgment (Morgan, Henrion, & Small, 1990).   
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 Ozone and Chlorofluorocarbons 2.2.3
Ozone is a thin layer within the stratosphere which protects the earth from the 
sun’s ultraviolet radiation.   The National Academy of Sciences repeatedly studied the 
impact F-11 and F-12 chlorofluorocarbons have on ozone.  These studies contain 
uncertainties associated with atmospheric transport, chemistry and loss volume; loss 
rates; and relationships between UV radiation and its biological effects.  A 1979 study 
provided specific percentage numbers regarding the uncertainty, which many 
scientists question.  The scientific community evaluating the 1979 report, and 
subsequent follow-up reports, point to iteratively examining the uncertainties 
associated with an evolving understanding of a complex problem. 
2.3 Historical Successes, Failures, and Suggested Improvements 
Risk assessment processes are inconsistent in federal agencies.  In 1994, an 
NRC committee was unable to agree upon specific recommendations regarding 
principles or practices for EPA.  The committee recommended the agency consider 
providing both quantitative and qualitative risk characterizations in verbal and 
mathematical forms (NRC, 1994).  Further, the committee avoided recommending 
baseline risk assessment principles on which to base assessments.  The experts 
suggested the process depended upon policy judgments, referring the agency to utilize 
the policy process to develop risk assessments.   
The committee included other conflicting process suggestions, offering 
“plausible conservatism” to bridge understanding gaps, and the counter suggestion 
that risk assessments reflect current scientific understanding (McClellan & North, 
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1994; Finkel, 1993).  The Committee articulated: “Model uncertainties result from an 
inability to determine which scientific theory is correct or what assumptions should 
be used to derive risk estimates”, indicating inability to reach consensus regarding 
appropriate risk assessment practice (NRC, 1994, p. 83). 
In the absence of expert suggestions for consistent practice EPA developed 
risk assessment processes for health risks, pollution risks, cancer risks, ecologic risks 
and Superfund cleanup risks (EPA, 1992; EPA, 2004a; EPA, 1989; EPA, 2000).  
Thus, EPA became the de facto leader within the federal government singularly 
focused on the quantification of the probabilities and characterization of hazards 
(Goldman, 2003).   
A risk assessment is defined as informative when the analysis provides value 
for making decisions, and the value can be verified (NRC, 1993; NRC, 1994; NRC, 
2008).  Risk assessment practice provided little confidence that the process informed 
the decisions at hand.  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was encouraged 
to increase agency staff expertise (NRC, 2008b; NRC, 2010c).  Two independent 
NRC review committees published critical reviews of the risk assessment DHS and 
the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) contracted regarding the National Bio- 
and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) in Kansas (NRC, 2010b; NRC, 2012).  EPA 
published multiple risk assessment and risk characterization processes for 
environmental and toxicological hazards (EPA, 1989; EPA, 1992; EPA, 2000; EPA, 
2003; EPA, 2004a).  Risk assessment practice in federal agencies remains fragmented 
for carcinogens, pollutants and other human health hazards (NRC, 1994; Morgan, 
Henrion, & Small, 1990). 
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The need for quantitative analysis is pervasive in environmental risk 
assessment (EPA, 1987; EPA, 1989; EPA, 1992; EPA, 2004a).   Experts maintain a 
critical reliance upon valid data to develop risk assessments from a frequency 
approach (Burke, 2003).  Reliance upon data leaves little room for inclusion of risk 
assessment practice employing subjective methods.  Subjective risk assessments are 
useful for infrequent hazards without historical record.  
Recommendations to federal agencies regarding risk assessment include 
qualitative analysis, expert judgment, and policy trade-off analysis (Hattis & Goble, 
2003; NRC, 1994).  According to Hattis and Goble (2003) policy trade-off analysis 
refers to comprehensive comparison of the effects of each regulatory choice and its 
potential outcome. 
Risk assessment is extensively applied throughout federal agencies, although 
academic risk assessment process research has been limited in its development.  Risk 
assessment process regarding alternative methods for quantifying probability resulted 
in misalignment, because assessments failed to address the issue at hand (NRC, 2008; 
McClellan & North, 1994; Machina, 1990).   
Lack of data was originally postulated as the primary issue within risk 
assessments (NRC, 1983).  Today, incomplete treatment of uncertainty associated 
with risk assessment stands out as the overarching inconsistency across federal 
agencies (Mirer, 2003; Morgan, Henrion, & Small, 1990). 
Limited understanding contributes to the problems associated with quantification 
of hazard probability and its associated uncertainty. Morgan and Henrion (1990) 
argue that objective uncertainties often tend toward overconfidence.  They equate the 
17 
 
tendency toward overconfidence with subjective judgment, with equivalent 
credibility.  As elements of making decisions and assessing risks, these underlying 
tendencies rarely surface in the assessment and risk management planning, thus 
leading to a suboptimal outcome (Hoch, Kunreuther, & Gunther, 2001).    
The data used within federal agencies to inform decisions should align with 
the decision at hand (McClellan and North 1994; NRC 1983; NRC 2008).   In 
practice, limited data available associated with an infrequent hazard can be shown to 
point to a particular desired decision, referred to by Morgan and Henrion as reverse 
analysis (Morgan, Henrion, & Small, 1990).  In academic circles, limited data 
regarding infrequent hazards often cannot be independently validated and repeated, 
thus reducing the decision-making value of a risk assessment, resulting in experts’ 
reliance upon judgment (EPA, 2003; Anderson, 2003; NRC, 1993).  Depending upon 
judgment under uncertainty often creates consternation, churn, and evasiveness in 
decision-making, resulting in less robust decisions.  Many risk assessment process 
approaches follow linear steps outlined in the 1983 Red Book (NRC, 1983).  
Modifying the process from a linear approach to iterative deliberation among 
stakeholders contributes to increased risk assessment value (NRC, 2008; 
Presidential/Congressionall Commission on Risk Assessment & Risk Management, 
1997).  Iteratively describing the problem, including stakeholder perceptions and 
judgments, and assumptions, increases risk assessment value for making decisions 
(Hoch, Kunreuther, & Gunther, 2001). 
Originally described as an assessment of a hazard, a risk in the current 
complex environment of overlapping, integrated multi-disciplinary systems is 
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frequently over-, or worse, understated (USNRC, 1975; Crump, 2003; EPA, 2003; 
NRC, 1993; NRC, 2007; NRC, 2008).  Decision makers often want as much data as 
can be mined, neglecting the important effort of initial problem articulation.  Data 
mining leads to analysis paralysis, referencing the repeated search for more data.  
Thus the assessment provides little value to aid decisions (Machina, 1990; NRC, 
2008).  Data gathering, interpretation, and communication exercises employed to 
develop comprehensive risk assessments often lengthen projects, add unnecessarily to 
project costs, and, in many cases, are rarely revisited for verification purposes.  
Iteratively articulating the problem and potential alternatives and options, with all the 
stakeholders included, potentially reduces the costs and duration of conducting the 
risk assessment.  In addition to technically assessing risks, capturing stakeholders’ 
perceptions adds to assessment value (Kleindorfer, Kunreuther, & Schoemaker, 
1993).   
The risk assessment process should result in straightforward probabilities of 
the hazard(s) to improve understanding within the stakeholders and decision makers.   
Low-frequency, high impact risks quantified as minute numbers remain abstract and 
nebulous to most people (Hoch, Kunreuther, & Gunther, 2001). 
With a goal of delivering a quantifiable risk assessment, the specific risk 
probability value, unfortunately, too often becomes the focus.  To be useful, the risk 
assessment should address the problem, provided the problem is well-articulated from 
the beginning of the process.  In today’s climate of cross-functional, multi-
disciplinary risk engineering science and assessment methodology, the NRC 
recommends iteration of the assessment of project hazards, with a goal of useful 
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decision-making and participation from all the stakeholders (NRC, 1993; NRC, 
2008).  The strength of the assessment, and its value for making decisions, often 
depends upon the openness of the agency to include all stakeholders across agencies 
with the goal of achieving stakeholder satisfaction and a valuable assessment (Finkel, 
1993; De Rosa & Hansen, 2003).   
2.4 The Red Book 
In 1970 the federal government established the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA, 1970).  Simultaneously, the National Environmental Protection Act 
(NEPA) required an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for all federal projects 
which could impact the environment.  Few federal capital projects avoid impacting 
the human environment, thus federal agencies are required to conduct EIS’s for 
projects before the project proceeds (Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk 
Assessment & Risk Management, 1997).   
Each agency developed EIS assessment methods.  In the early 1980’s, 
confusing agency EIS methods prompted EPA to request the National Research 
Council (NRC) convene a committee of experts to develop a consistent method.  The 
result was published in 1983.  Titled Risk Assessment in the Federal Government:  
Managing the Process the publication became known as the Red Book (NRC, 1983).   
The Red Book offered a four-step risk assessment process model.  
Additionally, the committee authors articulated the conceptual separation of risk 
analysis from risk management, and suggested the inclusion of “inference guidelines” 
to bridge gaps between available scientific data and subjective judgment of the 
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associated risk (NRC, 1983).  Originally intended for cancerous hazards, the risk 
assessment process outlined in the Red Book has been adopted to varying degrees 
across federal agencies for assessing natural, ecological, environmental and in more 
recent years, terroristic hazards (EPA, 1987; NRC, 1994; NRC, 1996; NRC, 2008b; 
NRC, 2010c). 
The Red Book articulated a four-step process of (1) identifying potential 
hazards, (2) quantifying the relationship between a potential dose of the hazard and 
the probability of an adverse effect (response), (3) quantifying potential exposures to 
the hazard, and (4) characterizing the associated risks of each dose-response/exposure 
scenario (NRC, 1983).  Articulated in four steps, the Red Book process is: 
1. Hazard Identification 
2. Dose-Response Assessment 
3. Exposure Assessment 
4. Risk Characterization 
  
An overarching concept within the Red Book is the conceptual separation of 
risk assessment and risk management (Davies C. J., 2003; Mirer, 2003; North, 2003; 
NRC, 1983).  The NRC panel advocated the separation to avoid influencing the risk 
management options.  As a result, EPA and other agencies developed organizational 
separations between assessment and management functions.  The organizational 
separation between risk analysts and risk managers contributes to a communication 
gap, to the detriment of informing the process of decisions (GAO, 2009; EPA, 2000; 
Goldstein, 2003).   
The Red Book identified the lack of data as the largest gap in risk analysis 
practice, a prevalent issue today (Anderson, 2003; Finkel, 1993; Machina, 1990; 
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NRC, 1983).  Since 1983, several expert committees articulated updated risk 
assessment processes based upon the Red Book process, including subjective 
judgment considerations (EPA, 2000; NRC, 1994; NRC, 2008; 
Presidential/Congressionall Commission on Risk Assessment & Risk Management, 
1997). 
According to the original authors of the Red Book, the primary problem with 
risk assessment was the absence of data (NRC, 1983).  The Red Book authors 
suggested using “inference defaults” to bridge the data gap with subjective expert 
judgment (NRC, 1983).   This issue continues today (NRC, 2012; NRC, 2008).  
Ancillary problems associated with lack of data are analysis paralysis (NRC, 2008; 
NRC, 1994; EPA 2000); trying to obtain a singular, granular risk number (NRC, 
2012; NRC, 2008b; NRC, 2008; NRC, 2010c); lack of proper risk analysis planning 
and insuring the risk analysis addresses the questions appropriately (NRC, 1994; 
NRC, 2008).  Quantitative statistical analysis using the four steps outlined in the Red 
Book remains the standard of treatment for environmental assessments, although data 
availability remains a challenge.  
 Evolution of the Red Book process 2.4.1
The process outlined in the Red Book was adopted by many agencies to assess 
a variety of risks, including sociopolitical risk, ecologic risk, environmental risk, 
neurotoxicity risks and occupational hazards (Omenn, 2003; Slovic, 2003; Landis, 
2003; Walker Jr., 2003; Wassell, 2003).  The four-step process of the Red Book 
remains the standard for comprehensive risk assessment across federal agencies, 
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although implemented to varying degrees of sophistication (Burke, 2003; De Rosa & 
Hansen, 2003; EPA, 2003; NRC, 2008b; NRC, 2011; NRC, 1989).  
 Today the Red Book process within federal agencies depends upon the risk 
assessment resources and skills within each agency.  For example, EPA has focused 
on hazards assessed with the skills of the staff available, leaving larger issues 
unaddressed (Weisburger, 2003).  In other agencies, the Red Book is limited to a 
sociopolitical policy selection methodology, with little use for developing technical 
risk assessments (Slovic, 2003).  In agencies charged with protection of human health 
the Red Book framework is utilized to varying degrees (Burke, 2003; EPA , 2002; 
EPA, 1989).  Whether the original Red Book authors intended, other agencies have 
expanded using the Red Book process, looking to EPA as the leader in utilization and 
development of risk assessments (Doull, 2003; Landis, 2003; Burke, 2003; Walker 
Jr., 2003; Wassell, 2003).   
 Red Book Practice Across Agencies  2.4.2
The Bureau of Reclamation developed an agency-specific unique risk 
assessment process with respect to definitions, process and interpretation (Bureau of 
Reclamation, 2011).  The Reclamation risk assessment process differs from the Red 
Book, using standard terms of art and an alternative methodology.  The Reclamation 
risk assessment process is suited for low-frequency, high impact hazards associated 
with dams and levees falling under the agency’s purview.   
Reclamation wisely suggests a cross-disciplinary expert team develop the list 
of potential failure modes.  The bureau further suggests a seasoned engineer serve as 
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the facilitator for articulating failure modes and assessing risks (Bureau of 
Reclamation, 2012).  Limiting the facilitator role to an engineer assumes engineers 
are united to the risk assessment and subsequent risk management effort. 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) risk assessment practice has 
come under recent scrutiny.  DHS risk assessment skills lack maturity and expertise, 
relying heavily upon unfounded quantification of probability, and little treatment of 
associated uncertainty (GAO, 2009; NRC, 2008b; NRC, 2010c). 
As experts recognized risk assessment issues extend beyond a lack of data, 
updates to the original Red Book framework have been proposed, including a place 
for judgment (EPA , 2002; EPA, 2003; NRC, 1994).  EPA suggested Transparent, 
Clear, Concise, Relevant (TCCR) risk characterization (EPA, 2000).  Other experts 
suggested an iterative, overlapping framework for dynamically assessing risks 
(Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment & Risk Management, 
1997).  In 2008, an NRC committee of experts suggested updating the Red Book 
process to include iterating risk assessments to validate the assessment’s decision-
making value (NRC, 2008). 
 Red Book 2008 Update 2.4.3
The original Red Book risk assessment process was expanded and modified in 
2008, titled Science and Decisions: Advancing Risk Assessment (NRC, 2008).  
Intending to strengthen the risk assessment process, the NRC recommended 
improving the original Red Book process to include all the stakeholders, articulate the 
24 
 
problem prior to assessing the hazards, and verify early in the process the planned 
assessment addressed the problem (NRC, 2008).   
Selecting a course of action should occur after the assessment has first been 
confirmed as valuable and connected to the hazard.  Process improvement 
suggestions included careful and transparent documentation of models, theories and 
assumptions.  Stakeholders with a rudimentary understanding of the hazards should 
be able to follow the logical process of a transparent risk assessment (NRC, 2008). 
The NRC expert authors suggested iterating three phases of problem 
formulation, assessment planning, and risk management.  The three-phase process 
utilized stakeholder input to verify alignment of the selected project engineering risk 
assessment approach to the decisions at hand (NRC, 2008).  Upheld by multiple NRC 
risk assessment independent review committees, the updated process has been 
referenced as the appropriate risk assessment process standard  (NRC, 2010c; NRC, 
2011b; NRC, 2012).  
Recently agencies utilized the updated Red Book framework, achieving some 
success with their stakeholders (GAO, 2006; NRC, 2011b).  Those who elect to 
ignore the 2008 recommendations do so at the expense of the project (CALFED 
Independent Review Panel, 2008; MWD, 2011; NRC, 2012; GAO, 2009).   
Selecting a course of action should occur after the risk assessment has been 
vetted as useful and the stakeholders weigh the available options.  Determination of a 
valuable risk assessment varies according to the needs of the project, the stakeholders, 
and the problem the assessment is designed to address.  Foregoing a value 
determination of a risk assessment induces the potential of reaching a decision 
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disconnected from the problem.  A good risk assessment process is one which 
includes all the stakeholders throughout and contains the following elements (NRC, 
2008): 
1. A clearly-articulated problem. 
2. A plan to conduct the assessment, including the identification of the 
appropriate levels of uncertainty and variability. 
3. The engineers conduct the risk assessment, per the Red Book four-step 
methodology, including the relative risks and benefits between the decision 
options. 
4. The stakeholders confirm the value of the assessment, including peer review 
alignment to the original plan (see item 2), and capacity to make a selection 
among the available options. 
5. The stakeholders weigh the merits of each option, select an option, and 
develop an appropriate plan for communicating the selected option. 
 
The 2008 updated Red Book process contains a planning phase, an assessment 
phase, and a risk management phase, with an overarching provision for stakeholder 
involvement at all phases and at all stages (NRC, 2008).  As an element of that 
process, the confirmation of the value of the risk assessment is in Phase II.   
Confirming deliverables meet requirements reflects common project 
management practice.  Figure 1 Error! Reference source not found.shows a 
flowchart suggesting modification of the 2008 process to include stakeholder risk 
perceptions within the risk assessment process.  Including stakeholder risk 
perceptions increases risk assessment value for decision-making (Fischhoff & 
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Kadvany, 2011; Hoch, Kunreuther, & Gunther, 2001).
 
Figure 1 Flowchart of Iterative Red Book Process 
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This updated risk assessment methodology strengthens the original 1983 Red 
Book process in several ways (NRC, 2008; NRC, 1994).  Including quantification of 
the uncertainty and variability is required (NRC, 2008; Morgan, Henrion, & Small, 
1990).  Iteration of the options is recommended (EPA, 2003; 
Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment & Risk Management, 
1997).  The problem requiring a risk assessment should be clearly articulated at the 
outset (NRC, 2008; Bedford & Cooke, 2001; Morgan, Henrion, & Small, 1990).  
Assessment of the relative risks should be the focus, instead of a singular risk 
probability value, percentage or quantity (Bedford & Cooke, 2001; Morgan, Henrion, 
& Small, 1990) .     
Given the cross-disciplinary complex nature of the sciences within hazard 
assessment, the 2008 process update suggests closing the data gap through 
identification of uncertainty, variability, and conducting sensitivity analyses (NRC, 
2008).  Accounting for changes in uncertainty and variability originate from a variety 
of backgrounds, including game theory, decision science, Bayesian theory, and other 
more recently developed disciplines (Bedford & Cooke, 2001).  Although advances 
within computing capacity, technical expertise, and project management practice, risk 
assessment practice continues in isolation, providing little value for large, complex 
projects with impactful, low frequency risks (Hoch, Kunreuther, & Gunther, 2001).   
2.5 Engineering Risk Assessment Development within Federal Agencies 
 In parallel with the expansion of the utilization and application of the Red 
Book methodology throughout the EPA, the application of the risk assessment 
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framework and process expanded into other scientific areas, as well as into other 
federal agencies.  Morgan and Henrion (1990) provide an informative summary of the 
genesis of risk assessment and its evolution within policy research and policy 
analysis, starting with practical applications by Howard at Stanford and Raiffa at 
Harvard during the 1960’s across a broad range of areas such as seeding hurricanes, 
oil wildcatting, biocontamination of Mars by spacecraft, and risk of wildfires in the 
Santa Monica Mountains (Morgan, Henrion, & Small, 1990).  The early work by 
Howard and Raiffa led to the expansion of decision science, and specifically 
treatment of uncertainty, into theoretical as well as practical arenas.  Many privately-
held and corporate firms employ analytical decision making methods into the 
development of corporate strategic initiatives and planning.    
In addition to EPA, federal agencies such as the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (USNRC), Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), and others, regularly include treatments of uncertainty in risk 
assessments, although the degrees of completeness and specificity vary widely 
(Morgan, Henrion, & Small, 1990; Signature Science, LLC, 2012; DOE, July 2002).   
Risk assessment practice has spread across federal agencies in more recent 
decades.  Originally developed and established as fault-tree and event-tree analysis 
within the nuclear industry in the Wash-1400 report, the science of risk assessment 
evolved to include environmental, weather, human-health, animal health, and other 
hazards using multiple models and methods across a variety of scientific and social 
disciplines (USNRC, 1975; Dourson & Patterson, 2003; EPA, 2003; EPA, 1992; 
Hoch, Kunreuther, & Gunther, 2001; Fischhoff & Kadvany, 2011).   
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As complexity of the hazards increased, the expertise available within federal 
agencies to assess the risks and provide uncertainty estimates remained inconsistent 
(Burke, 2003; Davies J. C., 1993; GAO, 2006; Johnson B. L., 2003; NRC, 2008b).  
The Red Book articulated a conceptual separation between risk assessment and risk 
management, although the decision-making processes within federal agencies for 
complex large projects often remains incomplete due to organizational separation 
(Landy, Roberts, Thomas, & Nazar, 1990; NRC, 1993; North, 2003; NRC, 2012).  
The suggested conceptual separation between risk assessment and risk analysis within many 
federal agencies remains cavernous.   
Hundreds of compounds remain on the assessment list within EPA (Mirer, 
2003).  The planned medical research facilities at Fort Detrick, MD and the initial risk 
assessment for the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories (NEIDL) in 
Boston were action/no-action assessments (NRC, 2011; NIH (RWDI West, Inc.), 
2005).  The risk assessments of the NBAF in Manhattan, KS provided little value 
regarding going forward with construction (NRC, 2010; NRC, 2012). 
2.6 Current Practice 
Today the practice of risk engineering analysis spans the gamut of scientific 
disciplines within engineering, decision and social sciences, business and 
management science, environmental and ecological science, and biological science.  
Many methods of conducting engineering risk assessments have been developed in 
the decades since Wash-1400 (Bedford & Cooke, 2001; Winkler, 2003).  
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The origins of risk assessment combine 40-plus years of scientists and 
engineers asking fundamental questions:  What are the potential hazards?  What is the 
likelihood of the hazard actually occurring?  These are often extended into the risk 
management questions:  Proactively, what plans are we going to put in place to 
prevent a hazard from occurring?  What mitigations should be employed if a hazard 
occurs?  Growth in the complexity of federal projects has expanded the risk analysis 
of large, complex, high-impact, and low-frequency hazards to include questions such 
as:  Is the problem completely and clearly articulated?  Are all the stakeholders at the 
table and involved in the decision process?  What are the best decisions and how 
should managers decide?  The additional complexity has given rise to the field of 
decision science and generated the study of the human decision-making process 
within the social sciences (Fischhoff & Kadvany, 2011; Hoch, Kunreuther, & 
Gunther, 2001). 
The social scientists define decision selection process issues associated with 
underestimating probability called “anchoring bias” (Kleindorfer, Kunreuther, & 
Schoemaker, 1993).  In 1974 Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated the anchoring 
bias when they asked two different groups of high school students to compute a 
product in ascending and descending order.  One group computed 1 x 2 x 3 x…x 7 x 
8. The second group computed the reverse order.  Both groups should have obtained 
40,320.  Instead, the mean guess was 5412 for the ascending computation and 2250 
for the descending computation (Kleindorfer, Kunreuther, & Schoemaker, 1993).  
This difference illustrates an example of cognitive bias impacting the risk assessment 
process, including subjective judgment employed across federal agencies today.   
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Risk assessment process improvements from social science experts includes 
questions into the assessment process such as:  What anchoring biases, organizational 
silos, or hidden agendas are present in the evaluation of the risks?  How does the 
assessment account for the different frames of reference among the stakeholders?  
How are stakeholders’ perceptions changed throughout the risk assessment process? 
Addressing these recent questions suggests the inclusion of experts from other fields 
into the engineering risk assessment process (Hoch, Kunreuther, & Gunther, 2001; 
Kleindorfer, Kunreuther, & Schoemaker, 1993; Bedford & Cooke, 2001; Fischhoff & 
Kadvany, 2011; Landy, Roberts, Thomas, & Nazar, 1990; NRC, 2010; NRC, 2011c; 
NRC, 2010c; NRC, 2003).   
Expanding the risk assessment process to include additional scientific 
perspectives admittedly increases time on the front end of a project schedule, yet as is 
the case in all pre-planning for project execution, potentially reduces the schedule and 
cost overall.  The quantification of the magnitude of this suggested, and expected, 
cost reduction remains as future research.   
Today, the problems remain the same as 30, or even 50, years ago.  Recently 
stakeholders and engineers began to understand the complex nature of potential 
project hazards and associated management options.  Experts consider options outside 
individual siloes of expertise, toward developing extensive engineering risk 
assessments inclusive of all stakeholders.  Developing integrated, iterative risk 
assessments accounting for complexity enables the assessment process to withstand 
litigation, public scrutiny, and most important of all, expert peer review.  The epitome 
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of this inclusive, integrated, iterative type of risk assessment is its use as a model for 
others. 
2.7 Risk Assessment Value 
Although mandated by federal agencies, many risk engineering analyses have 
provided little value for making decisions for many large federal projects (NRC, 
1996; NRC, 1993; NRC, 1989; Burke, 2003; Crump, 2003; Finkel, 1993; Hattis & 
Goble, 2003).  Some assessments however, have proven useful and are considered 
models for other risk analysis efforts.  Although the process consumed ten years, the 
risk assessment of the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory (NEIDL) in 
Boston served as a model for the National Bio-and-Agro Defense Facility (NBAF) 
risk assessments (NRC, 2010b; NRC, 2012).  The Interagency Performance 
Evaluation Task force (IPET) assessment was recognized as a model for the Delta 
Risk Management Strategy (DRMS) risk assessment (CALFED Independent Review 
Panel, 2008; NRC, 2011c).  The National Research Council (NRC) maintains an 
extensive library of critical and also supportive risk engineering reports.  Critical 
reports articulating process gaps and suggesting improvement options outnumber the 
library of analyses held up as process models for other engineering risk assessments.   
Originally presented as a dose-response methodology to assess toxicology 
risks, the four-step risk assessment process articulated in the Red Book remains the 
practice within the federal government.  Many agencies identify the hazards, and use 
technical modeling to provide a quantification of the potential risk associated with the 
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hazard.  Individual agency implementation and maturity varies widely between the 
federal agencies.   
Toward improving the process, the risk assessment framework has been 
extensively reviewed in recent years in the spirit of continuous improvement and 
improving the value of the project risk assessment deliverable.  Risk assessments tend 
to provide a probability number, with little regard to the quantification of the 
associated uncertainty.  Some assessments, as in the case of the initial NEIDL 
assessment, simply return the equivalent of a manufacturing practice “go/no-go” 
decision, a process used globally in manufacturing to assess whether a particular 
product meets its design requirements and thus is ready for consumer consumption  
(Johnson, M.D., 2003; NRC, 2011; NRC, 2010; NRC, 2010).   
 
 Large Federal Projects Involving Complex Decisions Chapter 3:
Establishing value of each final risk assessment deliverable involved 
comparing the initial risk assessment to the final project risk assessment. In this 
research comparison context, the initial hazards and decisions are referred to as 
“initial conditions”, indicating the identified hazards and management decisions the 
assessment was designed to inform.  Stated in question form, the comparison became:  
Does the final risk assessment address the initial hazards?  Does the final risk 
assessment address the initial management decisions?  How are the final management 
decisions different from the initial management decisions?  How is the project 
outcome affected by changes in the risk assessment deliverable?  Risk assessment 
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value in this study stems from process changes and the associated impacts on 
decision-making capability.  
3.1 Selected Cases and Criteria for Selection 
The projects included in this study contained low-frequency, high-impact 
hazards.  Additionally, the selected cases utilized the Red Book risk assessment 
process or the updated 2008 Red Book process (NRC, 1983; NRC, 2008).     
Traditional statistical probability analysis, referred to as frequentist probability 
analysis, is applicable to large sample sizes.  The cases in this study were chosen 
because the projects contain high-impact, low-frequency hazards.  Many experts 
understand traditional statistical analysis is invalid in low-frequency spaces.  Selected 
projects contained hazard probabilities with varying degrees of uncertainty. The 
stakeholders in complex cases are better served when the analysis is designed and 
planned using appropriate methods for the problem at hand (i.e. binary event and fault 
tree analysis; etc.).  Experts suggest including variability and sensitivity analysis 
develops a comprehensive assessment (McClellan & North, 1994; Bedford & Cooke, 
2001; NRC, 2008).  The extensive literature offers assessment methods, including 
Monte Carlo, Bayesian, and other subjective models to assess low-frequency hazards 
(Bedford & Cooke, 2001; Winkler, 2003). 
Table 2 lists six public projects with risk assessments selected for evaluation of 
risk assessment value.  The table lists the date(s) of the risk assessment(s), the project 
title and its geographic location, the public agency responsible for the risk 
assessment, and the selection criteria for inclusion into this study.  Representing the 
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spectrum of public projects which often polarize experts, community stakeholders, 
and the general public, the selected six projects include: 
• Three biosafety level 3 and level 4 laboratories charged with researching 
vaccines for toxic pathogens; 
• Two assessment projects regarding protective levee systems designed to 
provide ecologic and economic health and safety for broad geographic 
areas;	  
• One environmental cleanup Superfund site, the subject of expensive, 
intensive natural resource damages (NRD) litigation extending over 
many years and across state and federal boundaries.	  
 
The extensive literature regarding polarizing, high-risk project assessments provided 
many potential options for inclusion.  Background and controversy associated with 
each project follows the tabular listing. 
	  
Date(s) Project Title Location Agency Selection Criteria 









contamination cleanup due 
to uncontrolled mining 
operations over 100 years.  
Site remediation risk 
analysis published in 2001, 

















Levee system risk analysis 











US Army Expansion of medical 
facility from hospital BSL-2 
laboratory to BSL-4 













Comprehensive risk analysis 
of NOLA levee system 
before, during and after 

















DHS authorized RA of a 
new BSL-4 laboratory to 
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Model RA conducted over 
several years.  BSL-4 
laboratory as response to 
9/11 events.  RA became a 
political, communication, 
and public effort. 
Table 2 Selected Cases 
 National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF):  Background and 3.1.1
Controversy 
3.1.1.1 Background 
After the terroristic events on September 11, 2001, the federal government 
created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) responsible for intercepting, 
understanding and preventing future terrorist attacks (Bush, Presidential Directives, 
2001).  The 2004 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9) authorized 
federal policy development to protect the agriculture and food chains from terrorists.  
Policy included surveillance, tracking, and laboratory infrastructure development for 
preventing and deterring animal and plant disease attacks (Bush, Presidential 
Directives, 2004).   
 Built in the 1950’s, Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), located off 
the New York coast, has been the single location for developing bio- and agro-supply 
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defenses and mitigation efforts against infectious agents, including foot-and-mouth 
disease virus (FMDv) research.  FMDv is the most highly-contagious known animal 
disease, infecting 100% of contaminated animals (GAO, 2008).   
As a result of HSPD-9, DHS assessed PIADC insufficient and outdated for 
continuing research into bio- and ag-terroristic threats, zoonotic diseases, and 
infectious deadly disease vaccines, including FMDv (GAO, 2009).  DHS selected 
Manhattan, Kansas for a new National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) to 
develop vaccines against infectious agro- and bio-diseases and conduct research into 
zoonotic threats, including foot and mouth disease virus (FMDv) research (Federal 
Register, 2009). 
Moving a BSL-4-ag research center from an island location to the mainland 
stirred significant controversy.  The US eradicated FMDv from the mainland in 1929, 
achieving FMDv-free status (GAO, 2008).  The GAO estimated economic losses 
potentially more than $6 billion, based upon 2007 agricultural economic sector.  
Today losses could be higher, as agriculture has expanded during the past seven 
years.  According to the US Farm Bureau, agriculture exports totaled $115 billion 
worldwide in 2010, indicating the US a net agriculture exporter (American Farm 
Bureau Federation, 2014).  Risks associated with DHS conducting FMDv research on 




3.2 Historical Controversy 
Controversy associated with the NBAF project began in 2007 when DHS 
published the NBAF Notice of Intent regarding moving forward to develop an EIS 
and select the NBAF site (GPO, 2007).  The GAO reviewed the EIS, responding with 
a critical assessment questioning DHS capability to safely conduct FMDv research on 
the U.S. mainland, noting the last outbreak of FMDv in 1929 in the U.S., and multiple 
risk analysis gaps regarding modeling, assumptions, and assessment processes (GAO, 
2008; GAO, 2009).  DHS responded, indicating in the Notice of Availability the 
preferred site alternative of Manhattan, KS for the NBAF and the Final EIS (FEIS) 
(DHS, 2008).   
Two Kansas websites contain evidence regarding community polarization 
surrounding the NBAF.  Concerned citizens established a website contesting the 
NBAF plans, and politicians established the website supporting NBAF (Concerned 
Citizens, 2008; State of Kansas, 2009).  Both websites contain compelling localized 
arguments supporting their respective positions.  The development of community-
based websites suggests deeply-held perceptions by supports and detractors, and 
questionable credibility of the EIS.    
Federal and state stakeholders raised comprehensive risk assessment practice and 
safety questions, including whether FMDv research could be conducted as safely on 
the mainland as on an island (GAO, 2008; GAO, 2009).   Kansas stakeholders raised 
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FMDv-specific questions regarding processes to prevent a potential FMDv outbreak, 
establishing a website documenting their concerns (Concerned Citizens, 2008).   
Congress connected releasing NBAF funding to independent NRC review of 
DHS-contracted risk assessments.  In addition to the EIS, DHS delivered two site-
specific risk assessments (SSRA).  Twice NRC experts questioned the technical risk 
assessment skills within each deliverable (NRC, 2010b; NRC, 2012).   
The committee indicated the first SSRA was a “notable first step in an iterative 
process”, identifying multiple significant shortcomings (NRC, 2010, p. 2).  An 
updated SSRA followed the initial SSRA and subsequent NRC review (Signature 
Science, LLC, 2012).   The NRC found similar gaps within the SSRA and the 
subsequent uSSRA regarding technical analyses and modeling methods employed in 
both efforts (Signature Science, LLC, 2012; NRC, 2010b; NRC, 2012).  
NBAF in Chapter 3 contains a comprehensive discussion of the SSRA and 
uSSRA, developing a connection between NBAF assessments, community concerns 
and the risk assessment processes employed.  DHS addressed community concerns 
through development of a “Stakeholder Engagement Plan” specifically to address risk 
communication to the public and critical stakeholders (Signature Science LLC, 2010).    
Other efforts in parallel with NBAF risk assessment suggest NBAF controversy at 
the federal level.  An NRC committee reviewed DHS technical risk assessment 
capability, documenting risk assessment skill gaps within agency staff (NRC, 2010c).  
As recently as fall 2013, the U.S. House of Representatives questioned NBAF safety, 
as well as the project cost (U.S. House of Representatives, 2013).  Throughout the 
NBAF planning phases, questions abounded regarding BSL-4 Ag safety relative to 
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FMDv research and potential release on the mainland, as well as questioning DHS 
risk assessment capability. 
3.3 Current Controversy  
Amid this tenuous controversy, Kansas and Congressional politicians broke 
ground in May 2013 to begin construction of the NBAF utility plant (State of Kansas, 
2009).  In fall 2013, the US House removed $400 million in NBAF funding from the 
budget (U.S. House of Representatives, 2013).  However, in January 2014, 
Representative Hal Rogers, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, 
restored $400 million into the federal budget for NBAF construction (U.S. House of 
Representatives, 2014).  
 NEIDL: Background and Controversy 3.3.1
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) biodefense research agenda expanded 
in the wake of September 11, 2001 events.  A division of NIH, the National Institute 
of Allergy and Infectious Diseases’ (NIAID) assessed the need for national 
laboratories to develop new methods of treating, preventing, and diagnosing a variety 
of bacterial and viral diseases which could be used as bioterrorist pathogens. Diseases 
and pathogens to be studied include viruses (e.g., Ebola, Marburg, dengue fever, 
Lassa fever, and highly pathogenic influenza) and bacteria (e.g., Shigella and plague). 
In 2003, the NIH awarded a $128 million grant to Boston University and the Boston 
University Medical Center to design and build the National Emerging Infectious 
Diseases Laboratories (NEIDL) facility designated to address biodefense research 
(NIH, 2003; NRC, 2007).    
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The NEIDL facility includes a biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) containment 
laboratory housed in a 192,000 square foot building. The BSL-4 laboratory has been 
the primary source of community controversy associated with the facility, although 
the footprint of the BSL-4 space reflects 13 percent of the building (NRC, 2011b).  
Contributing the controversy, the facility location in Boston’s South End is an 
environmental justice community (NRC, 2011b).  In addition to extensive public 
meetings regarding the facility operational safety and NIMBY syndrome, three legal 
actions challenged the project. 
NEIDL involves a complex timeline of community concerns, NIH risk 
assessments, and lawsuits.  According to the Boston Bar Association, approvals from 
the City of Boston and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts were granted in fall 
2004, without full disclosure from BU regarding three lab workers infected with 
tularemia.  The two-week delay from October 29 to November 9 between tularemia 
infection and state health department notification violated state laws.  The Boston 
Redevelopment Authority (BRA) also violated state laws when they transferred the 
land to BU in December 2004 without an appropriate finding under Section 61 of the 
state environmental statute (Boston Bar Association, 2014).  Learning about the 
tularemia infection in January 2005, and the land transfer without following MEPA 
guidelines, led to the first lawsuit Ten Residents vs. BRA.   A civil rights complaint 
was filed in July 2005 alleging the South End location discriminated against 
neighbors of color who were already disadvantaged.  Both suits were represented pro 
bono by counsel (Boston Bar Association, 2014). 
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NIH released the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) in December 
2005.  The FEIS analysis considered two approaches, action and no action.  RWDI 
West, Inc. developed the risk assessment focused on anthrax spore release and 
dispersion, using modeling techniques developed by Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory (LLNL) (NIH (RWDI West, Inc.), 2005).   In spite of the lawsuits, the 
record of decision to proceed with construction was published in the Federal Register 
in February 2006.   
Community stakeholders found the FEIS and Record of Decision (ROD) 
inadequate regarding the risks associated with BSL-4 research in a metro areas.  As a 
result, the Boston Bar Association Committee for Civil Rights Under Law filed a 
lawsuit in U.S. District Court alleging NEPA violation, Allen vs. NIH, in May 2006.  
In July 2006, in Ten Residents vs. BRA, state court concurred with the community, 
finding the FEIS fell short in several areas.  Judge Gants in the case indicated NIH 
failed to consider the risks associated with building the NEIDL in alternative 
locations, failed to consider the risks associated with a worst-case pathogen release 
and infection scenario, remanded prior project approvals to originating agencies, 
vacated prior decisions based upon the original FEIS, and ordered a new 
Supplemental Final EIR to comply with NEPA requirements (Boston Bar 
Association, 2014).   
Subsequently during Fall 2006, NIH and Judge Saris argued the merits of 
Allen vs. NIH.  In September, NIH suggested a new environmental impact review was 
unnecessary because of Judge Gants’ similar orders in Ten Residents vs. BRA.  NIH 
neglected to inform Judge Saris of the forthcoming appeal in that case, however.  In 
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October, Judge Saris ruled NIH had to inform the Court and Plaintiffs at least 60 days 
before conducting any BSL-4 research.  In December, NIH indicated to Judge Saris 
the agency intended to avoid NEPA compliance of the SFEIR ordered by Judge 
Gants, indicating the review was voluntary.  Indicating her agreement with Judge 
Gants regarding inadequacies, Judge Saris ordered the forthcoming supplemental 
review to comply with NEPA.  In January 2007 NIH informed Judge Saris the 
supplemental environmental impact review ordered by Judge Gants and endorsed by 
Judge Saris would comply with NEPA (Boston Bar Association, 2014).   
According to the Boston Bar Association, in April 2007 NIH demonstrated 
additional efforts to manipulate the information system when the Boston Globe 
reported a fire in a BU BSL-3 lab which occurred in March, including BU’s failure to 
notify the state health department.  The state agency learned about the fire 
“incidentally”, instead of BU reporting it directly (Boston Bar Association, 2014).  In 
August 2007, in compliance with NEPA and court orders, NIH released the Draft 
Supplementary Risk Assessment and Site Suitability Analysis (DSRASSA), followed 
by a tenuous public comment period.  A four-hour public meeting opposing the 
NEIDL, followed one month later by a five-hour hearing in the U.S. House of 
Representatives questioning the funding and risks of labs such as NEIDL, resulted in 
the Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs contract 
with NRC to review the NEIDL DSRASSA.  The NRC review published in 
November indicated the DSRASSA was unsound and incredible. On December 13, 
2007, the Supreme Judicial Court in Ten Residents vs. BRA unanimously confirmed 
Judge Gants’ findings, ordering NIH to submit to the Commonwealth, another, now 
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third, new supplemental environmental impact report.  One week following this 
ruling, on December 20, 2007, Judge Saris in King vs. Office of Civil Rights, ordered 
the Office of Civil Rights to begin investigating the discrimination claims, and to 
issue a decision no later than 90 days following the final NIH environmental report 
(Boston Bar Association, 2014).  Clearly the action/no action alternative in the 
original FEIS, and subsequent draft supplemental risk assessment, fell embarrassingly 
short. 
In the wake of the legal actions, NIH established a Blue Ribbon Panel (BRP) of 
independent experts in March 2008.  The BRP advised the agency regarding the 
scope of the recently mandated additional risk assessments.  The BRP suggested NIH 
conduct additional work regarding the risk assessments, including using validated 
scientific methodologies; epidemiologic data; community characteristics; insuring 
transparency of the process, methodology, results and final assessment interpretation; 
and improving risk communication (Tetra Tech, Inc., 2009).    
The BRP developed a Scope of Work (SOW) authorizing Tetra Tech, Inc. to 
provide updated additional risk analyses necessary to comply with the court’s and 
NRC’s recommendations (NIH Blue Ribbon Panel, 2008).  BRP suggestions 
regarding risk communication resulted in extending the risk assessment process to 
include additional analysis and feedback from the NRC review committee. Based 
upon this suggestion, NIH requested NRC risk assessment review and feedback at 
specific completion points throughout the process (NRC, 2010).  The Tetra Tech 
SOW contract stipulated risk assessment deliverables at the 25%, 50%, 75%, 90% 
and 100% completion stages, including appropriate public comment periods, with 
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completion by June 30, 2010, seven years after NIH awarded the initial construction 
grant. 
Beginning in 2008, NIH demonstrated commitment to a transparent process and 
cultivating community stakeholder support throughout the remaining NEIDL process.  
NIH demonstrated transparency by establishing the BRP and implementing their 
improvement suggestions; by requesting NRC review of the risk assessments; by 
submitting multiple risk assessments to public scrutiny and feedback; and by 
including community perspectives into the risk assessment process.   
For example, pathogen release scenarios included within the risk assessment 
originated from NRC review, public comments, and courts.  The 2008 Statement of 
Work contained 13 release scenarios:  eight from public comment, six from NRC 
review, two simultaneously suggested by NRC reviewers and community 
stakeholders’ comments, and two suggested by the courts.  Figure 2 lists the types of 
scenarios NIH included into the risk assessment process, with an example of each 
type.  The examples are not intended to be extensive or exhaustive.  The figure shows 
NIH assessed release events from the stakeholder perspectives, demonstrating agency 
commitment to risk communication by listening to the stakeholders, capturing their 
concerns, and addressing each type of release scenario within the risk assessment 
process.     
  













Mechanical or power failure 
Lab equipment failure   x     
Loss of electrical power x       
Malfunction of solid and liquid waste 
disposal systems 
x     
  
Transportation accident Transportation accident     x   
Security failure 
Site security failure   x     
Personnel security failure   x     
Release via fomites or vectors 
Fomites contaminated with transmissible 
agents 
x     
  
Release of vector-borne agent x x     
Human error 
Procedural errors resulting in inadvertent 
infection (e.g., mislabeled tubes) 
x x   
  
Infection not diagnosed early and spreads 
in community, esp. via public 
transportation 
x     
  
Malevolent actions 
Malevolent action   x   x 
Suicide bomber, airplane attack, truck 
with explosives, fire 
x     
  
Disgruntled or deranged lab worker 
spreads agents in community x       
Figure 2 Overview of Scenarios with Quantity of Sources 
 Fort Detrick: Background and Controversy 3.3.2
Congress mandated expanding the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of 
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) high-containment facilities as part of the National 
Interagency Biodefense Campus at Fort Detrick in Frederick, Maryland (NRC, 
2010d).  These facilities are responsible for handling infectious pathogens, which can 
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cause potentially lethal diseases.  The USAMRIID Final EIS was published in 
December 2006, followed by the Record of Decision to construct the laboratory in 
February 2007 (NRC, 2010d).  This facility was followed by the Medical 
Countermeasures Test & Evaluation Facility (MCMT&E), also located at Fort 
Detrick (NRC, 2011). 
The USAMRIID neighbors publicly opposed the expansion of additional 
laboratory space for research on potentially lethal agents.  Due to this opposition, 
Congress mandated the Secretary of Defense commission a National Research 
Council study of the required Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) (NRC, 2010d).   
The NRC committee evaluated three elements of the EIS:  the credibility and 
mitigation from a scientific perspective of the health and safety risks; USAMRIID’s 
procedures for reducing exposure to pathogens, and alignment of those procedures 
with Center for Disease Control (CDC) and NIH procedures; and review infections 
acquired in the current laboratory as a lessons learned exercise for the proposed 
laboratory and proposed procedures.  The neighbors were fearfully aware of prior 
laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) at Fort Detrick, contributing to apprehension 
regarding facility expansion (NRC, 2010). 
Based upon the USAMRIID process and feedback, the Army requested NRC 
review of the site-specific risk assessment work plan for the MCMT&E (NRC, 2011).  
NRC input included reviewing the proposed risk assessment work plans, as well as 
pathogen selection information, release scenarios, and infection models.  The 
committee was asked to review early quantitative and qualitative risk assessment 
models and results, if available.  The committee review was limited to assessing the 
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adequacy and validity of proposed risk-assessment methodology and draft results for 
inclusion into the MCMT&E EIS.  The committee was not permitted to assess the 
EIS as a whole, nor the safety of the facility.  Interestingly, the Army requested 
reconvening the USAMRIID review committee to evaluate the risk assessment plans 
for the MCMT&E facility.   
The Fort Detrick laboratory was selected for inclusion into this study because 
the Army recognized deficiencies in its risk assessment process.  The USAMRIID 
EIS was reviewed based upon Congressional mandate, while the MCMT&E risk 
assessment plans were reviewed.  This combination of review timing components 
reflects issues associated with both NBAF and NEIDL, contributing to the value of 
Fort Detrick for this research. Met with opposition similar to NBAF and NEIDL, the 
Fort Detrick expansion pressed forward with little regard to community stakeholder 
concerns, NRC review feedback, and no litigation.     
 IPET: Background and Controversy 3.3.3
New Orleans, Gulf Coast and Lake Pontchartrain hurricane protection history 
involves complex environmental, economic, public and private stakeholders 
collaborating for over 50 years regarding a comprehensive protection system (NRC, 
2006).  The protection system evolved after Hurricane Betsy in 1965, a storm which 
killed 75 people and caused billions of dollars in damages.  Congress authorized 
development of the hurricane protection system funded through federal, state and 
local resources (NRC, 2006).  A complex partner network developed and maintain the 
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levees, dams, and canals designed to protect swaths of public, private, urban and 
wetland infrastructure and lives (NRC, 2006). 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) maintains responsibility for 
hurricane protection project design and construction through contracts awarded to a 
host of private firms.  After construction, local authorities assume maintenance 
responsibilities.  USACE developed and constructed approximately 125 miles of 
protective levees, canals, floodwalls and other protective infrastructure along the Gulf 
Coast, turning management over to local entities upon completion.  The protection 
system reflects a complex system of varying capacities, resources, mandates, with 
different historical decisions and prior conditions (NRC, 2006).   
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast in 
Louisiana and Mississippi.  The 17th Street and London Avenue canals were 
breached, levees overtopped and Lake Pontchartrain water levels elevated (NRC, 
2006).   
Flood damage in the New Orleans-Gulf Coast geographic area amounted to 
hundreds of lives lost and billions of dollars in damages.  The storm generated a 28-
foot storm surge and 55-foot waves (USACE, 2014).  According to the USACE, the 
damage wrought by the storm was unprecedented. Approximately 80% of New 
Orleans was flooded to depths exceeding 15 feet in many areas. Surge and waves 
caused 50 major levee breaches in the regional Hurricane and Storm Damage Risk 
Reduction System (HSDRRS). Thirty-four of the city's 71 pumping stations were 
damaged, and 169 of the system’s 350 miles of protective structures were 
compromised. Also contributing to the flooding was heavy rainfall: 14 inches in a 24-
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hour period. More than 1,500 lives were lost. According to the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, Katrina is costliest disaster ever to occur in the United States, 
ranking as one of the largest natural disasters in U.S. history (USACE, 2014; NRC, 
2006).  
 In October 2005 the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) commissioned 
the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force (IPET) to conduct a technical 
root-cause investigation to understand what happened during Katrina, with the goal to 
apply lessons learned to the rebuilding of levees and other protection structures in and 
around New Orleans (NRC, 2006).  In addition to developing and applying risk 
assessment practices to understand the risks from hurricane-induced flooding, the 
Corps of Engineers also requested the IPET team estimate risk after the new 100-year 
hurricane storm damage reduction system (HSDRRS) was scheduled for completion 
in approximately June 2007 (NRC, 2006). 
The IPET team effort resulted in an engineering-based risk assessment for 
New Orleans and vicinity. IPET released flood-depth maps reflecting pumping 
capabilities at three points in time:  prior to Katrina, 2007 post-Katrina and 2011 post-
Katrina.  Further, the maps reflected expected property damage risk and loss of life at 
each frequency.    
Communicating associated risks for general public consumption and 
understanding involved risk communication concepts and strategies.  The resulting 
comprehensive risk assessment in general and technical terms enabled the 
stakeholders to ascertain the overall picture of the risk situation for New Orleans 
(Link, et al. 2009).   
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The IPET risk assessment combines technical engineering risk assessment and 
risk communication practices, lending to its inclusion in this research.  IPET 
demonstrates using communication concepts and social theories regarding public 
understanding of complex information.  IPET is an outstanding example of technical 
comprehensive risk assessment dovetailed with comprehensive communication 
methods designed to improve public risk perception of hazards.  
 DRMS: Background and Controversy 3.3.4
Including the DRMS assessment into the research is based upon the evolution 
of the state-legislated Delta levee system assessment into a comprehensive 
questionable plan.  DRMS began as reactionary legislation in California to understand 
vulnerability within the Delta levee system after Hurricane Katrina devastated New 
Orleans.  The DRMS levee risk assessment expanded into the political arena 
surrounding access to scarce, clean water. 
The DRMS story involves the assessment of 1300 miles of California Delta 
levees to simultaneously withstand breaches and provide clean water to California 
residents, without ecological damage to animal and plant habitat.  The levees and the 
Delta waters they protect provide life-giving water to people, land and aquatic 
animals, and plants across most of the state of California.  Two out of three people in 
California receive water from the Delta (DWR, 2009). Since 1900, 158 levee failures 
have flooded Delta islands (DWR, 2009).  Subsidence has reduced Delta islands to as 
much as 25 feet below sea level (DWR, 2009). 
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3.3.4.1 California Delta Background 
The San Joaquin and Sacramento rivers meet east of San Francisco Bay 
forming a delta region of approximately 700,000 acres protected by over 1100 miles 
of levees.  Originally built in the mid-1800’s 3 to 5 feet tall, today many are 15 to 20 
feet tall.  Over time, due to peat soil characteristics in the Delta, many of these levees 
have changed due to subsiding (eroding), seepage, compaction and other continual 
changes within the Delta region (DWR, 2009; Lund J. , et al., 2008; Lund J. , et al., 
2010; NRC, 2012).   
The Corps of Engineers manages 385 miles within the levee system, leaving 
the majority, over 730 miles, to public-private management sharing maintenance 
costs between the state of California and the local landowners (DWR, 2013).  
Protecting and improving the levee system remains critical because two-thirds of all 
the residents of California depend upon the Delta for drinking water.  Historic and 
future potential breaches due to wear, earthquakes, storms and rising sea levels 
threaten the Delta and its myriad of inhabitants. 
3.3.4.2 Controversy 
The state established competing yet co-equal goals of restoration and also 
usage of a scarce water resource and its ecosystem, increasing complexity regarding 
levee risk assessment policy and decisions (Lund J. , et al., 2008; Lund J. , et al., 
2010) .  According to one report, the current system of usage and maintenance 
supporting the Delta is not sustainable (Lund et al., 2008).  The levees, originally 
constructed over a period of years between the late 1800’s and early 1900’s, suffer 
from subsidence (erosion), and disjointed ownership and maintenance.  The levee 
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system conveys Delta water to the arid southern California regions.  The Delta 
controversy includes varying water management, conveyance, and ecological system 
health perspectives from a variety of stakeholders across a broad geographic area.  
Stakes are high should the Delta levee system incur damage similar to the damage 
wrought by Katrina upon New Orleans.      
Potential levee failure consequences runs into the billions of dollars and 
hazards to millions of people (Lund J. , et al., 2008).  Exporting Delta water to 
southern California results in water quality deterioration within the Delta and its 
system (NRC, 2012a).  The potential flooding threat in the event of a levee breach 
remains constant (Lund J. , et al., 2010).  Many experts in recent years share the view 
of a hazard of when, not if, and the unsustainable efforts to provide scarce water 
resources to the southern California areas (Lund J. , et al., 2010; Lund J. , et al., 
2008).  These conflicting demands upon Delta water remain unresolved.   
The state of California specified co-equal, conflicting Delta goals of 
ecological management for nature’s benefit, and providing water for human benefit 
(Delta Vision Blue Ribbon Panel, 2013).  Understanding complex Delta issues led to 
a group of volunteer Delta landowners starting a website, in response to a Delta 
Vision meeting during which DWR presented questionable information (Delta 
Landowners, 2014).  Levee risks are critically important, yet the underlying current of 
conflict between ecology and human sustainability remains unresolved.  
3.3.4.3 DRMS Background    
	   In August of 2005 Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans and the 
Mississippi Delta Gulf Coast.  Thousands of lives were lost, billions of dollars of 
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damage occurred, and the levees, originally designed to protect New Orleans and her 
residents, failed such that sections of the city sustained dramatic devastation (Link, et 
al., 2009).    
 As a result of the Louisiana devastation, the California legislature 
recognized their constituents’ vulnerability due to the instability of the Delta levee 
system.   Reacting to the devastation in the New Orleans-area hurricane protection 
system, the state of California passed Assembly Bill 1200 (AB 1200) in 2005.  The 
legislation required the California Department of Water Resources to assess Delta 
levees regarding 50-, 100-, and 200-year projections due to potential impacts from 
floods, earthquakes, and subsidence and climate changes, including combinations of 
those impacts (California Legislature, 2005).   The bill further required the 
Department of Water Resources and the Department of Fish and Game to 
collaboratively evaluate mitigation options to meet the legislated objectives 
associated with the two rivers and the Delta, culminating in a report due no later than 
January 1, 2008.   
 The nine objectives for the levee system assessment contained in the bill, 
include (California Legislature, 2005): 
1. Prevent supply disruption 
2. Improve drinking water quality 
3. Reduce the salts 
4. Maintain delta water quality 
5. Preserve the delta lands 
6. Protect water rights  
7. Protect infrastructure 
8. Preserve, protect and improve the levees 
9. Department of Fish and Game provide a rating of each option from the 




   
	   The Delta Risk Management Strategy (DRMS) report, issued in January 
2008, summarized the legislated objectives this way (CALFED Independent Review 
Panel, 2008): 
• Impacts of levee failures on water supplies within the Delta due to subsidence, 
earthquakes, floods and sea level rise (i.e. climate change) 
• Options to reduce the impacts of these hazards 
• Options to restore salmon and other fish in the Delta 
 
In addition to the levee system assessment through the DRMS effort, the State 
of California established multi-pronged, some might argue duplicative, committee 
efforts to understand the Delta ecosystem and water supply issues, including 
consideration of other options for risk mitigation, water quality improvements, and 
Delta management strategies and plans.   
DRMS was established to assess levees, projecting failure consequences 
balanced with maintaining and improving water quality (California Legislature, 
2005).  CALFED established the Ecosystem Restoration Program (ERP) 
Conservation Strategy to understand and evaluate potential restoration methods based 
upon evaluation of soils, habitats and fish species requirements (MWD, 2011).  The 
governor established the Delta Vision to develop a sustainable management vision 
and plan for the Delta to balance the economic and social needs of the state against 
the environmental ecosystem needs within the Delta for sustainability (California 
Departments of Water Resources and Fish and Game, 2008).  The Bay Delta 
Conservation Plan (BDCP) evaluated the Delta from the perspective of the water 
operations permitting process with the goal of protection and restoration of 
endangered or at-risk species (NRC, 2011).  On the receiving side of water exports 
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from the Delta, the Southern California Metropolitan Water District (MWD) noted 
these four groups charged with similar objectives working in isolation resulted in 
controversial political paralysis (Lund J. , et al., 2010; MWD, 2011).   
The interconnectivity between multiple parallel assessment and planning 
efforts against the backdrop of clean consumable water, coupled with minimizing 
disruption to community infrastructure in the event of a hazard, led one reviewer to 
suggest comprehensive collaboration to develop understanding of the risks and 
possible mitigation options (MWD, 2011).  Delta levee breaches had occurred, and 
would continue to occur. DRMS controversy revolved around the politics of water 
provision balanced against the co-equal goal of environmental protection, in the 
spotlight of recent Katrina catastrophic damage in New Orleans due to levee 
breaches. 
According to the CALFED Independent Review Panel (IRP) who reviewed 
DRMS deliverables, and other experts, controversy involves varying perspectives, 
mandates, investigative and operational conflicts regarding Delta water resources 
(CALFED Independent Review Panel, 2007; Lund J. , et al., 2008; Lund J. , et al., 
2010).  Southern California residents rely upon water exported from the Delta.  Delta 
farmers rely on the water locally to support farming enterprises.  Levees constructed 
over 100 years to a variety of specifications fail, resulting in flooding and requiring 
costly repairs.  Several endangered fish species face potential extinction due to the 
water usage and management practices.  The state mandated providing water for 
man’s benefit and nature’s benefit as co-equal goals, contributing to the controversy 
(Lund J. , et al., 2008). 
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Levee risk assessment involved political considerations and contention, which led to 
DRMS inclusion into this study.  The initial levee assessment became mired in 
political resource management processes for a scarce, life- and livelihood-sustaining 
resource.  Efforts to mitigate levee risks, based upon Hurricane Katrina in 2005, 
remain one component of solving the variety of conflicting controversial sustainment 
and preservation issues associated with executing the co-equal Delta management 
goals.   
 Coeur d’ Alene: Background and Controversy 3.3.5
The Coeur d’ Alene River Basin is a mountain stream flowing 166 miles 
across the panhandle of Idaho.  Originating in the Bitterroot Mountain Range on the 
border between Idaho and Montana, the south fork of the river courses westward in 
narrow valleys through steep mountains, lush valleys, vibrant wetlands, joining with 
the north fork and continuing for another 70 miles, eventually emptying into Lake 
Coeur d’Alene.   
The lake is 25 miles long, and is drained on the north end by the Spokane 
River.  Originally occupied by the Coeur d’Alene Native Americans, a tribe of only a 
few thousand, the area provided a substantial subsistence for the tribe members, and 
the native wildlife and plants which flourished within the river basin for hundreds of 
years.  Pristine water and fertile soil provided for the needs and nourishment of all the 
inhabitants who depended upon the life-giving water source.  That is, until 1883, 
when railroad operators traded the life-giving capacity of the river basin environment 
for profits generated by railroad passengers.   
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To encourage more rail travel, and profits, the Northern Pacific Railroad 
advertised the discovery of gold within the Coeur d’ Alene basin.  One a dramatically 
altered, and some would argue irreversibly changed, the Coeur d’ Alene basin and its 
life-giving capacity.  Designated a heavily-contaminated Superfund site, this trade-off 
between environmental sustenance for profits proved detrimental. 
3.3.5.1 EPA Superfund Designation 
EPA developed processes to establish and identify Superfund sites.  Metrics 
included physical site definition, human and ecologic risk assessment, remedial 
planning, and decision making.  To determine EPA use and suitability of Superfund 
processes, Congress insisted EPA obtain independent NRC review of Superfund-
identification practices and guidance, utilizing Coeur d’Alene as the case study. 
The following sections summarize the history, background and controversy 
associated with Coeur d’ Alene mining development and operations, and the 
subsequent NRC assessment regarding EPA Superfund practices and guidance.  
Historical details are germane to the context regarding contamination magnitude, 
including the recent metal-loading remediation plan developed by EPA under contract 
with URS Greiner and CH2M Hill.   
Full details of Coeur d’ Alene as a Superfund site are contained in the Coeur 
d’ Alene NRC report (NRC, 2005).  The history of Coeur d’ Alene environmental 
damage, EPA Superfund designation, and the subsequent metal-loading remedial 
assessment process apply to research between assessment-based decision-making and 
stakeholder perceptions.     
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3.3.5.2 Coeur d’ Alene History 
Within a few months of advertising the availability of gold, an estimated 5000 
gold prospectors and others looking for a short-term revenue source arrived in the 
river valley.  The discovery of gold in these valleys led to the richer discovery of 
silver-lead-zinc ores along the tributaries and primary branch of the South Fork of the 
Coeur d’ Alene River.   
Beginning in May 1884, the first lead-silver mine was the Tiger, near what is 
now Burke, Idaho.  Mining operations rapidly expanded along the richest and most 
productive seams in the area, leading to renaming the valley “Silver Valley”.  
However, the ores were also rich in lead and zinc.  Thus the original invitation to find 
gold via the railroad ultimately invited the high-dollar, high-waste, toxic mining 
methods necessary to extract silver, lead and zinc from the bedrock of the valley.   
The mining operations soon expanded into milling operations to separate the 
valuable ore from the rock.  These separators, or concentrators, were known as “jigs”, 
utilizing processes involving crushing the ore until it resembled the size of coarse 
sand.  Mixed with water, and passed across a grooved “jig table” or through a “jig 
cell”, the larger, heavier pieces collected in the grooves in the bottom of the table, 
while the smaller, waste pieces were carried off the tail of the jig to become “jig 
tailings.”  Jig tailings were dumped into nearby streams.  The tailing, including the 
mud and rock mixture, became known as “slimes”.   
The mine operators failed to realize the toxicity of the jig tailings and slimes, 
which contained high quantities of lead and other metals.  These high-dollar, high-
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waste processes, combined with the tight quarters of the river valley, led to conflict 
between the mine companies and the miners.   
Some argue the technology did not exist at that time to understand the toxicity 
of the waste.  However, by 1903, the waste was visible downstream, as were its 
detrimental effects on livestock and vegetation.  Then, in 1929 and 1930, the editor of 
the Coeur d’ Alene newspaper, John Coe, published the fact that Canada prohibited 
dumping mining waste into streams, and Canadian mine operators remained 
profitable (Aiken, 1994).   
Technological advances in the mining process improved ore extraction and 
separation efficiency.  Mine operators built wooden dams on the rivers and streams to 
hold the accumulating highly toxic waste.  As efficiency increased, increasing mining 
production and waste dumping, the dams failed, sending the waste downstream into 
the lake.   
Mining companies began smelting ore to increase local production efficiency.  
Groundwater, surface water, and air from the smelters became more infected.  The 
toxic evidence appeared downstream in the Coeur d’ Alene river basin.  The 
atmospheric haze settled over the mining towns.  The lake and river water turned into 
a murky, pungent sludge.  Mine owners and operators fought against the mounting 
evidence, simply purchasing “smoke rights”, in addition to citing their mining and 
dumping rights (Aiken, 1994; NRC, 2005).    
The struggle between purveyors of toxicity against the public health interest 
remains historically pervasive throughout the 20th century and into this one.  From 
multiple stakeholder perspectives, Coeur d’ Alene history could be repeating itself 
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across the country currently with the advent of liquid natural gas pipeline 
developments and fracking operations.  The question is:  what have we learned from 
the Coeur d’ Alene decision-making process and stakeholder perception management 
which we can apply today?  The answer, according to this research is:  Much.  
3.3.5.3 Controversy 
3.4 Legal Controversy 
Also in 1991, two Natural Resources Damages (NRD) lawsuits were filed 
against the mining companies.  The State of Idaho sued the mining companies for $50 
million, which was later settled for $4.5 million.   
The Coeur d’ Alene Tribe filed another NRD suit against 8 mining companies, 
including ASARCO, the parent of Bunker Hill Mining.  The United States joined the 
Coeur d’ Alene tribe lawsuit in 1996.  ASARCO paid the US government $1.8B 
December 10, 2009 for environmental cleanup at contaminated mines in 19 states as 
part of a bankruptcy reorganization enabling Grupo Mexico to take control of 
ASARCO (Fifield, 2009).  
3.5 Environmental Controversy 
In 1983, EPA added the Bunker Hill Mining and Metallurgical Complex on 
the Coeur d’ Alene river to the National Priority List (NPL) for Superfund sites.  
Throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, subsequent reforestation efforts failed.  In 1991 
and 1992, EPA issued two Records of Decision covering cleanup of the Coeur d’ 
Alene area (NRC, 2005). 
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In 2002, EPA issued a Record of Decision providing a ”final remedy” of the 
entire project area contamination and risks to environmental and human health, at a 
cost of $359 million over30 years.  Subsequently, under congressional direction, EPA 
asked NRC to independently review the Superfund technical designation process.  
NRC published the assessment of EPA Superfund designation processes in 2005, 
using Coeur d’ Alene as a model (NRC, 2005).   
The committee found substantial improvement areas for improvement, 
including questioning the applicability of the Superfund process to complex 
megasites such as Coeur d’ Alene.  Cleanup costs, geographic size and complex 
nature of contamination at Coeur d’ Alene expand beyond a simplistic contamination 
remediation assessment process.  Indeed, one committee member voiced significant 
concerns regarding the controversial risk assessment processes in an appendix. 
3.6 EPA Risk Assessment Process Controversy    
Edmund A. C. Crouch, Ph. D., describes issues with the probabilistic model 
for estimating metal loading and effectiveness of the remedial action in Appendix F 
of the Coeur d’Alene superfund document (NRC, 2005).  Dr. Crouch specifically 
questions the PTM assumptions of variability and uncertainty distributions as 
lognormal distributions, specifically suggesting confusion within the assessment 
between uncertainty and time variation.   
In addition to committee-documented shortcomings, Dr. Crouch found 
typographical errors in the analytical equations.  He specifically articulates four 
deficiencies within the metal-loading remediation assessment:  1. The hypothesis is 
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untested; 2. Issues with the treatment of time variation; 3. Undocumented, 
nonreproducible, and un-validated parameters and their values; 4. Incorrect 
probabilistic analysis. 
3.7 Risk Assessment and Risk Management Decisions 
 NBAF 3.7.1
3.7.1.1 EIS Initial Conditions  
Complying with federal NEPA mandates, DHS delivered an EIS indicating 
Manhattan, Kansas as the preferred NBAF alternative (DHS, 2008).  GAO evaluated 
the EIS, reporting DHS neglected addressing whether FMDv could be safely 
conducted on the mainland.  GAO included economic impacts of an FMDv outbreak 
and whether an island affords additional protection from an outbreak in its report to 
Congress (GAO, 2008).   
GAO found DHS based its assessment on a 2002 study which addressed the 
technical feasibility of conducting FMDv research on the mainland with appropriate 
safety procedures in place designed to protect the agriculture economic sector (GAO, 
2008).  These are different questions with different answers, suggesting simply 
because something is technically feasible does not mean it should be done (GAO, 
2008).    
Federal analysis of the EIS documented shortcomings relative to FMDv 
research (NRC, 2010; NRC, 2012; GAO, 2008; GAO, 2009).   
NBAF initial EIS risk assessment identified eight hazards (DHS, 2008): 




• Loss of Infected Animal/Insect 
• Release of Contaminated Wastes 
• Large Room or Facility Fire 
• Over-Pressure Event from a Deflagration 
• Seismic Event 
• Aircraft Crash into the Facility 
The initial risk management decisions contained within the EIS included site 
selection, operation and funding of the NBAF.  The EIS evaluated six alternative sites 
regarding land use, infrastructure, air quality, noise, geology, water, biological and 
cultural resources, and socioeconomics, traffic, waste management, and health and 
safety, indicating Manhattan, KS as the preferred alternative.  The EIS contained an 
assessment of the no action alternative, and overlooked hazards associated with 
pathogen release, specifically FMDv (DHS, 2008). 
DHS indicated the EIS would assess whether FMDv research could be safely 
conducted on US mainland (Shea, Monke, & Gottron, 2008).  However, the DHS 
ROD in January 2009 overlooked this assessment (Federal Register, 2009).  As a 
result, Congress restricted construction funds until DHS delivered a risk assessment 
regarding whether FMDv research can be conducted safely on the US Mainland and 
GAO reviewed the assessment (GAO, 2009).   
GAO analysis of the DHS EIS revealed multiple shortcomings regarding 
whether FMDv can be conducted on the mainland as on Plum Island (GAO, 2009).  
Congress mandated GAO analyze the NBAF EIS, finding shortcomings in FMDv 
release analysis, economic impact assessment and modeling (GAO, 2009). (GAO, 
2009).  GAO quantified health, economic and beef industry infrastructure hazards and 
impacts should FMDv research move to the U.S. mainland (GAO, 2009).  
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Table 3 contains the issues GAO found with the DHS EIS (GAO, 2009).  GAO 
consulted with experts from multiple national laboratories, academic institutions, and 
consultants regarding the validity of the EIS assumptions, methods and modeling, and 
assessment processes.  GAO found several deficiencies contributing to the 
underestimation of the overall risk associated with the capability of DHS to conduct 
FMDv research on the US mainland.  As a result of the GAO findings, Congress 
again withheld construction funds.  Congress mandated DHS conduct a site-specific 
risk analysis and submit it to NRC for independent review (NRC, 2010b). 









Straight-line Gaussian plume 
model applies to PRA for nuclear 
radiological aerosol spread.  This 
model lacks validation for FMDv 
spread.  
Appropriate model developed for 
localized puff diffusion of low-
frequency complex FMDv releases 
(RIMPUFF).  Gaussian model lacks 
input accounting for biological 
decay rates. 
Meteorological data and source 
term assumptions introduced 
errors.   
DHS submitted a year’s worth of 
average weather data to the 
Gaussian plume model.  More 
appropriate and reflective modeling 
would utilize actual data from each 
site.  DHS underestimated the spill 
size, contributing to errors in the 
source term of the amount of 
amount of aerosol released. 
DHS failed to model of FMDv 
spread after infection.   
Modeling FMDv spread depends 
upon the site, available vectors, 
local susceptible livestock and 
wildlife populations, and local 




DHS concluded an export ban 
would result from an FMDv 
outbreak.  Weaknesses include 
limited outbreak scenarios and 
missing details. 
DHS failed to consider market 
response to an FMDv outbreak and 
associated costs of establishing a 




EIS is missing integrated release 
scenarios with FMDv dispersion 
and spread relative to specific sites 
Plume and dispersion assessment 




and local impacts assumptions to predict economic 
impacts.  Missing connection 
regarding economic impact 
differences between Plum Island 
and mainland sites. 
Little Site 
Differentiation 
Little differentiation between sites 
regarding risks 
EIS identified different factors at 
each site (i.e. proximity to livestock) 
the associated risks were considered 
inconsequential. 
Large Animal  DHS overlooked hazards regarding 
working with large animals.  
Animal control listed as one of the 
risks. 
Large infected animals reflect 
containment hazards.  The risk was 
not quantified. 
Table 3 GAO Concerns Regarding NBAF EIS 
 Subsequent sections elaborate regarding each EIS deficiency GAO 
documented (GAO, 2009). 
3.8 EIS Gaussian Plume Modeling Deficiencies 
Gaussian plume models lack input accounting for biological decay rates.  The 
model assumes particles disperse in a Gaussian distribution, assuming a uniform wind 
and continuous release of a constant strength.  According to GAO, DHS experts from 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories (LLNL) questioned using Gaussian 
plume modeling, indicating limitations within the Gaussian plume model actually 
applied to a viral release.  Therefore, LLNL experts questioned applying a Gaussian 
plume model to an FMDv release, citing the lack of an established model appropriate 
for FMDv release tracking (GAO, 2009).   
Conversely, experts from Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab 
indicated the Gaussian model useful for aerosol release, citing model limitations 
regarding sufficiently and accurately describing effects associated with a specific 
release event.  APL experts suggested limiting Gaussian plume model results as a 
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general estimation of a hypothetical release situation, instead of interpretation as a 
definitive result.  MIT and the Department of Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
suggested the Hazard Prediction Assessment Capability (HPAC) model as a method 
to estimate long-range dispersion.  This model, however, lacks validation for FMDv 
release, although the model accounts for variables regarding landscape and wind.   
Danish experts suggested RIMPUFF for modeling FMDv release.  This model is 
used in Europe for predicting accidental nuclear releases, chemical gas releases and 
specifically FMDv spread.  RIMPUFF application aligns with assessment of FMDv 
release spread because the model uses parameterization, a technique common for 
modeling low-frequency complex problems.  RIMPUFF considers wind, 
precipitation, and turbulence variables using scaling theory over multiple time scales.  
Further, this model considers biological decay of FMDv (GAO, 2009).   
DHS contracted with Lawrence Livermore National Lab (LLNL) to review the 
EIS.  LLNL indicated results of a Gaussian plume model as insufficient (GAO, 2009). 
3.9 Meteorological data and source term assumptions 
The Gaussian plume model defines atmospheric stability according to one of six 
possible categories.  According to the experts GAO consulted, few atmospheric 
models use these six categories.  Called Pasquill stability categories, more 
advanced models include additional atmospheric variables using more advanced 
tools.  As a result, the Gaussian models remain location-dependent.   DHS 
confirmed using weather data from locations other than the actual sites, thus 
contributing to questions regarding atmospheric dispersion modeling. 
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 The five-factor source term contained an estimation regarding spill size.  DHS 
estimated a small-to-medium-concentration spill from a gel-based agent.  GAO 
consultation with experts in Denmark found higher actual concentrations of 
FMDv in stock solutions.  Gel is rarely used.  The particle size and decay rate 
were also underestimated, confirmed by APL analysis, suggesting the dry 
deposition removal rates were overestimated.  APL research indicates FMDv 
particles are larger than 1 micron, which settle at significantly slower rates than 
DHS described in the EIS. 
3.10 EIS Economic Impact Shortcomings 
DHS conducted a literature review of FMDv outbreaks overseas, and 
requested BKC conduct a “quick and limited” economic analysis of FMDv outbreak 
at each site (GAO, 2009, p. 34).  Recognizing limitations associated with quick 
analyses, BKC suggested DHS conduct additional economic analysis.  The literature 
review lacked site-specific impacts, and according to DHS, was intended to bound 
economic losses instead of providing a comprehensive economic assessment at each 
site.  OIE is the intergovernmental agency responsible for animal health worldwide, 
providing three possible FMDv classifications applicable to each country:  present 
with or without vaccination, absent with vaccination or absent without vaccination.  
OIE also establishes the containment zone regarding specific surveillance, control and 
biosecurity measures for animals and specific diseases.  The economic analysis 
neglected to include evaluation regarding the containment zone for each site.   
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The Biodefense Knowledge Center at LLNL (BKC) analysis did not assess 
the scenarios contained in the EIS or the plume modeling of those scenarios.  Instead, 
the BKC analysis noted more advanced weather and dispersion modeling would be 
needed to quantify the relative risk rankings of each site. Recognizing limitations in 
its economic and epidemiological analyses, BKC recommended DHS conduct 
comprehensive assessments including consequences of accidental release at each site 
evaluating the location and quantity of susceptible animals; modeling with improved 
source term and regional meteorological data applicable to the EIS scenarios; and 
using more advanced dispersion models.  BKC suggested modeling the eight EIS 
release scenarios at each would provide information useful for making siting 
decisions to DHS.  BKC indicated analysis regarding estimating FMDv release 
leading to infection of at least one animal at one location would require an assessment 
by a “qualified risk analysis team” (GAO, 2009, p. 39).   
3.11 Lack of Integration Resulted in Site Similarities 
An effective risk assessment includes evaluation of FMDv release scenarios 
regarding site-specific infection and dispersion effects and impacts.  Lack of 
comprehensive dispersion modeling of release scenarios integrated with site-specific 
epidemiologic and economic impacts blurred differences between Plum Island and 
mainland sites.  The EIS assessed the release and dispersion associated with each site 
equally, neglecting to use similar assumptions for infection and epidemiologic 
modeling as used for the plume modeling.  Similar assumptions led to similar results, 
70 
 
providing little difference between mainland sites.  The EIS ranked Plum Island 
slightly safer than mainland sites based upon the island location. 
3.11.1.1 Mandated Risk Assessment and Management Decisions 
As a result of GAO’s critical assessment of the NBAF EIS, Congress 
appropriated NBAF 2009 federal funding based upon delivery of an acceptable SSRA 
(111th Congress, 2009).  Congress requested formal assessment of hazards associated 
with dispersion pathways and animal infection from FMDv release, the resulting 
economic impact, and an independent NRC assessment review (111th Congress, 
2009). Congress defined the SSRA elements to contain (NRC, 2010b):   
a. Site-Specific biosafety and biosecurity risk assessment  
b. Integrated analysis using plume modeling and epidemiological 
impact modeling to assess the extent of the dispersion of the foot-
and-mouth virus following a potential	  laboratory spill, the potential 
spread of foot-and-mouth disease in the surrounding susceptible	  
animal population, and its economic impact; 
c. Requirements ensuring safe facility operation in Kansas 
d. Integrated analyses of specific local, State, and national risk 
mitigation strategies in the event of FMD release or another 
dangerous pathogen 
e. NRC Review of the SSRA 
  
GAO and Congress commissioned the SSRA for two primary reasons:  (1) 
because DHS failed to specifically address whether FMDv research can be conducted 
as safely on US mainland as PIADC and the EIS did not evaluate an FMDv release; 
and (2) DHS failed to commission a study showing FMDv research can be safely 
conducted on US mainland (GAO, 2009; GAO, 2008).  According to DHS, 
motivations for the SSRA were “intended to assist DHS by providing input on design 
strategies, operational considerations, and mitigation and response planning at the 
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early stages of the facility development program.” (NBAF SSRA, page ES-1).  DHS 
subsequently contracted with Signature Science, LLC, to develop a site-specific risk 
assessment (SSRA). 
Congress and GAO wanted to understand the risks associated with FMDv 
research on the mainland, and whether the impacts of a release would be equivalent to 
a release on Plum Island.  Congressional decisions revolved around FMDv research, 
release and impacts specific to the Kansas site.  DHS decisions revolved around 
constructing a safe facility to prevent a release. The two decisions reflect different 
perspectives and priorities. 
Signature Science completed the SSRA in June 2010 for NRC review (Signature 
Science LLC, 2010; NRC, 2010b).  The SSRA modeled 13 different pathogen release 
scenarios along four different transport pathways:  liquid, solid, fomite/vector/carrier, 
and air.  The NRC committee commended DHS and Signature Science regarding 
assessment methods, facility design plans, and hazard mitigation strategies. The 
committee suggested improvements regarding appropriate models and general 
validity.   Table 4 lists NRC findings regarding the SSRA. 
2010 NRC Findings (NRC, 2010): 
1. The SSRA lacks evidence to support the conclusion that the risk of release 
resulting in infection is very low relative to the risk of infection introduced from an 
external source. 
2. The SSRA overlooks critical issues, both site-specific and non-site-specific, that 
could significantly elevate the risk of accidental release and spread of pathogens. 
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Table 4 NRC SSRA Deficiencies and Findings 
Conversely, the committee found critical technical shortcomings of the SSRA, 
including failure to address congressional and GAO concerns regarding the safety of 
conducting FMDv research on the U.S. mainland (GAO, 2006; GAO, 2009; Dourson 
& Patterson, 2003; NRC, 2010b).  The committee indicated model inputs and 
assumptions neglected to account for operational activities associated with BSL-3 and 
BSL-4 labs.  The committee further noted assessment gaps regarding how pathogens 
3. The SSRA has several methodological flaws related to dispersion modeling, 
tornado assessment, and epidemiological modeling. Thus the committee believes 
that questions remain about the validity of the overall risk estimates. 
4. The committee agrees with the SSRA’s conclusion that for FMD virus, long-
distance plume transport will likely be less important than the near-site exposure of 
cattle. 
5. Substantial gaps in knowledge make predicting the course of an FMD outbreak 
very difficult, which led to weaknesses in the SSRA.  
6. Although the economic modeling was conducted with appropriate methods, the 
epidemiological estimates used as inputs to the SSRA were flawed. 
7. The committee agrees with the SSRA’s conclusion that early detection and rapid 
response can limit the impact of an FMD virus release from the NBAF, but is 
concerned that the SSRA does not describe how the NBAF could rapidly detect 
such a release.  
8. The SSRA lacks a comprehensive mitigation strategy developed with 
stakeholder input for addressing major issues related to a pathogen release. The 
mitigation strategies that are provided do not realistically demonstrate current or 
foreseen capacity for how federal, state, and local authorities would effectively 
respond to and control a pathogen release.  
9. The committee agrees with the SSRA’s conclusion that human error will be the 
most likely cause of an accidental pathogen release, and fomite carriage is the most 
likely way that a pathogen would escape the facility’s outer biocontainment and 
biosecurity envelope. 
10. The committee agrees with the SSRA’s conclusion that investment in biosafety 
and biosecurity engineering and the training of personnel and responders can 
reduce the risks, but is concerned about current design plans that potentially 
compromise safety measures. 
73 
 
might be released, and the resulting potential exposed animal populations.  Identified 
shortcomings suggested an underestimation of the specific risks associated with an 
FMDv release in the economic center of the beef industry. 
Citing pathogen release as a “generic” risk, the reviewers indicated health and 
economic impacts of a release depend upon the NBAF location,  suggesting DHS 
underestimated the potential negative economic impacts with locating the NBAF in 
Kansas (NRC, 2010b, p. 2).  In addition to the NRC, other stakeholders including 
GAO, Congress, and concerned citizens, suggested DHS improve its assessment of 
FMDv release impacts in Manhattan (GAO, 2009; 111th Congress, 2009; Concerned 
Citizens, 2008).    
3.12 Stakeholder Engagement Plan 
The SSRA contains twelve appendices including Appendix A Stakeholder 
Engagement Plan (DHS, 2010).  DHS recognized stakeholders’ need regarding 
design, construction, commissioning, and operational information.  Engagement plan 
objectives included: 
• Identification of activities to inform and engage stakeholders; 
• Dialogue facilitation among DHS, USDA and stakeholders to establish 
public confidence; 
• Develop communication channels for the dialogue, including a 
Stakeholder Engagement Committee; 
• Engage the Manhattan, KS, local community to earn public trust; 
• Outline NBAF preliminary risk communication strategies. 
 
The plan identified the lead agency (DHS) and the stakeholders, with specific 
engagement activities aligned to different stakeholders.  Table 5 NBAF Stakeholders 
and Engagement Activities lists the defined stakeholders and activities associated 
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with each group.  The activities were designed to develop dialogue between DHS and 
each group, with the goal of increasing public confidence in the NBAF and its 
operations.   
 
 
Identified Stakeholder Engagement Activities 
Local Community 
(Manhattan; Kansas State 
University; and Heartland 
BioAgro Consortium 
(HBAC) 
NBAF to conduct open houses, facility tours, and 
town halls so the public can learn about laboratory 
operations and the control measures in place; 
establish a Stakeholder Engagement Committee 
(SEC).  
Private sector; non-profit and 
non-governmental 
organizations; academia 
Establish research forums, national conferences and 
general meetings for these groups; meet monthly 
with HBAC; maintain a public web-based calendar 
of meetings and events. 
DHS, USDA and other 
Federal agencies 
Provide agencies updates via materials, website 
updates, meetings and briefings, including meeting 
with PIADC leaders. 
State and local government Same as above 
Congress Inform Congress via legislative affairs channels, 
and specifically via Office of the Under Secretary 
for S&T, the Office of Strategy, Policy and Budget, 
the Office of Legislative Affairs, and the Office of 
Public Affairs to conduct briefings, answer 
questions, and receive feedback from members of 
congress and their staff 
General Public Same as above 
Table 5 NBAF Stakeholders and Engagement Activities 
 Research on the NBAF website and academic sites resulted in little 
information regarding the suggested plans.  Members of the SEC remain unknown.  
HBAC offers little information.  The largest purveyor of information supporting the 
NBAF is the NBAF in Kansas website, established by the Kansas governor’s office. 
75 
 
3.12.1.1 Updated Site-Specific Risk Analysis (uSSRA) 
Congress continued withholding construction funds.  In 2012 NRC reviewed the 
congressionally mandated updated SSRA (uSSRA) (NRC 2012).  Although 
improved, this committee found the uSSRA underestimated risks associated with 
pathogen release and infection, including incomplete uncertainty characterization.  
For example, the uSSRA reduced FMDv release probability to 0.11% from an 
original estimation of 70% during the 50-year NBAF lifespan.  The committee 
questioned assumptions within the uSSRA, suggesting invalid assumptions led to 
“artificially lower probabilities and amounts of pathogens released” (NRC, 2012, p. 
2).   
Despite improvements, the 2012 NRC committee found the uSSRA incomplete in 
application, modeling, and an underestimation of pathogen release (NRC, 2012). 
NRC findings regarding the uSSRA are listed in Table 6 NRC Findings of uSSRA.  
DHS again missed conducting a risk assessment regarding FMDv release, indicating 
weather or seismic activity the most likely source pathways of a release (NRC, 2012).  
The original SSRA indicated fomites or lack of personal respiratory protection as the 
likely source.  Conversely, both risk assessment reviews contain overlapping 
recommendations and criticisms: 
1. Ignoring probabilistic dependencies within risk scenarios, possibly leading to 
an underestimation of the risk of FMDv release 
2. Incomplete and inconsistent application of risk methods with respect to the 
scenario based modeling in the uSSRA, specifically tornado assessment and 
epidemiological modeling. 





NRC Findings Regarding uSSRA (NRC, 2012) 
1.uSSRA does not adequately include the overall risks for the most dangerous 
pathogens 
2. 65% design phase documents APPEAR sound, but were not studied in detail. 
3. uSSRA misinterprets and misapplies some risk methods; inconsistent application 
of “scenario-based” risk analysis approach. 
4. uSSRA ignores probabilistic dependencies in risk scenarios; could possibly result 
in underestimation of accidental FMD release 
5.Incomplete and inconsistent characterization and assessment of uncertainties 
6. uSSRA assumes low human error rates, and omits error pathways, without 
justification of the reason NBAF workers are less likely to make mistakes than 
similar workers in similar facilities 
7. uSSRA uses overly optimistic values in the models, yet describes those values as 
conservative (the presence of biases contributes to shifting results by orders of 
magnitude) 
8. Lack of approach descriptions, illustrated by a less-than thorough literature review 
of risk assessment assumptions, illustrated by usage of outdated or single references. 
9. Modeling improved, with gaps in model limitations and model data, leading to 
uncertain results and conclusions, particularly with regards to an underestimation of 
the spread and duration of an FMD outbreak. 
10. Economic analysis of FMD outbreak lacks reproducibility of the results and an 
inability to assess the execution of the economic analysis. Carryover of Finding 9 
into the economic analysis gaps in Finding 10. 
11. Committee questions the uSSRA conclusion of greatest hazard posed by natural 
disasters.  Committee also found an overestimate of the probability of natural disaster 
occurrence. Committee found that risk assessments of an FMD release due to 
earthquakes and tornado are too high. 
12. uSSRA relied upon incomplete, science-based assumptions regarding 
surveillance, detection, response and mitigation strategies with insufficient input 
from all government stakeholders at the local, state, and federal levels.  For example, 
vaccine availability strategies are incomplete or completely lacking, yet are critical 
for managing an FMD outbreak. This is a duplicate of Finding 7 from 2010 NRC 
evaluation of the original SSRA.  DHS and USDA continue to lack the plans, 
programs and strategies to manage an FMD outbreak. 
13. Committee found lack of preparation and training regarding security, lab 
procedures & processes, and emergency response at NBAF, as required by P.L. 112-
10.  DHS needs to fully address and document these processes and training. 
14. In the BSL-4 assessment, the uSSRA lacks an overall risk assessment as well as a 
qualitative impact assessment.  The risks presented focus on the unique risks 
associated with the use of large animals, which limits the overall risk assessment of 
operating a BSL-4 laboratory. 
Table 6 NRC Findings of uSSRA 
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3.13 Updated Stakeholder Engagement Plan 
Objectives and stakeholders of the plan remain unchanged from the original 
SSRA (DHS, 2012).  The specific members of the referenced Stakeholder 
Engagement Committee remain undefined (State of Kansas, 2009).   
On July 15, 2011, however, the Kansas governor’s office established the 
“NBAF in Kansas Steering Committee”, whose members are primarily elected 
political officials.  Kansas Board of Regents Chair Tim Emert, and Kansas State 
University President Kirk Schulz, are notable exceptions.  The appointment of these 
two gentlemen reflects the political process, in that governors appoint members onto 
Boards of Regents and Regents select postsecondary institution presidents. 
3.13.1.1 Risk Analysis in DHS 
In 2008, at congressional request, NRC appointed a committee to review risk 
analysis within the agency (NRC, 2010c).   The committee provided insight regarding 
improving risk-informed decision-making across the agency (NRC 2010c).  The 
committee suggested ten areas for improvement within DHS.  Note the timing of the 
assessment of DHS expertise occurred during the NBAF risk assessment process. 
Findings: 
1. DHS should improve its scientific analysis practices, including 
documentation, validation and expert peer review, and also improve its 
internal risk analysis skillset.  
2. DHS should develop longer-term analysis capabilities for natural hazard 
risk assessment, including the development and quantification of 
uncertainty.  
3. DHS should include models which allow adaptation to changing observed 
conditions, such as Bayesian models, game theory, and other research-
based models.  
4. DHS needs to insure that risk analyses are documented, transparent and 
repeatable (i.e. TCCR per EPA 2000).  Maximize transparency.   
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5. Develop a comprehensive risk communication plan and strategy for all 
stakeholders.  
6. Comprehensive, single integrated risk analysis is untenable for an agency 
with a wide variance of risks to study, understand, articulate and manage.  
Comparative risk assessment is a better approach for each situation.  
7.  Include both qualitative and quantitative assessments, moving away from 
singular quantitative numbers, given the complexity of assessment and 
threats under DHS purview.   
8. DHS should develop a risk assessment lexicon.   
9. Develop and document models, subject those models and methods to peer 
review, and improve, including sensitivity analysis.   
10. DHS should improve and expand the risk analysis team of experts internal 
to the agency. 
 
The Biodefense Knowledge Center (BKC) at LLNL suggested using a 
competent risk analysis team to assess hazards and impacts associated with FMDv 
release at a specific NBAF site (GAO, 2009).  Johns Hopkins, MIT and LLNL found 
inconsistent modeling application and model input assumptions in the NBAF risk 
assessment (GAO, 2008; GAO, 2009).  A critical NRC review regarding DHS risk 
analysis skills documented similar shortcomings, inconsistencies and risk assessment 
skills gaps within the agency (NRC, 2010c). 
Independent NRC review validated stakeholder concerns regarding NBAF risk 
assessment shortcomings.  In 2010 the NRC documented 11 improvement 
recommendations regarding the SSRA. DHS conducted an updated SSRA, and two 
years later another NRC committee duplicated eight of the original 11 
recommendations in 2010 (NRC, 2010b; NRC, 2012).  Connecting the duplicity 
between NBAF risk assessments, DHS received a critical review regarding risk 





The initial conditions considered within this analysis originate in 2008, when 
NIH complied with court orders by contracting with Tetra Tech, Inc. to conduct the 
risk assessment, incorporate public and NRC comments, and include BRP feedback.   
3.13.2.1 Initial Conditions 
Initial conditions regarding the NEIDL risk assessment hazards and decisions 
originate from the April 2008 BRP input to the risk assessment scope and process 
with the NRC review committee (NRC, 2008d).  Initial conditions associated with the 
new supplemental risk assessment include a comprehensive assessment of pathogens, 
release scenarios, and communication with stakeholders regarding the probability 
associated with NEIDL operational hazards. 
Beginning with the inadequate DSRASSA, the NRC recommended risk 
assessment scope and approach improvements (NRC, 2008d).  Three overarching 
questions summarize initial conditions regarding NRC approach to risk assessment 
and decisions associated with operating the NEIDL in South Boston: 
1. What could go wrong? (i.e. release scenarios and pathogens to include into 
the risk assessment) 
2. What are the probabilities of such an event sequence? 
3. What would be the consequences? 
 
These questions formed the risk assessment framework.  The NRC committee 
recommended a two-phase analysis, suggesting an initial phase containing an analysis 
based upon reasonable scenarios comparing three alternative sites, and including an 
analysis of a low-frequency, high-impact event.  Following the initial analysis, the 
NRC suggest phase two encompass a comprehensive analysis of pathogens, 
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transmission pathways (blood, fomites, vectors, aerosol), and addressing equipment 
failures, malevolent actions and workplace procedural failures.   
The NRC suggested the comprehensive analysis include probabilities 
associated with each transmission method and four transmission scenarios: small 
initial infection pool, with no transmission; multiple exposure pool, with small 
transmission; public health measure to contain a multiple exposure pool, with small 
transmission; and large transmission (NRC, 2008d).  Additionally, the NRC 
recommended a qualitative analysis of the local characteristics (population, public 
health infrastructure, vector availability, etc.) on the probability of the four 
transmission scenarios.  The NRC also recognized critical implications regarding risk 
communication, suggesting NIH employ validated communication methods from the 
literature, and comply with EPA TCCR principles, clearly articulate and substantiate 
defaults, including communicating uncertainty and sensitivity analysis (EPA, 2000; 
NRC, 2008d). 
With NRC suggestions as a framework, NIH contracted with Tetra Tech, Inc. 
to deliver a risk assessment which would withstand court scrutiny (NIH, 2008).  The 
assessment compared four alternative sites; expanded list of pathogens and exposure 
pathways; assessed potential infection spread; identified preventative safety and 
security controls; and identified response strategies should escape occur (NIH, 2008). 
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3.13.2.2 Updated Assessment; Updated Decisions 
3.14 Phase I 
The NRC committee reviewed the Phase I NEIDL risk assessment and 
provided feedback to NIH in April 2010.  According to the NRC committee, Phase I 
consisted of plans and approaches, with results forthcoming (NRC, 2010).  The NRC 
committee found the range of agents, event sequence analysis, and modeling 
approach appropriate.  The committee advised NIH adhere to TCCR principles in risk 
analysis and communication, allowing input from all stakeholders (EPA 2000).  The 
committee cautioned against using extreme value analysis, instead suggesting 
emphasis on low-frequency, high-impact scenarios and associated sensitivity analysis, 
including expert judgment (NRC, 2010). 
3.15 Phase II 
In Phase 2, the NRC committee noted shortcomings in the risk assessment.  
The original three questions remained unaddressed.  In the Phase I analysis, the 
committee suggested a qualitative to quantitative approach to including expert 
subjective information.     
The assessment lacked transparency, uncertainty analysis, and default 
justification.  The committee criticized NIH and Tetra Tech for avoiding a tiered 
qualitative and quantitative approach to address the Phase I original three questions 
for 13 pathogens.  The committee suggested an iterative analysis to obtain direct 
scientific data and indirect scientific expert judgment as evidence into the model, a 
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process outlined in the updated Red Book risk assessment process (NRC, 2010a; 
NRC, 2008). 
The committee criticized NIH for using a modified Delphi process to obtain 
input on several unknowns associated with the 13 pathogens, averaged over three 
infectious doses fitted to three plume/puff exposure models dependent upon expert 
opinions.  The committee indicated fitting opinion to quantitative modeling is 
unnecessary, potentially leading to misleading and possibly invalid results (NRC, 
2010a). 
3.16 Phase III 
The Phase 3 review occurred at the 90% complete stage of the NEIDL risk 
assessment.  The 90% complete risk assessment contained prior NRC committee 
recommendations, resulting in a complex, comprehensive assessment.  The updated 
assessment and decisions reflected risk assessment practice, quantification, and 
communication, including NRC critical feedback, public comments, and BRP 
suggestions.   
Reflecting risk communication methodologies, the NRC Phase 3 comments 
offered five general improvements associated with the assessment and its presentation 
to the community:   inclusion of an Executive Summary and risk assessment 
summary written in plain language; documentation of a safety culture at BU and the 
NEIDL; justification regarding omission of a “carry-out” scenario, where a pathogen 
could be unknowingly carried out of NEIDL on a worker’s clothes; differentiation 
between conclusions based upon expert opinion and those based upon data; inclusion 
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of cross-referencing to reduce navigation complexity through the document (NRC, 
2011b). 
The NEIDL decisions throughout the risk assessment process reflected 
compliance with court orders regarding technical and communication improvements 
(NRC, 2010; NRC, 2010a; NRC, 2011b).  At the turn of 2007 into 2008, NIH 
recognized the value outside stakeholders brought to the risk assessment process.  
NIH decisions demonstrated evidence of this recognition.  NIH involved 
incorporating NRC recommendations, expanding the risk assessment methodology, 
developing a comprehensive feedback process including all stakeholders, and 
expanding community involvement. 
 Fort Detrick  3.16.1
3.16.1.1 Initial Conditions 
In 2010, the NRC independent review committee found the initial Fort Detrick 
USAMRIID EIS lacking.  The risk analysis was incomplete; the risk characterization 
was insufficient including epidemiologic characteristics, route exposure and 
evaluation of alternative sites (NRC, 2010).  The committee indicated the 
USAMRIID EIS lacked transparency regarding the development of the risk 
assessment, including failure to appropriately model potential possible transmission 
from a laboratory worker into the community.  Further, according to the NRC review 
committee, the review was congressionally mandated based upon local community 
opposition. Yet the ROD had already been issued when the review occurred, 
documenting prior LAIs and lack of transparency to the community stakeholders.   
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Recognizing these deficiencies, the Army requested assistance from the same 
NRC in addressing these issues for the MCMT&E facility.  The Army looked to the 
NRC for guidance to develop the risk assessment work plan for the MCMT&E high-
containment laboratory facility.  The NRC committee suggested the Army develop a 
detailed risk assessment protocol for the Ft. Detrick expansion, as well as any other 
future expansion (NRC, 2010d).  The NRC committee was acutely aware of prior 
LAIs and subsequent public sensitivity throughout the community the LAI record 
raised.  Therefore, the NRC strongly encouraged the Army to include community 
stakeholders and use the 2008 updated Red Book process (NRC, 2011).  Although the 
location had been decided, the initial conditions regarding the risk assessment process 
lacked public stakeholder concern.  Based upon critical feedback regarding 
USAMRIID, initial decisions at Fort Detrick involved the Army’s implementation of 
NRC recommendations regarding risk assessment practice, transparency, and proven 
methodologies (NRC, 2011). .   
3.16.1.2 Updated Assessment; Updated Decisions 
Facility design and staff training are critical components of risk mitigation 
within high-containment biosafety laboratories. The Army revised the MCMT&E 
EIS, deciding to expand the current facilities instead of constructing a new facility 
(NRC, 2011).  The NRC letter report outlined the gaps in the work plan for assessing 
the risks associated with the facility.  Noting misalignment between the risk analysis 
and the facility development, the committee strongly advised against conducting a 
risk assessment without facility plans available (NRC, 2011c).  The committee 
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specifically articulated using the iterative 2008 risk assessment model to improve the 
MCMT&E risk assessment work plan, and ultimately the EIS (NRC, 2011). 
Upon second review, published five months later in September 2011, the NRC 
committee noted the contractor who prepared the MCMT&E EIS viewed the risk 
assessment process as a chore, and hurdle to overcome, instead of as a collaborative, 
iterative effort with the local community (NRC, 2011c).  The NRC committee 
criticized federal agencies, including the Army, regarding the lack of a consistent risk 
assessment framework across federal agencies, contributing to the MCMT&E 
insufficient risk assessment work plan.  The 2008 NRC risk assessment model 
articulates developing a plan to conduct risk assessments, and iterating the hazards 
and mitigation strategies (NRC, 2008).  The NRC recommended this process for the 
MDMT&E facility at Fort Detrick (NRC, 2011).   
 IPET  3.16.2
3.16.2.1 Initial Conditions 
The US Army Corps of Engineers commissioned the Interagency Performance 
Evaluation Task Force (IPET) to conduct an engineering investigation to understand 
the root causes of what happened during Katrina, with the goal to apply lessons 
learned to the rebuilding of levees and other damage-reduction structures in and 
around New Orleans.  In addition to developing and applying risk assessment 
practices to understand the risks from hurricane-induced flooding, the Corps of 
Engineers also requested the IPET team estimate risk after the new 100-year 
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hurricane storm damage reduction system (HSDRRS) is complete, in approximately 
June 2007. 
IPET categorized hurricane protection system risk assessment within ten study 
topics over five general areas:  a) the flood protection system; b) the storm; c) 
protection system performance; d) damage consequences; and e) risks to the New 
Orleans area from future storms & hurricanes (NRC, 2006).  IPET planned to conduct 
NRC reviews at the 30%, 60% and 90% completion points of the risk assessment 
(NRC, 2006). 
The IPET risk assessment revolve around IPET developing three primary 
topics: a) hurricane protection system design capacity; b) hurricane forces during the 
storm and the system’s response; and c) overtopping, breaching, or failure causes of 
levees and floodwalls (NRC, 2006).  The initial conditions of the risk assessment 
overlooked including risk communication methods or processes, elements which 
became increasingly critical as the IPET team progressed. 
Initial conditions comprise NRC improvement suggestions based upon review 
at the IPET 30% completion point, captured in a 2006 letter report (NRC, 2006).  The 
identified improvement areas involved system-wide and interdisciplinary issues; 
geotechnical data and investigations; and hydrology, hydrolics, and hurricane surge 
and wave analysis (NRC, 2006). 
NRC identified specific technical gaps in the initial risk assessment.  Intended 
to assess the protection system, the 30% risk assessment lacked a system-wide 
perspective.  The NRC provided ten suggestions in its critique of the initial risk 
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assessment, listed in Table 7 NRC Recommendations of 30% Complete Risk 
Assessment.  
NRC Committee Recommendations – 70% Complete Risk Assessment  
1. Use GIS to facilitate analysis, understanding and communication. 
2. IPET should include uncertainty in the assessment. 
3. Geodesics should be used to connect the comprehensive assessment to the 
risk assessment purpose. 
4. June 1, 2006 delivery date of a comprehensive risk assessment is too 
aggressive. 
5. Establish the connection between IPET activities and overall system 
recovery. 
6. IPET should increase technical assessment regarding soil and geologic data 
to enable root cause analysis. 
7. IPET should increase technical assessment regarding levee foundation data 
to enable root cause analysis. 
8. IPET should develop a region-wide geologic and soil map. 
9. Define concepts “authorized level of protection” and “standard project 
hurricane” (SPH)	  
10. Input data accuracy and parameters need clarification, such that the 
modeling of future hurricane impacts contains a comprehensive approach. 
Table 7 NRC Recommendations of 30% Complete Risk Assessment 
3.17 System-Wide Perspective Gaps   
Flooding maps lacked evidence of employing GIS technology, suggesting 
using GIS for analysis, visualization, and communication.  The technology was 
available, and NRC considered it should be used to help inform the general public 
and visualize the area as a complete, comprehensive protection system.  
Data collection and accuracy lacked uncertainty quantification and 
explanation.  The committee suggested IPET characterize the level of confidence it 
had in the data gathered, including uncertainty estimates.  The NRC suggested 
including explanations regarding relative data accuracy across the protection system, 
including reliability, for public understanding. 
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The assessment lacked comprehensive maps supporting the geodetic efforts 
IPET expended.  The reviewers suggested connecting clear, comprehensive data to 
the protection system maps. 
USACE requested report completion in June 2006, thus condensing the IPET 
team efforts into nine months.  Reviewers noted compressing a schedule prevents 
thoughtful complete analysis, lending instead to hasty decisions with little room for 
correction when new information surfaces.  Thus the logic associated with 
accelerating the report delivery schedule and providing system-wide recovery 
implementations remained unclear to the reviewers (NRC, 2006). 
3.18 Geotechnical Data 
The committee suggesting improving the description and analysis of system-
wide geologic conditions across the Gulf region.  The reviewers suggested describing 
the system-wide geologic conditions comprehensively to facilitate stakeholder 
understanding the distinction of failures.  Some failures might be due to hydraulic 
loading, structural design, or foundation conditions.  Such a geologic description 
served the stakeholders to understand the different geologic root causes, and whether 
similar conditions exist elsewhere in the levee system.   
The committee noted this type of descriptive, separate knowledge as crucial in 
improving overall system preparedness and performance. Committee discussions with 
IPET team members suggested IPET was developing and presenting an overall 
regional geologic picture to support stakeholder understanding. 
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The 30%-complete risk assessment provided little information regarding 
system-wide and site-specific data collection and application.  Data collected 
contained gaps regarding levee strengths and weaknesses, along with the underlying 
ground conditions, particularly at the 17th Street and London Avenue canal breaches.  
Missing the opportunity to suggest root causes of these particular disastrous breeches 
contributed to stakeholder skepticism (NRC, 2006).  Further, the 30% report lacked 
the establishment of levee performance baseline via a site investigation plan.  The 
reviewers suggested a system-wide plan instead of a forensic plan at the specific 
breech locations (NRC, 2006). 
3.19 Hydrology and Hydraulics 
Hurricane protection system design accounts for storm surge and waves 
associated with an appropriate level of preparedness.  The design questions include 
the limits of the storm surge and waves relative to a storm exceeding design 
parameters, or possibly a lack of maintenance, or both.  The committee found 
inconsistent definitions in the 30%-complete risk assessment regarding establishment 
of an authorized protection level; defining a standard hurricane; water level heights 
on a frequency; and flooding probability.  The IPET report emphasized wave and 
surge models, without detailing relative interactions of the models, including 
associated parameter and model uncertainty.  The reviewers suggested IPET provide 
these details in subsequent risk assessments (NRC, 2006). 
The initial conditions associated with IPET include references to the 2008 
updated Red Book risk assessment process, although IPET was conducted two years 
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prior.  The committee suggested planning the risk assessment prior to conducting the 
risk assessment, including verification of stakeholder goals and values at the outset, 
particularly when solving volatile problems.    
“When a large, comprehensive field study of the scope of the IPET 
investigation is undertaken, it is vital to carefully specify during the initial 
planning stages what data are to be collected, how they are to be collected, 
and how they are to be presented, and to list the analysis to be conducted. 
Doing so in a study’s early stages is even more important when several entities are involved in 
the study. In the case of the IPET studies, all tasks to be pursued should be planned to fit 
into and support the goal of the parent study, which should ultimately enable the design of a 
hurricane protection system to adequately protect New Orleans. In a politically charged 
study such as this one, it is tempting to get into the field immediately in order 
to show that something is being done. Unfortunately, if a clear, definitive, and 
system-wide approach is not established at the beginning, the ultimate results 
may well turn out to be less than desired.” (NRC, 2006, p. 11). (Emphasis 
added). 
  
3.19.1.1 Updated Assessment; Updated Decisions 
3.20 70% Complete Risk Assessment and Second Review 
Subsequent NRC reviews represent updated risk assessments and decisions 
associated with the New Orleans and vicinity hurricane protection system.  The 70% 
report serves as the second review of the risk assessment. 
In the 70% review, the history changed from a 50-year complex management 
system into a 100-year management system, thus pointing to the complexity of the 
IPET team regarding balancing root-cause analysis and future preparedness (NRC, 
2006b).  The IPET team collected enormous amounts of data and technical 
information.  The NRC reviewers reduced the effort to a data report, suggesting IPET 
improve integration between the data and report clarity.   
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Similar to the initial conditions, the committee suggested system-wide 
evaluations, including simple explanations of levee overtopping and levee breaches to 
enable stakeholder comprehension.  Also similar to the initial conditions, the report 
lacked explanation regarding the policy-associated decision of an authorized 
protection level, and also lacked the definition of a standard hurricane (NRC, 2006b). 
Other recommendations echoed the 30% initial conditions, including 
additional GIS maps as a framework for system-wide integration.  The investigation 
into the 17th Street Canal breech and soil analysis seemed disconnected from the 
system-wide review (NRC, 2006b).  The reviewers cited twelve recommendations, 
similar to recommendations in the 30%-complete risk assessment review. 
The committee’s second report indicated shortcomings with respect to 
providing credible engineering-based findings on a compressed schedule.  The 
reviewers noted the decision to issue a draft final report in June 2006, instead of a 
final report, enabled IPET to improve credibility of engineering-based findings.  IPET 
needed additional time for delivering a complete, comprehensive the final report 
serving the New Orleans area as a baseline to improve hurricane preparedness (NRC, 
2006b).  Table 8 NRC Recommendations of the 70% Complete Risk Assessment lists 
the twelve recommendations NRC identified in the second review.  Discussion of 
each recommendation, including NRC specific details and suggested improvements, 
follows.  The discussion regarding communication and use of an RPM occurs in 
chapters four and five.  
 
NRC Committee Recommendations – 70% Complete Risk Assessment  
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1. Schedule delay improves comprehensive analysis 
2. Repairs mask underlying vulnerabilities 
3. GIS usage expanded as a framework to enable communication regarding 
system-wide risk 
4. Define concepts “authorized level of protection” and “standard project 
hurricane” (SPH) 
5. More data and analysis needed for IPET to deliver system-wide geotechnical 
assessment of the hurricane protection system 
6. Assessment emphasis on the protection areas loaded to capacity without 
failing  
7. Failure of 17th Street Canal breech remains plausible.  To insure validation, 
IPET should study other plausible root causes.   
8. Direct-simple-shear (DSS) and field-vane-shear (FVS) tests should be 
conducted at 17th Street Canal breech, and results integrated with an NSF-
sponsored study. 
9. IPET should compile a historical record of significant storms in the Gulf, with 
the SPH, as an element of the probabilistic analysis. 
10. IPET should include comprehensive, understandable explanation of the risk 
and reliability methods used, including validation of probabilities assigned to 
protection system components, and clear uncertainty explanation.  
11. IPET should include two separate estimates of hurricane wave levels at 
various locations across the system. 
12. Expectations of a complete report by June 1, 2006 are too aggressive. 
Table 8 NRC Recommendations of the 70% Complete Risk Assessment 
The committee noted repair progress to the protection system damaged areas 
potentially masking broader risks across the system.  IPET explained to the 
committee the levee breech investigations led to critical root-case failure modes 
which were outside design considerations of the New Orleans levees.  The coastal 
geography near the Gulf and Mississippi River, coupled with low topography, 
increases storm surge and flooding vulnerability in New Orleans and surrounding 
areas.  Coupled with growth, urbanization and wetland erosion, the committee 
suggested formal recognition regarding continuous vulnerabilities to provide broader 
awareness of risk to the general public in the final risk assessment (NRC, 2006b).  
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New Orleans residents should increase vigilance and awareness of vulnerabilities to 
their community. 
Similar to the 30% report, the committee noted IPET should apply GIS as a 
framework for the risk assessment.  The committee further suggested IPET establish a 
website for public review of GIS-developed soil maps, levees, and other critical 
components of the hurricane protection system.  Specifically, the committee 
recommended public access to system-wide defined authorized levels of protection, 
existing levels of protection, and realistic worst-case surge and wave conditions 
(NRC, 2006b). 
IPET again neglected to define the authorized protection level and also the 
standard project hurricane, similar to 30% assessment review.  The NRC committee 
again suggested defining these terms to facilitate understanding and comprehension 
of the risk assessment.  The committee also recommended connecting these concepts 
to levee design and protection levels prior to and also after Katrina (NRC, 2006b). 
The NRC noted the magnitude of data and analysis remaining for IPET to 
deliver a comprehensive hurricane protection system geotechnical analysis.  The 
NRC suggested IPET consider the intersection between levee construction history and 
regional geologic features.  The various levee construction methods, resources, 
locations and maintenance provide opportunities evaluate hurricane impacts.  
Coupled with geologic constraints and features surrounding levees, IPET should take 
advantage of the study opportunity to collect extensive data and conduct in-depth 
analysis (NRC, 2006b). 
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The reviewers suggested IPET assess areas of the protection system which 
Katrina loaded, yet held, as a component of understanding system protection levels.  
The reviewers connected the idea of hydraulic loading, without levee failure, to 
heightened system evaluation and public risk awareness, to enable stakeholder 
understanding regarding the overall system risks and stakeholder choices to remain or 
evacuate (NRC, 2006b). 
IPET appropriately determined formation of a vertical gap in the 17th Street 
Canal levee I-wall between the concrete wall and adjacent soil on the canal side, 
indicating loading and deformation as a valid failure process.  The NRC reviewers 
criticized IPET for failing to fully consider alternate failure mechanisms associated 
with the gap development.  The committee identified IPET analysis limitations 
including full explanation regarding the gap between the soil and the levee wall on 
the canal side; Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute modeling of a similar failure 
mechanism which behaved differently than the behavior suggested by IPET using this 
model; and IPET rationalization between storm surge observations and timing 
predictions using models.  Specifically, with respect to the storm surge observed and 
predicted modeling, the reviewers noted inconsistent application of applicable datums 
(NRC, 2006b).   
The NRC suggested the case presented by IPET offering a root cause for the 
17th Street Canal breach was unconvincing, offering additional suggestions to include 
uncertainty analysis into the failure probability assessment beyond averaging over 
multiple levee locations.  The committee suggested direct-simple-shear (DSS) and 
field-vane-shear (FVS) tests at the 17th Street Canal breach site, and integrating the 
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results into previously acquired strength data. The committee strongly suggested 
IPET assess instability at multiple locations in the protection system, providing 
stakeholders with an overview of system stability. 
Reviewers criticized IPET for using the concept of a standard project 
hurricane (SPH), and omitting the definition.  The reviewers suggested IPET develop 
a probabilistic history of hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, categorizing major storms 
(e.g., Betsy, Camille, and Katrina), relative to the SPH to facilitate public 
understanding of the risk based upon choosing to live in the area. 
Development of public risk perception and understanding of the system as a 
whole, the committee recommended IPET provide explanation for the method used in 
its assessment of risk and reliability of the hurricane protection system. IPET 
evidence should validate probabilities assigned to the various parts of the system. The 
explanation should also contain clear discussion identifying level(s) of uncertainty 
associated with these results. 
The NRC suggested a two steps regarding hurricane wave estimations.  
Considering wave levels at various locations, IPET should analyze wave heights 
based on a relatively small set (e.g., ~50) of representative storms that include a 
worst-case scenario. The second suggested step involved joint probability analyses 
for a given storm along with the probability of occurrence of specific system failure 
modes. 
Noting the aggressive schedule NRC suggested delaying the risk assessment 
to insure credibility. 
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3.21 90% Complete Risk Assessment and Third Review 
The review committee met with IPET team members regarding the 90% 
complete risk assessment.  The 90% risk assessment contained an Executive 
Summary, which earlier versions lacked.  The Executive Summary contained twenty 
overall recommendations (NRC, 2006c).  The list of recommendations is included in 
Table 9.  The 90% review contained eleven recommendations contained in prior 
review reports, noted in the table as “repeated”. 
NRC Committee Recommendations – 90% Complete Risk Assessment 
1. Remove "negligence" and "malfeasance" from Executive Summary. 
2. Develop consistency between Executive Summary and report body. 
3. Align Executive Summary with the five overarching objectives of the 
IPET analysis. 
4. Discuss improving the overall hurricane protection system in 
Executive Summary, beyond specific breaches.  (repeated) 
5. Add GIS maps illuminating hurricane protection system strengths and 
weaknesses in Executive Summary.  (repeated) 
6. Expand Executive Summary uncertainty discussion regarding future 
protection system planning and decisions.   
7. Provide additional evidence regarding the IHNC breach root cause 
regarding overtopping and erosion, and the logic for limiting the root 
cause to these reasons.  (Repeated, except for location) 
8. Include shear strength of the marsh and clay deposits in the soil 
analysis, and soil field data at levee failure sites.  (repeated) 
9. Include soil profiles at the breach sites. (repeated) 
10. Include marsh and clay strength analysis at levee locations in addition 
to the 17th Street Canal.  (repeated) 
11. Include other possible failure modes, in addition to gap development 
between soil and levee. (repeated) 
12. Include property and human values in the levee protection design 
safety factor.   
13. Show erosion and its mitigation methods.   
14. Include uncertainty estimation in the assessment.  (Repeated) 
15. Describe each variable and its associated uncertainty.  (repeated) 
16. Provide risk and probability of the standard project hurricane.  
(repeated) 
17. Describe system risk in terms of overall protection, surge levels and 
other storm parameters to benefit stakeholders.    (repeated) 
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18. Develop storm scenarios aligned with joint probability discussion.   
19. Assess reliability of the present system design in terms of the Standard 
Project Hurricane.     
20. Coordinate the assessment with other agencies. 
Table 9 NRC Recommendations of the 90% Risk Assessment 
Implications regarding the 90% risk assessment and its review germane to this 
discussion revolve around the repeated recommendations, and suggested 
improvements to aid decision-making and protection system planning.  The 90% 
review provided suggestions designed to increase risk assessment value for 
stakeholder decision-making, and improve public perceptions, and offered additional 
technical improvements (NRC, 2006c).  The NRC committee validated the technical 
merits of the assessment methods, models, and processes associated with root causes 
of the levee breaches, simultaneously suggesting deeper analysis into potential 
alternative root causes, and schedule extensions to accommodate additional 
investigation. 
3.22 Volume VIII Risk Assessment and Final Review 
Two years after the final draft 90% review, the NRC committee evaluated 
Volume VIII of the risk assessment and risk methods for New Orleans.  The 
committee cited assessment strengths included levee system risk flexibility pre- and 
post-Katrina which can be modified and changed over time as needs warrant.  The 
committee also identified several aspects of the risk assessment advanced the state-of-
the-art using probabilistic methods (NRC, 2008c).  Criticisms of the assessment 
involved explanation gaps regarding assumptions, logic and limits of the risk 
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assessment, including a lack of complete presentation of the results or the method 
employed to achieve the results (NRC, 2008c).   
According to the committee, Volume VIII needed additional explanation 
regarding the Joint Probability Model, including justification and explanation for the 
number of storms as inputs to the model and a descriptive qualification of traits the 
number of storms represented.  Table 10 contains twelve recommendations, six of 
which are repeated based upon earlier reviews.   
NRC Committee Recommendations – Final Volume VIII Risk Assessment 
Chapter 1: Valid overall assessment method.  Assessment advanced the 
state of the art.     
Chapter 2: Incomplete methodology validation and explanation used to 
obtain results. (repeated)   
Chapter 3: Encouraged USACE to allocate necessary resources for 
timely completion.   
Chapter 4: Draft report contained errors.  Careful documentation of 
assumptions, data and models.   (repeated) 
Chapter 5: Finish uncertainty assessment quickly, while maintaining the 
rigor.    
Chapter 6: Develop a communication plan to increase assessment value 
for the public.   
Chapter 7: Complete additional soil and I-wall evaluations, along with 
explanations regarding single location points instead of system segments 
(repeated) 
Chapter 8: Increase climate change analysis depth and breadth.   
Chapter 9: Use flood inundation maps to validate the models. (repeat)  
Chapter 10: Explain Joint Probability Model details regarding variables 
and usage. (repeat) 
Chapter 11:  Consider including a resettlement and reconstruction 
analysis.   
Chapter 12: Conclude the study quickly. (repeat) 
Table 10 NRC Recommendations of IPET Volume VII Risk Assessment and Risk Methods 
 As New Orleans struggled to rebuild, the IPET effort contributed to 
understanding technical root causes of breaches and flooding.  In addition to technical 
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expertise and recommendations regarding hurricane protection system improvements, 
IPET included public risk communication and perception management strategies.  
 DRMS  3.22.1
3.22.1.1 Initial Conditions 
DRMS responded to a California Department of Water mandate in Assembly 
Bill (AB) 1200 to conduct a risk assessment of delta levees, including maintaining 
water quality and land preservation.  Passed in 2006, the focus of AB 1200 
enumerated nine areas related to the Delta, including an assessment of the antiquated 
levee system.  The assessment of each area was provided to the legislature in a report 
by January 1, 2008 (URS Corporation, 2009; Duffy, Armstrong, Maurer, & Mitchell, 
2006).  In contrast to the nine areas specified in the original legislation, the original 
report covered some of the nine areas, and expanded on others outside the legislation 
(CALFED Independent Review Panel, 2007).   
With respect to transparency, the IRP criticized DRMS inconsistent risk 
assessment methodology.  The reviewers were unable to follow the process or 
reproduce the methodology throughout the assessment.  The IRP indicated that the 
report is missing critical analyses, including a thorough probabilistic risk assessment, 
prohibiting following the analysis through the report to the end (CALFED 
Independent Review Panel, 2007).   
According to the IRP, the DRMS initial Phase I report failed to articulate the 
assumptions and a proper accounting methodology of the uncertainty. Additionally, 
the overall integration of the risks from the sources specified in the legislation is 
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missing.  The IRP further points out the report overlooks the impacts to the aquatic 
life within the assessment and the impacts to the Delta ecosystem.   
The DRMS legislation specified assessing infrastructure, after witnessing the 
Hurricane Katrina levee system devastation.  AB1200 outlined a two-phase decision-
making process:  Phase I was the assessment regarding levee safety and Phase II was 
the mitigation selection from potential options.  The two-phase effort failed to 
materialize in the initial risk assessment report (California Legislature, 2005; 
CALFED Independent Review Panel, 2007; California Departments of Water 
Resources and Fish and Game, 2008).  Originally intended to provide a decision-
making mechanism for Delta levees, the intial report was found inadequate (CALFED 
Independent Review Panel, 2007). 
Item 9 in the DRMS legislation suggested the Department of Fish and Game 
rate each option’s impact on salmon restoration within the Delta and its tributaries 
(California Legislature, 2005).  The IRP sought a comprehensive ecological risk 
assessment of the Delta, which is a broad interpretation of the original legislative 
purview (CALFED Independent Review Panel, 2007).  
URS, the risk assessment contractor, suggested the DRMS legislation was 
specific to the levees and associated risks, thus narrowing the focus to levee system 
(URS Corporation, 2007).  URS’ response to the initial IRP review indicated that 
elaboration regarding risk assessment methods would not change the risk assessment 
results.   Further, URS pointed out the largest levee system risks remained seismic.  
URS agreed that the treatment of uncertainty could be and would be improved with 
further work (URS Corporation, 2007). 
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The DRMS Phase I report failed the adequate documentation standard 
(CALFED Independent Review Panel 2007).  The reviewers found five broad missing 
elements, identified as Tier 1 Issues.  The reviewers elaborated on specifics within 
each element as a Tier 2 issue.  Table 11 contains the five broad areas reviewers 
found in the initial Phase I DRMS report, with examples of each Tier 2 deficiency. 
Review of the Delta Risk Management Strategy Report, Phase 1 
Tier I Issue Tier 2 Examples 
Analyses lacked transparency Poorly written; undocumented 
assumptions and methods; risk 
terminology used interchangeably; 
expert reviewers had difficulty 
following the logic.  Panel indicated the 
report failed the adequate 
documentation standard. 
Limited carry-through of analysis to end Failure to deliver complete probabilistic 
risk assessment.  Narrow seismic and 
hydraulic hazard scenarios assessed; 
report departs from the documented 
plan. Lack of comprehensive scenario 
development and evaluation. 
Limited treatment of uncertainty Uncertainty is treated as a discrete 
quantity, without propagation through 
the analyses and limited to a few 
parameters. Substandard evaluation of 
uncertainty leads to questionable results. 
Disjointed analyses – lack of integration Unclear links between multiple models 
and assumptions associated with each 
model.  Missing QA/QC processess 
regarding data management associated 
with multiple models.  
Insufficient impact assessment on 
aquatic resources 
Ecosystem assessment methodology 
description does not align with what 
was actually done.  Lack of justification 
for what appears to be a new method for 
assessing risks to fish species. 
Table 11 DRMS Initial Condition Phase I Report Issues 
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Calfornia leaders formed three other Delta conservation and risk assessment 
efforts:  the Delta Bay Conservation Plan, the CALFED Ecosystem Restoration 
Program, and the Delta Vision, which utilized the levee breach assessment 
information contained within the DRMS reports (MWD, 2011).  Authorization of 
three parallel efforts regarding Delta hazard assessment, coupled with reviewers 
interested in different risk assessment deliverables than URS provided suggests 
misaligned goals of the DRMS levee assessment authorization and independent 
reviewers’ expectations. 
3.22.1.2 Updated Assessment and Updated Decisions 
3.23 Draft 4 Phase I Assessment 
The updated Draft 4 Phase I assessment indicated flooding risk due to siesmic 
and levee seepage hazards, with siesmic risk assessed as the highest risk to the levee 
system (CALFED Independent Review Panel, 2008).  According to the CALFED 
IRP, Phase I Draft 4 risk assessment addressed most of the initial issues, enabling 
Draft 4 Phase to seve as input into Phase II development of strategies and mitigation 
efforts to reduce the Phase I identified risks (CALFED Independent Review Panel, 
2008).  However, the IRP issued a caveat to the sufficiency, advising stakeholders 
consider the predictions as directional indications of effects, instead of direct literal 
interpretations of the risk, due to the 50-year and 100-year timeline projections.   
For a second time, similar to the initial condition asssessment, the IRP noted 
deficient ecosystem analysis in the Draft 4 Phase I assessment (CALFED 
Independent Review Panel, 2008).  Reacting to New Orleans’ devastation from 
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Hurricane Katrina, AB1200 emphasized the levee system and infrastructure risks, 
including holding to the co-equality of water provision and ecosystem assessment 
(California Legislature, 2005).  IRP criticisms regarding lack of Delta ecosystem 
assessment conflicted with the genesis of the original legislated intent, thus 
suggesting a disconnect among the risk assessment stakeholder perceptions relative to 
the assessment emphasis and purpose.  This disconnect has been articulated as co-
equal, yet competing, goals of Delta water consumption for human interested 
balanced against Delta water conservation for animal and plant sustainability (Lund J. 
, et al., 2008; Lund J. , et al., 2010). 
3.24 Phase II 
According to the Phase 1 executive summary, DRMS Phase 2 originally 
intended to evaluate risk-reduction options for Delta levees long-term (DWR, 2009).  
Further, Phase I indicated proposing a new plan for the Delta Region beyond the 
purview of DRMS.  Instead, DWR indicated Phase 2 would contain possible actions 
and a Delta strategy toward reducing levee failure risks and impacts (DWR, 2009). 
DRMS Phase 2 evaluated the Phase I risks from a statewide economic impact 
perspective along three objectives: evaluation of risks and impacts to Delta levees 
from all sources over time; propose management criteria for Delta policy 
development; and, develop a levee-failure risk management strategy (DWR, 2011).  
These three objectives captured the legislated intent of evaluating potential impacts 
on Delta water supplies, included a plan for the Delta region, yet avoided improving 
or maintaining Delta water quality (California Legislature, 2005; DWR, 2011).  
104 
 
Similar to the questionable attainability regarding co-equal goals of water 
provision and ecological management, DRMS became centered politically on Delta 
water resources instead of remaining focused on the levee system risks.  Phase I 
authors clearly stated the Phase 2 would avoid suggesting a Delta plan.  The Phase 2 
evaluation of water supply impacts included a Delta management plan.  
 Coeur d’ Alene  3.24.1
3.24.1.1 Initial Conditions 
Initial conditions associated with Coeur d’ Alene depends upon the interest 
and perspective of the investigator.  From a legal perspective, the initial conditions 
associated with mining in the Coeur d’ Alene river basin stimulated multiple legal 
challenges and perspectives.  From an environmental perspective, the NRC 
recommended several suggestions EPA could employ to improve Superfund 
designation processes and methods.   
From a risk assessment perspective, the NRC suggested multiple 
improvements regarding methods and processes.  The analysis here focuses on the 
risk assessment probabilistic model developed by URS Greiner and CH2M Hill.  The 
NRC found several shortcomings, with Dr. Crouch on the committee providing 
specific criticisms regarding terminology, methodology and conclusions based upon 
faulty methods.   
3.25 Untested Hypothesis 
The PTM suggests the remediated volume of material is proportional to the 
load reduction from a remedial action for metals from a given source.  Dr. Crouch 
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indicates this is an unjustified hypotheses.  The PTM neglects to provide data or 
plausible theories connecting the proportionality of volume of material to the load 
reduction via a given source and a remedial action. 
The small probabilities developed within the PTM resulted in Dr. Crouch 
questioning their validity.  Using small numbers and probabilities, the PTM 
references effective mass of contaminated material available for leaching pre and post 
remediation, along with the respective change in material mass.  The magnitude of 
the geographic area coupled with the small number of samples relative to the area size 
leads to questions regarding validity of small numbers and associated probabilities 
within the PTM (NRC, 2005). 
3.26 Time Variation   
PTM incorrectly assumes a constant decay rate for all times and all 
remediation scenarios, thus treating time variance as a constant.  Time decays are 
typically exponential functions and not constant functions.  The PTM introduced 
relative loading potential (RLP) defined as a metal leaching rate from contaminated 
source material, such as soil.  Dr. Crouch suggested the assumption of a constant 
decay rate misrepresented the total mass of metal available for leaching.  As the 
amount of leachable metal varies across an area, a constant decay rate leaves little 
room for a variable decay rate relative to the quantity of leachable metal available.  In 
addition to the metal decay rates, the PTM indicated the decay rate of the annual 
average loading for all remediation processes is a constant, independent of the 
remediation methods, including no remediation. 
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3.27 Un-validated and Nonreproducible Values for Parameters Values  
The PTM assessment uses quantitative estimates as input values, particularly 
for the relative loading potential (RLPj) estimates and remedial action effectiveness 
(Rij) estimates.  These values are derived via qualitative descriptions.  The qualitative 
descriptions result in relative loading and remedial effectiveness quantities somehow.   
For example, the PTM suggests metal concentrations, leaching and erosion 
exposures, analysis of simple loading models, and professional judgment contributed 
to determining the RLP.  Uncertainty within the RLP quantity uses expected value 
and variation coefficient, and the assumption the uncertainty follows a lognormal 
distribution.  Dr. Crouch indicates data regarding mobility, exposure to leaching, or 
erosion are presented.  The PTM neglects to identify the simple loading models used 
or how the models were used.  Regarding professional judgment, the PTM neglects to 
connect the professional judgment with the site and influences upon the judgment. 
3.28 Incorrect Probabilistic Analysis   
Dr. Crouch documented discrepancies between the PTM and reasonable risk 
assessment logic and practice.  The PTM combined time variation of a physical 
quantity with its uncertainty.  For example, the PTM confused changes in loading in 
the Coeur d’ Alene river with estimates of the remediation factor.  The PTM 
suggested variability is the combination of both irreducible uncertainty associated 
with a physical phenomenon, and the probabilistic nature of the phenomenon.  Thus, 





3.28.1.1 Updated Assessment and Updated Decisions 
EPA limited its assessment regarding Coeur d’ Alene to the 2005 review.  Thus, 
an updated Coeur d’ Alene risk assessment with updated decisions remains open.   
 Risk Perceptions Inform Stakeholder Decisions Chapter 4:
Stakeholders perceive project risks and informed decisions differently, based 
upon individual frames of reference (Kleindorfer, Kunreuther, & Schoemaker, 1993; 
Fischhoff & Kadvany, 2011).  Using the risk assessment process shown in Figure 3, 
each case analysis connects how the risk assessment(s) informed management 
decisions through stakeholder perceptions and communication.  Foundations of the 
Risk Management Plan (RPM) involve expanding risk registers used in current 
practice.  The RPM concept includes capturing and addressing stakeholder 
perceptions, using perceptions to develop risk communication plans, thus informing 
management decisions and increasing assessment value.  
The RPM plan captures stakeholder perceptions through iterative collaboration 
between risk engineers and social science experts; subsequently enabling 
management decisions through appropriate stakeholder communication (Section 4.1 
Managing the Risk Analysis Process). Using the RPM leads to increased value-add of 
the assessment process (Section 4.2 Risk Perception Management).  Collaborative 
communication facilitates capturing stakeholder perceptions throughout the risk 
analysis process, improving risk analysis value.      
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The 1983 Red Book recognized potential conflicts of interest when risk analysts 
deliver assessments and also make risk management decisions.  To avoid this conflict, 
the Red Book suggested separating analysts and managers (NRC, 1983).   Risk 
assessment practice in the federal agencies resulted in multiple interpretations 
regarding the conceptual separation between analysts and managers.  The RPM 
concept suggests collaborating with social experts toward closing the separation while 
simultaneously avoiding conflicts of interest.   
Separation between analysts and managers resulted in inconsistent decisions 
within some agencies, leading to disconnected risk analysis processes (North, 2003).  
For example, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) process 
developed antagonistic, ineffectual sub-agencies failing to deliver risk assessments 
and associated management decisions (Johnson B. L., 2003).  Johnson (2003) 
describes how DHHS developed and documented a risk assessment/risk management 
policy leading to the process’ ultimate abandonment due to “Balkanization” within 
the agency (p. 9).  Lacking sufficient agency leadership, cross-functional teams 
developed and documented risk analysis practices, ultimately failing due to 
bureaucratic misalignment and lack of leadership (Johnson B. L., 2003).  Federal 
agencies developed and abandoned risk assessment processes (Burke, 2003; EPA, 
1989; EPA, 1992; EPA, 2000; GAO, 2006; Suter II, Norton, & Barnthouse, 2003; 
Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment & Risk Management, 
1997; Morgan, Henrion, & Small, 1990). 
Finkel and others suggest risk management begins through iteratively 
articulating decisions prior to conducting analysis, using the needed decisions as 
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inputs to plan the technical assessment (Finkel, 1993; NRC, 2008; NRC, 2005).  
Finkel (1993) explicitly refers to, “decision-driven assessments instead of assessment-
driven decisions”, suggesting the decisions at hand inform developing the risk 
assessment process, instead of analysts planning the assessment to meet a risk 
management deliverable (p. 14).  Planning risk assessment activities connected to the 
decision at hand has been repeatedly recommended since the Red Book (EPA, 2000; 
Hoch, Kunreuther, & Gunther, 2001; NRC, 1996; NRC, 2008; 
Presidential/Congressionall Commission on Risk Assessment & Risk Management, 
1997).   
4.1 Managing the Risk Analysis Process 
Risk analysts issue deliverables designed to inform decisions.  General risk 
analysis practice includes creating a risk register, using technical software tools to 
analyze the hazards, and delivering a report compiling the results.   Generally, risk 
management deliverables focus on technical aspects of risk analysis and assessment, 
as they should.   
Technical focus cannot be overstated; historically, complex project deliverables 
overlook stakeholder management elements associated with perceptions and 
communication planning.  The case analysis within this study connect stakeholder 
management of complex projects to perception management and risk communication.  
The cases contain varying degrees of perception management and communication 
planning, demonstrating the novel process with varying degrees of success. 
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In addition to the risk register, an RPM contains multiple perceptions associated 
with each option, and a mitigation path to achieve stakeholder agreement.  Social 
experts developed multiple methods regarding capturing stakeholder perceptions and 
including perceptions into decision-making processes (Fischhoff & Kadvany, 2011; 
Hoch, Kunreuther, & Gunther, 2001).  Social experts suggest capturing stakeholder 
perceptions at the outset to inform which method improves decisions.  The process 
includes verifying connectivity between decisions and hazards. 
The cases selected for this study represent a variety of analytical risk 
assessment process techniques.  If risk assessment remains defined as simply 
providing predictions and probabilities, the technical assessments reflect efficacious 
results for each case.  Assessment processes in this study refer to systematic risk 
assessment processes capturing stakeholder perceptions associated with complex 
problems, informing whether the assessment provided value to enable decision-
making. 
Discussed prior in Section 2.4.3 Red Book 2008 Update, the NRC published an 
updated risk assessment process suggesting iteratively connecting risk assessment 
deliverables to hazards (NRC, 2008).  Based upon studying these cases, the risk 
assessment process suggested in Figure 3 suggested involves collaborating with social 
experts to develop risk assessments to capture stakeholder perceptions connected to 
project hazards identified within the risk register.  The risk perception management 
plan (RPM) concept guides experts regarding capturing stakeholder perceptions 
aligned to the decisions at hand, including iterating changes in the alignment and/or 









 National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) 4.1.1
The NBAF case demonstrates issues regarding stakeholder perception 
management coupled with risk communication management.  DHS neglected to 
address stakeholder perceptions regarding agency capability to contain lethal 
pathogens in the event of a release; neglected to adequately address stakeholder 
concerns associated with locating the laboratory in Tornado Alley; and neglected to 
adequately address technical aspects of the risk assessment raised by risk analysis 
experts (NRC, 2010b; NRC, 2012; Concerned Citizens, 2008).  Technical risk 
analysis issues included lack of uncertainty analysis; flawed technical assessment 
modeling with respect to tornado models; questionable modeling projections of 
potential FMDv spread; and seemingly random initial assumptions regarding 
epidemiologic, wind and pathogenic disbursement models (NRC, 2010b; NRC, 
2012). 
Recall from Chapter 3: DHS received presidential direction to protect citizens 
from terroristic threats, including infectious agents.  Evidence in the literature 
suggests DHS perceived presidential direction included a new state-of-the-art BSL-4 
agro-defense facility designed to conduct research to keep the country safe from 
lethal pathogens, including foot-and-mouth-disease virus (FMDv) (Bush, Presidential 
Directives, 2001; DHS, 2008).  The literature further indicates stakeholders, including 
the GAO, Congress, NRC experts, and the public, perceived DHS lacked the 
capability to contain FMDv within a biosecurity facility on the U.S. mainland (GAO, 
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2008; GAO, 2009; NRC, 2010b; Concerned Citizens, 2008; 111th Congress, 2009).  
In addition to pathogen containment concerns, NRC experts questioned DHS’s risk 
analysis expertise (NRC, 2010c).  These recognized deficiencies, coupled with 
stakeholder awareness of the United States’ FMDv-free status since 1929, resulted in 
contention between state officials and Kansas residents (GAO, 2008; GAO, 2009).  In 
light of the concerns, DHS pressed forward, selecting Tornado Alley in Kansas as the 
NBAF site, ignoring community, state and federal stakeholders’ concerns regarding 
preventing an FMDv release, and containment in the event of an FMDv release 
(111th Congress, 2009; Concerned Citizens, 2008; NRC, 2010; NRC, 2012).  Beef 
industry economic impact estimates in the event of an FMDv release varied widely.  
Evaluating the two opposing websites suggests stakeholders talking past each other 
instead of conducting a collaborative conversation working toward resolving 
concerns (Concerned Citizens, 2008; State of Kansas, 2009). 
NRC risk analysis experts repeatedly documented similar deficiencies 
contained within duplicative risk assessments (Signature Science LLC, 2010; 
Signature Science, LLC, 2012; NRC, 2010; NRC, 2012).  Congressional action 
reflected skepticism when the House voted to remove $404M from NBAF for 
construction based upon safety and cost concerns, thus halting the NBAF in Kansas 
(U.S. House of Representatives, 2013).  During the 2013 floor debate, Representative 
Bishop from New York cited the two NRC reviews regarding risk assessment and 
associated safety, questioning DHS capability to prevent potential FMDv release; 
contain a potential FMDv infectious spread; and questioned the ballooning cost from 
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451M to $1B, although Bishop’s interest conflicted with moving the laboratory from 
his home state of New York.    
The House voting record documents lack of support for NBAF in fall 2013, 
including Kentucky Rep. Rogers vote to remove funding, followed by Rep. Rogers’ 
vote to restore funds in January 2014 a few brief months later (U.S. House of 
Representatives, 2013; U.S. House of Representatives, 2014).  Rep. Rogers chairs the 
House Appropriations Committee, raising open questions regarding congressional 
support changes.  Rogers, a Kentucky representative for 30-plus years, is well-known 
in his home state for bringing federal dollars into impoverished Appalachian 
Kentucky counties.  Rogers’ shift toward releasing funds for NBAF opens more 
questions about congressional perceptions overriding local community concerns.  
Kansas political stakeholders perceived NBAF economically beneficial (State 
of Kansas, 2009).  Kansas elected officials ignored expert assessments of DHS risk 
assessment capability, and instead focused on the economic impacts of the laboratory.  
In spite of NRC expert critical assessment of the two DHS site-specific risk 
assessments; and in spite of concerns raised by local Kansas residents; Kansas 
officials moved forward singing praises for securing the laboratory and its potential 
economic and employment benefits (Concerned Citizens, 2008; State of Kansas, 
2009; NRC, 2012; NRC, 2010b).   
State and federal leaders’ myopic view of near-term $3B economic impact for 
the state compared to the long-term potential $50B negative economic impact should 
FMDv escape clouded federal funding decisions (U.S. House of Representatives, 
2014).  The state stakeholders ignored the potential impacts associated with losing 
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“FMDv-free” status (GAO, 2008; GAO, 2009).  GAO (2008; 2009) and NRC (2010b; 
2012) experts repeatedly warned stakeholders regarding DHS BSL-4 laboratory-
management capability; questioned DHS capacity to manage a potential FMDv 
release in an area of potentially highest economic impacts; illuminated the magnitude 
of potential global beef industry economic impact in the event of an FMDv release; 
and questioned DHS’ ability to restore FMDv-status in a timely fashion.  
  In spite of the litany of concerns perceived by the majority of stakeholders, 
DHS managed to reverse congressional perceptions regarding the low probability of 
release and the low economic impact, convincing Congress to restore construction 
funding.  The connection between Rep. Rogers as Chair of Appropriations and DHS 
remains cloudy.  On January 15, 2014 the House of Representatives Appropriations 
Committee reinstated $404M for NBAF construction (U.S. House of Representatives, 
2014).   
The NBAF risk analysis process lacks transparency, clarity, and repeatability, 
key components established by other agencies and endorsed by independent experts 
(EPA, 2003; EPA, 2000; NRC, 2008).  The leaders driving the process neglected to 
iteratively account for stakeholder perceptions regarding laboratory operation and 
safety; neglected connecting perceptions to critical DHS expertise and management 
questions raised by experts, using a process suggested by experts; and instead forged 
ahead without satisfactorily addressing concerns (Concerned Citizens, 2008; State of 
Kansas, 2009; NRC, 2008; NRC, 2010b; NRC, 2012). 
NRC reviews experts highlighted NBAF technical risk assessment issues:  
lack of uncertainty analysis; selecting apparent random assumptions; leading to 
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criticism of low risk of infectious release, and an inaccurate representation of risks 
associated with operating the laboratory and specifically conducting FMDv research  
(NRC, 2010b).   Experts reviewed the second assessment found similar deficiencies  
(NRC, 2010b; NRC, 2012).  The expert reviews were limited to the technical aspects 
of the assessments and skills.  Review of NBAF risk assessment shortcomings, and 
DHS risk assessment skill gaps, fell short with respect to political perception 
management.  NBAF serves the research purpose because the disconnected 
politicians and local community share differing perspectives, with little documented 
effort to bridge the two.   
The Kansas government established a website documenting the positive 
impacts and support for the facility including the positive economic impact of $3.5B 
over 20 years in Kansas (State of Kansas, 2009).  A group of concerned citizens 
established a website questioning the validity of DHS risk assessments where NBAF 
skeptics point to the potential $50B national economic impact should a release of 
FMDv occur (Concerned Citizens, 2008; NRC, 2012).   
DHS discussed a Stakeholder Engagement Plan in the SSRA and uSSRA 
appendices, including establishing a Stakeholder Engagement Committee (SEC) and 
specific activities (DHS, 2010; DHS, 2012).  The DHS website containing NBAF 
documentation and reports lacks available evidence regarding the stakeholder 
engagement activities.  Undocumented purpose and activities of the SEC suggests 
questioning the validity of such a committee. 
The SEC could potentially refer to the Kansas Steering Committee, although a 
direct connection remains unclear.  DHS lacks documentation regarding conferences, 
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websites, and meetings with academics and experts regarding NBAF and laboratory 
practices.  Construction of the NBAF utility plant continues, with an unanswered 
question regarding whether FMDv can be conducted safely on the US mainland, 
compared to as safely as on Plum Island.  Congress has been convinced, as of January 
2014.  The public remains unconvinced.  As a constructive aid toward building 
bridges within the community, DHS should consider delivering the activities 
documented in the uSSRA Appendix A Stakeholder Engagement Plan (Signature 
Science, LLC, 2012).  
 National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories (NEIDL) 4.1.2
 NEIDL demonstrates increasing risk assessment value through the lens of 
process improvements by iteratively evaluating stakeholder perceptions and 
addressing perceptions through a crisp communication plan.  Thus, NEIDL informs 
this research regarding increasing risk assessment value.    
NIH developed a biodefense research agenda based upon the anthrax mailings 
in 2001 (NAID, 2003).  Boston University (BU) responded to DHS’s request for 
proposals and won the NEIDL award, one of two national biosafety level 4 
laboratories (BSL-4) laboratories under consideration at that time (the second is the 
Galveston National Laboratory & Institute for Human Infections and Immunity 
operated by the University Texas Medical Branch at Galveston).  BSL-4 laboratories 
serve research purposes on the world’s most virulent pathogens, following strict 
international laboratory practice protocols.   
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NIH released the initial Final Environmental Impact Study (FEIS) assessing 
the merits of action compared to no action.  Simply providing an FEIS indicating an 
“action/no action” assessment, NIH and BU underestimated the magnitude of 
negative community response (Boston Bar Association, 2014).  The selected South 
Boston neighborhood had been deemed a federal social justice community, meaning 
the resident demographics were largely elderly, children and other underrepresented 
populations with little voice in neighborhood activities (NRC, 2007).  Based upon this 
lack of representation, NIH and BU encountered a cohort of neighbors filing lawsuits 
to stop the laboratory construction (Boston Bar Association, 2014).  Law firms 
represented disadvantaged neighbors and community groups pro bono, raising 
questions in the court system about laboratory safety and security, causing project 
delay (Boston Bar Association, 2014).   
BU contributed to the lack of community confidence through apparent neglect 
to inform state and community stakeholders regarding tularemia infections in fall 
2004 and a BSL-3 lab fire in spring 2005 (Boston Bar Association, 2014).  Review of 
Boston Bar Association case progression documentation (2014), in December 2006 
the court ordered NIH rework the risk assessment to achieve compliance with NEPA.  
NIH subsequently argued such compliance unnecessary, to which the judge disagreed 
(Boston Bar Association, 2014).  Facing with compliance or appellant options, NIH 
instead recognized the courts’ collaboration assessing the supplemental risk 
assessment inadequacies.  Judges in both cases cited similar concerns, concurring 
together ordering NEPA compliance in late 2006, to which NIH agreed in January 
2007 (Boston Bar Association, 2014).  NIH subsequently announced the Blue Ribbon 
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Panel (BRP) to assist development and communication of the court-ordered NEPA-
compliant risk assessment.  NIH compliance with court orders, coupled with 
establishing the BRP suggest the agency recognized stakeholder perception problems, 
and began demonstrating stakeholder management connected to risk assessment 
communication process improvements.  
Using the framework suggested by this research and documented in Figure 3, 
the NEIDL case suggests a real-time connection between stakeholder perceptions and 
failure to inform stakeholders of a problem.  NIH neglect to inform officials about the 
tularemia infections and the fire suggest an understandable unwillingness to share 
required internal problems with the public.  In practice, admittedly few organizations 
voluntarily share internal issues with stakeholders, instead working to resolve 
problems before a leak occurs to provide stakeholders with a general sense of 
confidence.  Generally, many engineers practicing in industry are trained to offer 
suggestions at the time of problem identification.  Anecdotally, business books 
describe managers attesting to bringing problems in hand with solutions.  With 
respect to risk analysis, describing problems and solutions simultaneously removes 
stakeholders from the process; contributes to risk analysis confusion; and enables 
disconnection between comprehensive risk assessments and potential complete 
solutions (Kleindorfer, Kunreuther, & Schoemaker, 1993; Hoch, Kunreuther, & 
Gunther, 2001; RAE, 2003). 
NIH and BU partnering to construct the NEIDL coupled with BRP and 
community feedback throughout the process demonstrates federal agencies using 
Figure 3 to iteratively capture stakeholder perceptions and develop communication 
120 
 
plans.  Prior to establishing the BRP and developing an assessment process including 
community stakeholders and communication, NIH neglectful information exchange 
reinforced stakeholders’ NIBMY syndrome, and reinforcing negative laboratory 
safety perceptions (Boston Bar Association, 2014; Jahnke, 2013).  To facilitate 
transparent communication, the BRP and the NRC review committee discussed the 
supplemental risk assessment throughout the process, suggesting NIH fully 
incorporate NRC and community concerns into the assessments as they were 
developed (NRC, 2010; NRC, 2010a; NRC, 2011b).  NIH announced the Blue 
Ribbon Panel (BRP), a committee of experts convened to advise the agency regarding 
appropriate responses to litigation, community concerns and the initial critical NRC 
report (NIH, 2009).   
Between mid-2006 and early 2007, NIH and BU began to understand the 
impact risk communication bears on the process associated with public acceptance of 
a biosafety lab.  NIH’s actions demonstrate the connection between informing 
officials about a problem (or neglecting to inform), with improving stakeholder 
management and communication associated resolving community contention.  The 
NEIDL case demonstrates the evolution regarding meeting federal and state 
requirements with a risk assessment into a public community relations 
communication platform (NIH, 2009).   
Choosing to comply with court mandates, coupled with the establishment of 
the CLC, reflects an agency turning from isolated operations into the beginning of a 
community partner.  Legal milestones reflect a change in tone by NIH from 
condescending to cooperation when NIH offhandedly indicated a NEPA-
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noncompliant attitude, until the judges ordered NEPA compliance (Boston Bar 
Association, 2014).  In addition to NEPA-compliant standards, BU established a six-
member Community Liaison Committee (CLC), which conducted seven public 
forums to capture community concerns regarding research safety; raise community 
educational awareness regarding laboratory safety measures; and increase community 
cooperation regarding facility operation through providing open house tours 
(Laskowski, 2007).  To insure transparency, the committee eventually expanded from 
the initial six to nine members from across Boston, including three from the South 
End directly (Four Point Associates, Inc., 2013; Boston University Medical Campus, 
2014).  Beginning in 2008 and throughout the process, BU plans and programs 
regarding interactions with the community involved open houses, educational events, 
and open public forums to discuss research plans and activities (Four Point 
Associates, Inc., 2013).   The Suffolk Superior Court ruled in May 2014 that the 
Supplemental Final Environmental Impact Review (SFEIR) met NEPA requirements, 
reflected a comprehensive risk assessment, and established the operational security of 
NEIDL (Jahnke, BU Today, 2014; Sanders, 2014).  As of mid-2014, NEIDLS awaits 
final approval from the Boston Public Health Commission to conduct BSL-4 research 
(Jahnke, 2014) 
 Fort Detrick  4.1.3
The risk analysis process used during the Fort Detrick facility expansion fell 
short from a management perspective, as well as technically (NRC, 2010d).  Through 
the lens of the 2001 criminal anthrax mailings originating from Fort Detrick which 
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killed five postal workers and sickened many others, experts questioned the risk 
analysis credibility and adequacy, from both community communication and 
technical laboratory process protection perspectives (NRC, 2010d).  Laboratory 
infections acquired by workers fueled community apprehension regarding the 
expansion (NRC, 2010d).  The reviewers strongly suggested agency use of proven 
risk assessment communication processes (NRC, 2010d).  The Army, as the agency 
responsible for the lab expansion, overlooked these recommendations, serving as an 
example in this case study which could benefit from communication and perception 
management practice.  
Expert independent review of the USAMRIID facility at Fort Detrick was 
originally mandated by Congress (NRC, 2011; NRC, 2010d).  After the initial critical 
reviews, the Army recognized the value these reviews provided, requesting further 
expert review and constructive feedback (NRC, 2011; NRC, 2010d).  In addition to 
already-mentioned deliberate anthrax exposure, Fort Detrick has a history of 
laboratory-acquired-infections (LAIs) (NRC, 2011c).  Despite these assessment 
process shortcomings, risk communication and stakeholder perception management 
processes utilized during facility expansion planning changed little.  
The NRC found the USAMRIID risk assessment incomplete, indicating the 
most credible events were not foreseeable and suggesting the Army expand risk 
communication paths with the local residents (NRC, 2010d).  The community 
recognized the history of LAIs, increasing community apprehension regarding 
infection spread from the facility (NRC, 2010d).  The experts documented the 
contractor perception of the risk assessment work plan as a hurdle to overcome, 
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instead of an opportunity to collaboratively resolve community stakeholder fears and 
communicate risks appropriately (NRC, 2011). 
Fort Detrick facility expansion demonstrates insufficient stakeholder 
perception management because the Army requested NRC review as a step forward to 
build communication for the laboratory.  The Army overlooked expert suggestions 
regarding applying an iterative risk assessment framework; failed to include 
community stakeholders in the assessment process; and ultimately moved forward 
without regard to the neighborhood concerns (NRC, 2011; NRC, 2011c).  The Army 
missed an opportunity to collaboratively develop a comprehensive risk assessment 
stakeholder management process accounting for stakeholder perceptions and 
including risk communication methods. 
 Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force (IPET) 4.1.4
The IPET project demonstrated the stakeholder management process 
connection to risk perceptions and communication suggested within this study.  
Throughout the assessment development process, the review committee repeatedly 
suggested delivering the assessment in both technical and laymen’s terms (NRC, 
2008c; NRC, 2006; NRC, 2006b; NRC, 2006c; NRC, 2009).  Reviewers recognized 
providing the assessment to a nontechnical, broader public audience increased risk 
assessment value to community stakeholders.  From the outset, IPET team leaders 
developed collaborative public engagement throughout the hurricane protection 
system assessment process via public forums and feedback mechanisms (NRC, 
2008c; NRC, 2009).  The IPET leaders built the collaborative stakeholder 
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management process as the assessment progressed, iteratively demonstrating 
stakeholder management process improvements to such a degree that IPET was held 
up as a process model for the Delta Risk Management Strategy (DRMS) in 
California.  IPET demonstrated including stakeholder perceptions regarding risk via 
developing a risk perception management plan. 
Throughout the analysis process, reviewers suggested IPET include risk 
communication and risk perception elements into the risk assessment to facilitate 
improved decision-making and public understanding, and involving the community 
and providing information in terms easily understandable by the public (NRC, 2008c; 
NRC, 2009)(NRC, 2006; NRC, 2006b; NRC, 2006c).  The NRC committee suggested 
IPET iterate the assessment, including providing information to simultaneously 
increase risk awareness and also allay public fears regarding living in a hurricane 
zone (NRC, 2006).  The NRC strongly suggested connecting the societal and 
communal hurricane risk to the technical assessment of specific protection system 
elements (NRC, 2008c; NRC, 2009).  NRC review of Volume VIII, the final risk 
assessment, suggested connecting the technical assessment to overall system risk in 
laymen’s terms to improve resettlement motivation (NRC, 2009).  The IPET case 
validated in practice the novel idea of iteratively assessing risks, including capturing 
stakeholder perceptions via public comment and input, thus increasing risk 
assessment value for stakeholder decision-making.   
The primary contribution IPET makes to this study revolves around New 
Orleans residents risk perceptions connected to living in a hazard-prone area.  The 
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NRC accurately pointed out IPET contributions to assessment and geologic state-of-
the-art technical advances (NRC, 2009).   
Conversely, the NRC pointed out New Orleans’ neglect to develop and 
implement comprehensive hurricane preparedness.  The lessons learned from 
Hurricane Katrina represent common knowledge by experts and practitioners 
regarding natural hazards, civil defense, emergency preparedness, and other 
suggestions are widely known and suggested prior to Katrina, suggesting New 
Orleans and vicinity had achieved a complacency with the hurricane protection 
system (NRC, 2009).  IPET validates the study, short of specifically articulating the 
connection between an RPM and improved decision-making value.  Experts 
suggested iteratively and collaboratively soliciting stakeholder feedback, and 
developing case connects iterative risk assessment processes with increased value for 
decision-making.   
 Delta Risk Management Strategy (DRMS) 4.1.5
Risk Assessment practice which delivers a report failing to meet the needs of 
the problem at hand remains a pervasive issue (Charnley, 2003; Anderson, 2003).  
The California legislature mandated a Delta levee system risk assessment with respect 
to improving and maintaining water quality, including assessing levee hazards 
(California Legislature, 2005).  Reviewers criticized the lack of Delta ecosystem risks 
in the delivered assessments (CALFED Independent Review Panel, 2007; CALFED 
Independent Review Panel, 2008).  The difference between the ordered deliverable 
and final risk assessment deliverable suggests stakeholders held misaligned 
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perspectives about the purpose of the risk assessment, pointing to issues within the 
Delta risk assessment process.   
In the case of DRMS, needed decisions were articulated in the AB1200 
legislation.  Delta perceptions involve the politically-charged co-equal goals of 
human consumption balanced against ecological provision (Lund J. , et al., 2010; 
NRC, 2012a). 
According to the IRP, the initial DRMS risk assessment failed to provide 
useful information to aid appropriate decisions.  URS took issue with IRP Tier 1 
comments (see Table 11), including seismic risks, and revised and updated the Phase 
I assessment (Salah-Mars & McCann, Jr., 2007).  Originally due in January 2008, 
DRMS submitted Draft 4 Phase I report for review by the IRP in February 2009 
(DWR, 2009). 
Draft 4 Phase I risk assessment contained gaps, although less severe than the 
initial assessment, rendering this version suitable as an input to Phase II (CALFED 
Independent Review Panel, 2008).  However, the IRP noted several caveats and 
concerns, including the continued missing ecosystem impact analysis.  URS included 
in the updated effort clarity, transparency and traceability within the updated Draft 4 
Phase I assessment, including quantifying risk numbers and percentages for the 50- 
and 100-year levee failures, perpetuated through the Final Phase I assessment (URS 
Corporation, 2009; CALFED Independent Review Panel, 2008).   
The IRP suggested URS reduce the precision of providing a risk number or 
percentage to instead providing a general trend, given the long-term nature of 
assessing levee stability (CALFED Independent Review Panel, 2008).  This 
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suggestion aligns with the suggestions from risk communication science, specifically 
regarding the brain’s inability to process small numbers, and the human tendency to 
change decisions based upon changes in the risk presentation (Fischhoff & Kadvany, 
2011; Hoch, Kunreuther, & Gunther, 2001).  Although useful for the Phase II 
development of the mitigation strategies for the levees, the IRP suggested the updated 
Phase I report of the risks to the Delta be reviewed and utilized as input to Phase II 
with these caveats in mind.   
The Phase II analysis was reviewed and commented upon by a stakeholder in 
the process, Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD).  The MWD 
depends upon the exports from the Delta to serve the population of the southern 
California.  Delta residents infer MWD as a “bully” because of this relationship, 
questioning MWD motivation regarding Delta mitigation and risk assessment 
strategies (Delta Landowners, 2014).  That said, the two primary issues MWD cited 
included a lack of ecosystem risk analysis associated with water exports, and the lack 
of economic building block analysis, both of which fall outside the original legislated 
scope of the DRMS AB1200 assessment.  MWD’s review fails to align with the 
Phase I Risk Assessment methodology of insuring the answers provided by the risk 
assessment remain pertinent to the questions posed by the problem, as outlined by the 
NRC in the 2008 updated Red Book risk assessment process (MWD, 2011; NRC, 
2008). 
After Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the state of California recognized their 
vulnerability to a similar potential devastation, although from a different source.  The 
levees within the California Bay-Delta area are fast outpacing the current status quo 
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management practices, as pointed out by Lund and others (Lund J. , et al., 2008; 
NRC, 2012a).   
To force the state to begin addressing the inevitability of a potential economic 
and infrastructure catastrophe, the California legislature passed Assembly Bill 1200 
in 2005 authorizing the Delta Risk Management Strategy (DRMS).  Simultaneously, 
the governor initiated several other complimentary efforts to address the overall Delta 
sustainability, in addition to the levee integrity and maintenance issues (California 
Departments of Water Resources and Fish and Game, 2008).   
DRMS efforts inform this research through stakeholder disconnects.  The 
initial Phase I risk assessment developed by URS failed the adequate documentation 
standard (CALFED Independent Review Panel, 2007).  According to URS’ response, 
the initial Phase I assessment accounted for levee assessments, overlooking water 
quality availability and maintenance (Salah-Mars & McCann, Jr., 2007).  This 
disconnect suggests different stakeholder perceptions relative to the desired risk 
assessment deliverable and the resulting deliverable.  The NRC recommended 
iterative risk assessment, including all stakeholders to insure alignment between the 
problems the assessment is trying to address and perceptions (NRC, 1994; NRC, 
2008).  The concept of an RPM could address closing the stakeholder perception 
disconnect by iteratively including stakeholder perceptions regarding the co-equal 
goals of Delta water consumption balanced with ecological sustainability.  
Speculatively, these goals could be ultimately unachievable.  A process to determine 
solvability includes assessing stakeholder perceptions connected to Delta water 
consumption and ecological sustenance.  There may be other processes as well.    
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Subsequent assessment revisions met the standard for usability regarding 
decisions (CALFED Independent Review Panel, 2008).  DRMS disjointed risk 
assessment gaps, coupled with authorized disconnected Delta assessment efforts, 
demonstrate risk assessment process issues regarding iterating hazards and mitigation 
options relative to stakeholder perceptions, as the concept of an RPM suggests (NRC, 
2008; Kleindorfer, Kunreuther, & Schoemaker, 1993; Hoch, Kunreuther, & Gunther, 
2001). 
 Coeur d’ Alene 4.1.6
Superfund megasite Coeur d’ Alene informs this research on multiple levels.  
Originally this case was selected for inclusion based upon a critical NRC review of 
the contracted probabilistic risk assessment.  Succinctly, EPA confused variability 
with uncertainty regarding assessing remediation models, pointing to the 
ineffectiveness within the agency to conduct and deliver appropriate risk assessments.   
Upon further investigation, however, Coeur d’ Alene provides a rich history 
regarding the research suggesting risk assessments include an RPM.  The local 
residents and scientists of the early 20th century recognized evidence of the hazards.  
Instead of collaboration, conflict ensued, and litigation.   
The Coeur d’ Alene historical evidence is silent regarding the possibility of 
collaborating to develop a public-private partnership toward resolving pollution 
control issues balanced with corporate profits.  The concept of such a partnership 
potentially applies to recent EPA mandates for carbon emissions, for example.  
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Coeur d’ Alene provides education regarding environmental impacts due to 
corporate negligence, corporate resistance to evidence, and corporate will versus 
community will.  The litigious history documents the magnitude of the chasm 
between corporate perspectives and public perspectives.  An RPM aligned to a risk 
register developed for corporate capital investment could potentially service both 
public community and private industry interests.    
Coeur d’ Alene and its contamination apply to a variety of current environmental 
issues today.  Fracking, for example, could benefit from a healthy dose of perception 
management bridging the gaps between environmentalists and corporate decision-
makers.  Liquid natural gas pipelines could benefit also.  Stakeholders associated with 
these large, complex projects could, and this research suggests should, collaboratively 
iterate the risk assessment(s) to include perceptions, developing a perception 
management plan.  The NRC has documented the benefits of stakeholders 
collaboratively evaluating the risk assessment to insure alignment between the 
decisions and the problem (NRC, 2008).    
 Managing Risk Analysis Processes  4.1.7
These cases suggest risk analysts have an opportunity to learn from history.  The 
cases suggest including social science experts in a collaborative risk assessment 
planning process; clearly connecting risk assessment process decision deliverables to 
the hazards and problems under assessment; collaborating with social experts to 
capture stakeholder perceptions into the process; and delivering comprehensive risk 
assessments covering both technical and social perspectives regarding project 
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hazards.  For too long risk engineers and risk managers have focused singularly on 
probabilities, projections, and quantification, overlooking increasing assessment value 
through comprehensive perception and communication process planning. 
4.2 Risk Perception Management 
The practice of risk management has traditionally involved investigation and 
quantification of potential hazards and their resulting potential occurrence, viewed 
through the lenses of potential impacts associated with each hazard (NRC, 1983; 
NRC, 2008).  Social experts suggest limiting risk assessments to technical 
interpretations of probability and impact limits assessment value (Fischhoff & 
Kadvany, 2011; Botzen, Kunreuther, & Michel-­‐Kerjan, 2014; Morgan, Henrion, & 
Small, 1990; Hoch, Kunreuther, & Gunther, 2001; Kleindorfer, Kunreuther, & 
Schoemaker, 1993).  Little has been said in the risk assessment literature regarding 
extending the practice of risk management to include the perceptions held by the 
decision makers, and effects stakeholder perceptions have on decision-making.   
Risk Perception Management involves articulating stakeholder perceptions at 
the outset of planning risk assessments.  Social science experts suggest capturing 
stakeholder perceptions as a decision-making element for a variety of complex 
choices (Fischhoff & Kadvany, 2011; Hoch, Kunreuther, & Gunther, 2001).  
According to social scientists, perceptions, also referred to as frames of reference, 
contribute to human choice processes.  The manner in which options are presented 
further complicates decision-making, creating a sociopolitical conflict regarding the 
decision data and available choices (Slovic, 2003).  Framing issues across agencies to 
132 
 
include multiple perspectives has been lost as risk assessment process has evolved 
(Hattis & Goble, 2003).  This study suggests including risk perceptions increases risk 
assessment value, facilitating improved decision-making. 
The concept of risk perception management begins at the outset during problem 
definition and quantification of the decision at hand.  The notion of an RPM is 
analogous to a risk register.  As hazards become identified, the risk assessment team 
conceivably captures stakeholder perception(s) associated with each hazard.  
Agreement regarding perceptions remains the goal.  Achieving agreement involves 
negotiation, deliberation, and communication.  This study suggests including risk 
perceptions into the project management processes for large projects using a Risk 
Perception Management (RPM) plan connected to the risk register as the mechanism 
for including stakeholder perceptions regarding hazards into risk assessments.    
4.3 Perception Confirmation 
 Economic, business, and decision models and metrics exist to establish the 
formal value of something.  Confirming the value of a product involves answering the 
question, “Does the product function as intended?”  From an engineering perspective, 
the question becomes, “Does the design meet the specification?”  Confirming the 
value of a risk assessment involves answering the question, “Does the risk assessment 
address the problem at hand?” (NRC, 2008).  Valuable risk assessments lead to risk 
management decisions including all stakeholders participating in the process (NRC, 
2008).  The cases in this study suggest valuable risk assessments iteratively address 
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these questions, including stakeholder perception management processes within the 
project communication plan. 
A hurdle for many federal agencies regarding risk assessment involves 
capacity of agent personnel to iteratively include all stakeholders, taking time to plan 
the assessment, and then verifying the assessment addresses the problem (NRC, 
2008).  A missing element of risk assessment involves accounting for stakeholder risk 
perceptions, and communicating information appropriately to address risk perceptions 
and misperceptions.   
Perceptions refer to frames of reference held by different stakeholders (Hoch, 
Kunreuther, & Gunther, 2001).  The ultimate choices people make depends upon how 
a problem is framed (Hoch, Kunreuther, & Gunther, 2001).  Excluding frames and 
perceptions, coupled with communication issues, results in suboptimal decisions, 
particularly as the problems become more complex (Hoch, Kunreuther, & Gunther, 
2001; Fischhoff & Kadvany, 2011; Morgan, Henrion, & Small, 1990). 
Improving risk assessments for decision making involves including 
independent reviewer recommendations, aligning risk assessment methodology to the 
updated 2008 NRC model (see Figure 3), and including a Risk Perception 
Management plan to evaluate stakeholder risk perceptions.  Conceptually, the RPM 
reflects a formal plan capturing stakeholders’ perceptions associated with each hazard 
contained in the project risk register.  The NEIDL and IPET cases in this study 
demonstrate benefits of the suggested process. 
NEIDL risk assessment began with a simple decision whether to build the 
laboratory, evolving during ten-plus years from a generic mandated EIS into a 
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comprehensive communication and perception management plan accounting for and 
including community perceptions regarding BSL-4 research in urban Boston (NAID, 
2003; NIH (RWDI West, Inc.), 2005).  As NIH comprehended the magnitude of 
community opposition and concerns, the process expanded.  NIH established the BRP 
to dialogue with risk assessment experts, sought community feedback to inform risk 
concerns and expand the hazards under consideration, and eventually established a 
CLC specifically tasked with community engagement (Boston University Medical 
Campus, 2014; NIH, 2009; NRC, 2010; NRC, 2010a; NRC, 2011b).  Incorporating 
and addressing community perceptions has enabled NEIDL to clear all but one final 
hurdle regarding permits to conduct BSL-4 research (BU Press Release, 2014). 
IPET began as an assessment of the hurricane protection system before, 
during and after Hurricane Katrina (Link, et al., 2009).  Initially designed as an 
assessment to prepare for the following hurricane season, IPET expanded from a 
technical risk assessment regarding levee failure modes, vulnerabilities and repair 
into a comprehensive plan coupling community perceptions and communication 
(NRC, 2006; NRC, 2006b; NRC, 2006c; NRC, 2008c).  In addition to modeling risk 
communication planning, IPET advanced state-of-the-art hurricane prediction 
assessment from measuring wind speed into damage predictability (NRC, 2008c).  
IPET addressed community perception education regarding a false sense of security 
associated with living below sea level behind a complex system of levees designed 
and constructed with inconsistent different funding levels and managed from 
inconsistent management plans (Link, et al., 2009).  IPET serves as a model for the 
suggested risk assessment process shown in Figure 3.  
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NBAF, DRMS, and Fort Detrick demonstrate the hazards associated with 
ignoring stakeholder perceptions.  Coeur d’ Alene stands as an expensive 
environmental example regarding the risk assessment ignoring scientific technical 
evidence and local community stakeholder perceptions regarding contamination 
hazards. 
NBAF dysfunctional construction continues within the Kansas community 
(Concerned Citizens, 2008; State of Kansas, 2009).  According to Concerned 
Citizens, state leaders’ political motivation serves as self-promotion regarding the 
influx of federal dollars, with little regard to the potential hazards associated with 
losing FMDv-free status (Concerned Citizens, 2008).  State leaders express 
unabashed optimism regarding future high-paying jobs and federal research 
opportunities, with little regard to lack of medical infrastructure necessary in the 
event of FMDv release, or the subsequent potential economic impacts (State of 
Kansas, 2009; NRC, 2012).  Community stakeholders perceive government 
stakeholders have overlooked and ignored concerns of significant magnitude 
(Concerned Citizens, 2008; GAO, 2009; NRC, 2012).  These differences suggest 
NBAF could benefit from an RPM. 
 Perception confirmation of DRMS involved politically complex issues 
(CALFED Independent Review Panel, 2008; MWD, 2011; DWR, 2013).  Originally 
motivated as an assessment of the Delta levee system after New Orleans’ Katrina 
devastation, DRMS became another element in a statewide political controversy 
regarding water management and availability (California Legislature, 2005; CALFED 
Independent Review Panel, 2007; CALFED Independent Review Panel, 2008; DWR, 
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2009; DWR, 2013; Lund J. , et al., 2010).  According to Lund (2008) the co-equal 
goals of water availability and ecological restoration are unsustainable, suggesting the 
initial hazard perceptions of availability and restoration lack adequate exploration and 
development using the suggested iterative assessment process shown in Figure 
3Figure 3 Risk Assessment Process including Risk Perception Management.  
Expending additional resources conducting parallel efforts to DRMS supports 
suggesting the political nature of the DRMS effort, simultaneously failing to address 
the levee system vulnerabilities (MWD, 2011; NRC, 2011).  DMRS confirmed 
perceptions remain limited to the co-equal unattainable goals of availability and 
restoration, instead of moving forward toward integrated levee infrastructure 
solutions (NRC, 2012a). 
Literature regarding the biosafety lab at Fort Detrick remains relatively scarce, 
compared to the other cases selected for this study.  Stakeholders in this project 
include the Army, and the local Fredrick residents.  The Army clearly avoided 
including community perceptions, evidenced by approaching the risk assessment as a 
chore instead of a collaborative opportunity to develop a community relationship 
(NRC, 2011).  Prior unreported LAIs validated negative community perceptions 
(NRC, 2010d; NRC, 2011). 
Coeur d’ Alene history suggests collaboratively bridging scientific evidence 
with community negative perceptions (Aiken, 1994; NRC, 2005).  When the 
community recognized the hazards, the mining companies simply purchased pollution 
rights (NRC, 2005).  Superfund designation provides resources for cleanup (NRC, 
2005).  The federal government won the lawsuit against the mining companies to 
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fund cleanup (Fifield, 2009).  The critical assessment of the probabilistic model 
regarding remediating Coeur d’ Alene suggest issues with models in all these cases 
(NRC, 2005, p. Appendix F). 
The appendix authored by Crouch discusses the confusion between 
uncertainty and variability, an issue with many risk assessments even among experts.  
Crouch illuminates the assessment uses unjustified hypotheses, neglecting to provide 
data or plausible theories that the volume of material remediated is proportional to the 
load reduction from a given source and for a remedial action.  Similar inconsistencies 
abound in the early assessments of NEIDL, and continued in NBAF (NRC, 2010; 
NRC, 2010b). 
Dr. Crouch clearly quantified the discrepancies between the probabilistic 
model and reasonable logic.  He questioned the validity of small probabilities 
regarding the remediation techniques based upon the contamination magnitude 
throughout the Coeur d’ Alene basin, suggesting the model incorrectly assumed a 
constant contaminant decay rate, and therefore misrepresenting the total metal 
contamination.  His expert assessment of the risk assessment suggests the agency 
overlooked critical indicators, used invalid assumptions, and invalid technical 
methods.  Overall, he questioned the risk assessment validity, based upon 
contamination magnitude.  Perceptions involved with assessing Coeur d’ Alene 
contamination included overlooking significant issues from the outset.  Crouch 
correctly points out the questionable potential cleanup results. 
Coeur d’Alene, Fort Detrick, NBAF and DRMS risk assessments collectively 
support the social scientists’ suggestions relative to including stakeholder perceptions 
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in assessments.  Limiting risk assessment to incomplete technical analysis, 
inconsistent uncertainty treatment, without capturing and developing stakeholder 
perceptions is detrimental in several ways:  poor communication, poor community 
relations, public suspicion and mistrust, and worse, the potential for a documented 
hazard to occur (Aiken, 1994; Botzen, Kunreuther, & Michel-­‐Kerjan, 2014; Carignan, 
2014; Delta Vision Blue Ribbon Panel, 2013). 
4.4 Risk Perception Management (RPM) Plan 
  Risk Perception Management (RPM) involves expanding the current 
risk assessment and management processes to include the social science experts at the 
beginning of the iterative risk management process.  Originating with the Red Book 
in 1983, the four-step process articulated at that time specified the separation of risk 
assessment and analysis from the risk management and decision-making, using 
defaults to suggest departures from data to account for the inherent uncertainty within 
risk analysis (NRC, 1983).   
During the 30 years hence, the Red Book process has been evaluated and 
updated to include suggested improvements regarding transparency, data and process 
clarity, use of cumulative probability density functions instead of a singular 
probability, including technical improvements such as Monte Carlo and other 
analytical and subjective methods to assess risk and enable decision making (Bedford 
& Cooke, 2001; Davies J. C., 1993; Dooley, 2006; EPA , 2002; EPA, 2003; EPA, 
1989; EPA, 1992; EPA, 2000).   
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These process improvements, while indeed valid and necessary as the 
complexity of the problems has evolved, stop short of suggesting deliberate, 
purposeful perception management.  Decision science expertise and practice suggests 
including perception management into the project risk assessment practice and 
management enables optimal decision-making, particularly under uncertainty 
(Bedford & Cooke, 2001; Morgan, Henrion, & Small, 1990; Fischhoff & Kadvany, 
2011).  The process could potentially look similar to the flowchart in Figure 3.   
A drawback of accounting for perceptions could lead to delays in project 
schedule as the risk assessment extends into understanding perceptions held by 
stakeholders and decision makers.  The balance of including perceptions lies within 
perception management practice.   
The concept of the RPM involves iteratively framing and reframing 
stakeholder perceptions, working through the risk register.  Iteratively reframing 
exposes the underlying contributions to analysis paralysis, enabling optimal decisions 
(Hoch, Kunreuther, & Gunther, 2001; Morgan, Henrion, & Small, 1990).  Hindsight 
enables evaluating each of these selected projects within the postulated updated 
framework to include the risk perceptions. 
Alternatively, social scientists caution that persuasive effort could potentially 
steer a decision to positively influence a subset of stakeholders, to the detriment of 
other stakeholders (Fischhoff & Kadvany, 2011; Morgan, Henrion, & Small, 1990).  
They suggest avoiding this potential pitfall by including all stakeholders at the outset, 
thus thoroughly vetting perceptions and possible outcomes associated with those 
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perceptions in the decision-making process.  NEIDL is the example of success 
(Jahnke, BU Today, 2014). 
NEIDL and IPET reflect success with respect to an RPM.  As risk 
communication improved, framing and reframing of issues associated with 
stakeholder perceptions enabled decision improvements by strengthening 
communication processes.  Social experts suggest that as communication improves, 
perceptions are changed.  Thus the communication can be tailored to achieve a 
desired perception and subsequent decision, which is the premise behind writing a 
persuasive paper in an undergraduate English course (Hoch, Kunreuther, & Gunther, 
2001).   
IPET served the public interest well, as evidenced by the reception of the 
comprehensive nine-volume report and final summary.  Protection system evaluation 
relied upon communicating and understanding stakeholder perceptions as the 
assessment of the failed system unfolded.  The IPET process was referenced as a 
model for the State of California to emulate, given the potential similar hazards in the 
California Delta (CALFED Independent Review Panel, 2008).   
Unfortunately in the Delta, perception management processes overlooked 
conflicting constraints between water use and water conservation, contributing to 
deviation from original legislated goals, and aiding development of ancillary efforts, 
thus diluting potential comprehensive solutions to the ecological, environmental, 
infrastructural and conservational problems (California Legislature, 2005; MWD, 
2011).  The public developed a website providing a repository of the various 
conflicting reports regarding the Delta assessments and options (Delta Landowners, 
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2014).  This research suggests the Delta remains unresolved until the Delta 
stakeholders come together to iteratively frame and reframe respective perceptions 
and communicate them comprehensively.  
Also from a hindsight perspective, the deliberate inclusion of perception 
management into the NBAF and Fort Detrick risk analyses could have enabled those 
projects to successfully proceed.   In addition to ignoring the independent reviewers’ 
suggestions, the NBAF risk assessment lacked alignment between the risks perceived 
by the local community (NRC, 2010b; NRC, 2012).  Conducting the risk assessment 
for the facility expansion at Fort Detrick as a chore, instead of approaching it as a 
collaborative effort within and between the local community and the federal 
government contributed to the overarching mistrust between the stakeholders (NRC, 
2011).   
Assessing improvements from the perspective of risk perception management 
as an element of the process remains a speculative exercise.  Based upon decision 
science experts, decision-making improves when options and perspectives are framed 
and reframed, accounting for how risks are presented (Hoch, Kunreuther, & Gunther, 
2001).   
4.5 National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) 
The NBAF Final EIS (FEIS) discussed alternative sites and their relative 
merits regarding land use, infrastructure, air quality, noise, geology, water, biological 
and cultural resources, and socioeconomics, traffic, waste management, and health 
and safety (DHS, 2008).  DHS reduced the assessment regarding FMDv release in the 
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FEIS to a minimal effort, briefly indicating FMDv release as a public concern; 
highlighting a LLNL report regarding economic impact of FMDv release; and 
suggesting an FMDv release would have no impact to hunting (DHS, 2008).  
Congressional records regarding assessing FMDv release compared the limited 
discussion in the EIS to comprehensive stakeholder concerns, suggesting disconnects 
between the EIS, DHS risk assessment process, and widely-held stakeholder concerns 
(111th Congress, 2009). 
Prior to releasing NBAF construction funds, Congress mandated DHS provide 
an integrated risk assessment regarding safe facility operation, specifically addressing 
spread of FMDv and its associated economic impact in the event of a release (111th 
Congress, 2009).  DHS delivered a site-specific risk assessment (SSRA) for review 
by a panel of NRC experts.  The NRC reviewers commended DHS for including 
FMDv release via multiple potential pathways, responding to GAO’s criticism 
regarding airborne FMDv release (NRC, 2010b).   
The site-specific risk assessment contained comprehensive quantitative 
numbers, scenarios, and small probabilities, neglecting a comprehensive assessment 
regarding conducting FMDv work in Manhattan, Kansas (DHS, 2008; Signature 
Science LLC, 2010; NRC, 2010b).  DHS estimated 70% probability of an infection 
resulting from an FMDv release over 50 years with an economic impact of $9 to $50 
billion, although the SSRA characterized the risk as very low (Signature Science LLC, 
2010).  Considering the location in Kansas, DHS underestimated the probability of 
an FMDv release and its economic impact (NRC, 2010b).  Overoptimistic scenarios 
resulted in underestimated risks (NRC, 2010b).   
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DHS used arbitrary and biased assumptions in the epidemiological, tornado 
and dispersion models, which experts had difficulty following and reproducing (NRC, 
2010b).  The NRC reviewers suggested the 2008 NRC assessment process, as well as 
the NEIDL risk assessment, as models for DHS regarding the NBAF assessment.  
DHS modeling contained methodological flaws (NRC, 2010b).  The NRC 
committee of experts was unable to establish the model input parameters to the 
software used to model animal disease spread.  DHS cited limitations of the model 
regarding geography, subsequently indicating the model geographic area as a “hub of 
animal movement for the entire U.S.” (Signature Science LLC, 2010, p. 176).  The 
SSRA discussed inapplicability of a network model due to the inability to obtain 
animal movement data from 10,000 animal facilities of five different types in seven 
states (Signature Science LLC, 2010).   
Cited by the review committee, input parameter limitations and lack of 
modeling skills support public stakeholder concerns regarding underestimating an 
FMDv release and the subsequent potential economic impacts.  The reviewers further 
cited concurrence with a parallel NRC review regarding DHS shortcomings with 
respect to agency risk analysis capabilities, aligning with the deficiencies in the SSRA 
(NRC, 2010b). 
Following the SSRA, DHS published the uSSRA two years later, with similar 
deficiencies (NRC, 2012). A second time DHS underestimated the risk associated 
with FMDv release by assuming probabilistic independence within the scenarios 
(NRC, 2012).  DHS reiterated the risk assessment, yet the outcome changed little, 
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with little input from stakeholders, noted by the second review committee (NRC, 
2012). 
The SSRA and uSSRA referenced consultations with local stakeholders 
regarding mitigation and culling procedures in the event of an FMDv outbreak 
(Signature Science LLC, 2010; Signature Science, LLC, 2012).  The reviewers of 
both assessments cited shortfalls in mitigation planning efforts, suggesting DHS 
collaborate with local stakeholders to develop an appropriate process (NRC, 2010b; 
NRC, 2012).  Stakeholders’ concern regarding FMDv release and subsequent 
economic impact remains unaddressed, with little collaboration with DHS 
(Concerned Citizens, 2008).  The SSRA and uSSRA refer repeatedly to 
collaboratively developing emergency protocols and mitigation plans within the 
community, although little evidence regarding plans materialized for review (NRC, 
2010b; NRC, 2012). 
Local community stakeholders express critical concern with NBAF progress, 
in light of NRC reviews of the SSRA and uSSRA (Concerned Citizens, 2008).  Until 
January 2014, Congress withheld funding (111th Congress, 2009; U.S. House of 
Representatives, 2013; U.S. House of Representatives, 2014). 
Kansas political stakeholders continually express enthusiasm regarding NBAF 
progress and benefits for Kansas (State of Kansas, 2009).  Local and state elected 
leaders, in partnership with DHS, moved forward with construction, breaking ground 
in May 2013 (State of Kansas, 2009).  DHS NBAF risk assessment process delivered 
the desired result, at double the cost, from $500 million to almost $1 billion 
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(Concerned Citizens, 2008; 111th Congress, 2009; U.S. House of Representatives, 
2014).       
 Considering the 2008 NRC risk assessment model, NBAF risk assessment 
process failed the Kansas community stakeholders.  Experts criticized the NBAF risk 
assessments, modeling methods, assumptions, and processes (NRC, 2010b; NRC, 
2012).  Experts criticized DHS capability and skills regarding risk analysis, citing 
agency shortcomings (NRC, 2010c).  The critical risk assessment review informed 
the initial decision to withhold funding, although Congress eventually restored 
funding (111th Congress, 2009; U.S. House of Representatives, 2014).  According to 
the congressional voting record, Congressman Rogers, chair of the House 
Appropriations Committee responsible for the federal budget, changed his vote 
against funding NBAF in June 2013 to restoring funding in January 2014. 
The SSRA and uSSRA specified a Stakeholder Engagement Plan, although 
the assessment neglects to specify engagement activities (Signature Science LLC, 
2010; Signature Science, LLC, 2012).  Reviewers specifically suggested DHS 
collaborate with stakeholders (NRC, 2010b; NRC, 2012).  
Against recommendations from federal and academic experts, DHS assessed 
the need to replace PIADC on the U.S. mainland, with the possibility of reintroducing 
FMDv into the food supply.  The state of Kansas ignored capturing and including 
perception management into the NBAF risk assessment process (State of Kansas, 
2009).   
The evidence regarding NBAF perception changes is limited to the June 2013 
and January 2014 congressional records.  The research suggests the change to support 
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NBAF is politically-motivated, given the stakeholders in Kansas supporting NBAF 
construction are state and federal elected officials, and stakeholders opposing NBAF 
are local concerned citizens  (State of Kansas, 2009; Concerned Citizens, 2008).  
Website comments from community stakeholders suggest the process was politically 
motivated (Concerned Citizens, 2008).   
The gaps between NBAF stakeholders are wide.  The evidence suggests 
experts indicated risk assessments fell short, federal officials questioned whether 
FMDv can be safely studied on the U.S. mainland, community stakeholders continue 
believing they were excluded from the process, and construction started.   
The concept of an RPM involves collaboratively addressing stakeholder 
concerns and delivering an appropriate risk assessment.   An RPM capturing 
community concerns could motivate DHS to adequately address the GAO question 
regarding whether FMDv research can be safely conducted on the U.S. mainland.  A 
risk perception register capturing local stakeholders’ perceptions and concerns, and 
iteratively assessing the risks and perceptions could potentially bridge evident gaps 
between opposing NBAF camps. 
NBAF demonstrates the need for including stakeholder perceptions into the 
project risk assessment.  Experts questioned technical merits of the NBAF risk 
assessments, citing significant duplicate deficiencies (NRC, 2010b; NRC, 2012). 
DHS assessed the question associated with FMDv technical research (DHS, 2008).  
Government and community stakeholders perceived a different, larger issue, 
questioning DHS capability to safely conduct FMDv research and prevent a release, 
and economic impact associated with U.S. losing its status as FMDv-free since 1929 
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(Concerned Citizens, 2008; 111th Congress, 2009; GAO, 2009).  Stakeholders’ 
perceptions of avoiding the question regarding FMDv release and associated damage 
contributed to mistrust, withholding construction funds, and slowing NBAF progress 
(111th Congress, 2009; Concerned Citizens, 2008; State of Kansas, 2009).  Recent 
congressional support for NBAF supports the notion that the project is politically-
motivated, enforcing community concerns (U.S. House of Representatives, 2014; 
Concerned Citizens, 2008). 
Expert reviewers found several deficiencies in the NBAF risk assessment, 
supporting opposing stakeholders’ perceptions and claims (NRC, 2010b; NRC, 2012).  
The reviewers documented a lack of available infectious disease experts and 
treatment facilities in the event of an FMDv outbreak.  DHS provided small 
probabilities in tabular format experts found difficult to follow and interpret, citing 
tornadoes and earthquakes as the largest hazards (NRC, 2010b; NRC, 2012).  These 
hazards fail to address stakeholder primary concerns of an FMDv release (GAO, 
2009; Concerned Citizens, 2008).  Subsequent assessments insufficiently reflected 
pathogen releases and impacts, including FMDv, fueling stakeholder concerns (NRC, 
2012; Concerned Citizens, 2008).   
DHS insufficient risk assessment expertise supports the misalignment between 
stakeholders and the agency from a technical as well as a process perspective (NRC, 
2010c).  DHS delivered substandard technical methods and analysis regarding 
dispersion associated with weather and seismic events, neglecting to address 
stakeholder concerns associated with FMDv release (Signature Science LLC, 2010; 
Signature Science, LLC, 2012; NRC, 2010b; NRC, 2012; Concerned Citizens, 2008). 
148 
 
Combining the 2008 risk assessment model with an RPM serves to iteratively 
include and address questions regarding FMDv release and associated economic 
impact.  Development of a comprehensive risk register and associated stakeholder 
perceptions with each risk could improve the risk assessment by adequately 
addressing and responding to community concerns.  Stakeholders currently perceive 
the NBAF is being pushed upon them with little recourse or voice in the public 
process (Concerned Citizens, 2008). 
The NBAF SSRA and uSSRA produced mixed results, depending upon the 
reader’s perspective.  Political stakeholders continually express enthusiasm regarding 
NBAF progress and benefits for Kansas (State of Kansas, 2009).  Local community 
stakeholders express critical concern with NBAF progress, in light of NRC reviews of 
the SSRA and uSSRA (Concerned Citizens, 2008).  Local and state leaders, in 
partnership with DHS, move forward with construction (U.S. House of 
Representatives, 2014; State of Kansas, 2009).  From an agency perspective, DHS 
NBAF risk assessment process delivered the desired result, at double the cost, 
however (111th Congress, 2009).  NBAF construction moves forward.     
 From the NBAF skeptics’ perspectives, the risk assessment process failed. 
Experts criticized the NBAF risk assessments, modeling methods, assumptions, and 
processes (NRC, 2010b; NRC, 2012).  Further, experts criticized DHS capability and 
skills regarding risk analysis (NRC, 2010c).  The risk assessment informed the initial 
decision to withhold funding, although Congress eventually restored funding (111th 
Congress, 2009; U.S. House of Representatives, 2014).   
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The SSRA and uSSRA specified a Stakeholder Engagement Plan, although 
little evidence exists regarding engagement activities.  Congressman Rogers, chair of 
the House Appropriations Committee responsible for the federal budget, changed his 
vote against funding NBAF in June 2013 to restoring funding in January 2014, 
reflecting stakeholder engagement change (U.S. House of Representatives, 2013; U.S. 
House of Representatives, 2014).   
Against recommendations from federal and academic experts, DHS assessed 
the need to replace PIADC on the U.S. mainland, with the possibility of reintroducing 
FMDv into the food supply (GAO, 2008).  The state of Kansas ignored capturing and 
including perception management into the NBAF risk assessment process, evidenced 
from the state’s website (State of Kansas, 2009).  The evidence regarding perception 
changes is limited to the congressional efforts in June 2013 and January 2014, cited 
above.  Although the evidence remains vague, the research suggests the change to 
support NBAF is politically-motivated.  Stakeholders in the Kansas website 
supporting NBAF construction are state officials.  The website opposing NBAF is 
limited to local citizens.   
The value of the NBAF risk assessment process depends upon perspective.  
DHS valuation of the risk assessment process is questionable, given the duplicity 
between the SSRA and uSSRA.  Website comments from community stakeholders 
suggest the process was politically motivated, articulating little value for the risk 
assessments (Concerned Citizens, 2008).     
Theoretically, an RPM could serve to enlighten the politicians’ views 
regarding safety and costs, as articulated by the congressman from New York in June 
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2013 (U.S. House of Representatives, 2013).  Achieving agreement regarding 
perceptions associated with an FMDv release remains an idea, although GAO 
adequately provided evidence of the negative impacts (GAO, 2008; GAO, 2009).  In 
hindsight, an RPM describing community concerns could motivate DHS to 
adequately address the question regarding whether FMDv research can be safely 
conducted on the U.S. mainland. 
4.6 National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories (NEIDL) 
NEIDL demonstrated RPM theory in practice.  Over time, the risk assessments 
evolved to provide stakeholders with confidence their concerns were being heard, 
understood, and evaluated, culminating in the CLC (Boston University Medical 
Campus, 2014).  In addition to the technical aspects associated with BSL-4 laboratory 
operations, public concerns regarding a release were alleviated through establishment 
of the BRP and CLC, and transparent communication regarding the process progress 
(BU Press Release, 2014; Boston Bar Association, 2014).  The assessment process 
improved, including stakeholder perceptions and communication to the extent 
reviewers suggested NBAF follow the NEIDL assessment methodology (NRC, 
2010b). 
Beginning with the original NIH grant award to BU, the NEIDL risk 
assessment process evolved over 11 years.  Determining the efficacy of the risk 
assessment process for NEIDL therefore involves a time element.  Although the 
process seems to have produced the desired result – the NEIDL was complete in 2011 
– BSL-4 research faces the final approval hurdle by the Boston Public Health 
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Commission (Jahnke, BU Today, 2014).  NIH changed risk assessment contractors 
throughout the process, leading to the conclusion NIH recognized the need for risk 
communication at the expense of contractors who did not. 
The initial risk assessment deemed inadequate was conducted by RWDI West 
(NIH (RWDI West, Inc.), 2005).  Each subsequent NRC review strongly repeatedly 
articulated the exclusion of prior recommendations, and the need to utilize the 2008 
updated Red Book iterative assessment process (NRC, 2010; NRC, 2010a; NRC, 
2011b).  The critical NRC reports throughout the process leads to the conclusion the 
Tetra Tech team failed to prioritize an iterative, transparent, feedback process.  The 
SFIER, delivered by Four Point Associates, meets NEPA requirements, enabling the 
approval process toward BSL-4 research to move forward (Four Point Associates, 
Inc., 2013; Jahnke, 2013; Jahnke, BU Today, 2014). 
Determining process efficacy of the NEIDL risk assessment includes studying 
the risk communication methods and process, including an RPM.  NIH and BU 
demonstrate the theory of an RPM, without calling it out specifically.  Recognizing 
the need to communicate risks effectively, responsively, and completely, NIH 
developed critical elements of the theory, starting with the sources of risk hazards 
shown prior in Figure 2.   
Following expert and community input, NIH iteratively developed risk 
assessments using open, transparent communication with NRC and the public (NIH, 
2008; NRC, 2008d; NRC, 2010; NRC, 2010a; NRC, 2011b).  The NEIDL website 
shows the commitment to open engagement with the community.  The open, critical 
and iterative review of interim risk assessments throughout the process demonstrates 
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NIH perception management.  NIH incorporation of all NRC recommendations into 
the final assessment demonstrates a comprehensive feedback loop. 
Beginning with the original NIH grant award to BU, the NEIDL risk 
assessment process evolved over 11 years.  Determining the value of the risk 
assessment process for NEIDL therefore involves a significant time element.  
Although the process seems to have produced the desired result – the NEIDL was 
complete in 2011 – BSL-4 research faces the final approval hurdle by the Boston 
Public Health Commission (Jahnke, BU Today, 2014).  NIH changed risk assessment 
contractors throughout the process, leading to the conclusion NIH recognized the 
need for risk communication at the expense of contractors who did not. 
The initial risk assessment deemed inadequate was conducted by RWDI West 
(NIH (RWDI West, Inc.), 2005).  Each subsequent NRC review strongly repeatedly 
articulated the exclusion of prior recommendations, and the need to utilize the 2008 
updated Red Book iterative assessment process (NRC, 2010; NRC, 2010a; NRC, 
2011b).  The critical NRC reports throughout the process leads to the conclusion the 
Tetra Tech team failed to prioritize an iterative, transparent, feedback process.  The 
SFIER, delivered by Four Point Associates, meets NEPA requirements, enabling the 
approval process toward BSL-4 research to move forward (Four Point Associates, 
Inc., 2013; Jahnke, 2013; Jahnke, BU Today, 2014). 
Studying the NEIDL risk assessment process includes unraveling complex 
risk communication methods and processes utilized within the court system and 
public forums.  NIH and BU demonstrate the theory of an RPM, without calling it out 
specifically.  Recognizing the need to communicate risks effectively, responsively, 
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and completely, NIH developed critical elements of the theory, starting with the 
sources of risk hazards shown prior in Figure 2. 
NIH established the BRP as a resource for the risk assessment, although the 
initial interaction fell short of this goal (NIH Blue Ribbon Panel, 2008; NIH, 2009).  
Following expert and community input, the BRP and the risk assessment contractor 
iteratively developed risk assessments using open, transparent communication with 
NRC reviewers and the public, including public (mis)perceptions associated with 
establishing a BSL-4 laboratory in an urban area (NRC, 2010; NRC, 2010a; NRC, 
2011b). 
The NEIDL website is evidence of commitment to open engagement with the 
community.  The open, critical and iterative review of interim risk assessments 
throughout the process demonstrates NIH perception management.  NIH 
incorporation of all NRC recommendations into the final assessment demonstrates a 
comprehensive feedback loop.  
 
4.7 Fort Detrick 
The proposed model provides protocol framework for conducting, developing 
and delivering risk analyses for these large projects could turn inconsistent risk 
analysis performance into credible, sustainable, repeatable risk assessment efforts 
across all agencies.  Involving all the stakeholders from the start, clearly articulating 
the problem the assessment should address, iteratively capturing the perceptions held 
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by stakeholders to generate an RPM, and overall iteration of the risk analysis process 
for making choices would serve the agencies, and ultimately, the public good. 
Risk assessment process efficacy regarding Fort Detrick high-containment 
laboratory facilities involves evaluating the relationship between Army leadership 
and the local community.  The community continues to exhibit skepticism regarding 
facility safety (Carignan, 2014). 
The facility is under construction, scheduled for completion in May 2015 due to 
a welding fire in 2013 (Carignan, 2014).  Within this research, risk assessment 
process efficacy involves more than constructing a laboratory facility, however.  
Using the 2008 updated Red Book process as a starting point, this research suggests 
process efficacy includes public perceptions associated with high-risk projects, and 
developing a consistent risk assessment methodology within federal agencies to 
account for public perceptions.  
The proposed model provides protocol framework for conducting, developing 
and delivering risk analyses for these large projects could turn inconsistent risk 
analysis performance into credible, sustainable, repeatable risk assessment efforts 
across all agencies.  Involving all the stakeholders from the start, clearly articulating 
the problem the assessment should address, iteratively capturing the perceptions held 
by stakeholders to generate an RPM, and overall iteration of the risk analysis process 
for making choices would serve the agencies, and ultimately, the public good. 
Risk assessment process value regarding Fort Detrick high-containment 
laboratory facilities involves evaluating the relationship between Army leadership 
and the local community.  The community continues to exhibit skepticism regarding 
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facility safety (Carignan, 2014).  The facility is currently under construction, although 
delayed due to a welding fire in August 2013 (Carignan, 2014).   
The Fort Detrick risk assessment process includes neglecting public perceptions 
associated with high-risk projects.  The little available literature regarding insufficient 
risk assessment depth, overlooking community involvement, suggests the Army 
develop consistent risk assessment methodology to account for public perceptions 
(NRC, 2011).   
4.8 Interagency Protection Evaluation Taskforce (IPET) 
IPET developed risk assessments regarding five areas of the hurricane 
protection system:  pre-Katrina protection system design; storm surge and waves, and 
protection system performance during the storm; societal consequences of the storm; 
and future risks to the New Orleans area (NRC, 2009).  The IPET assessment process 
advanced risk assessment practice regarding predicting hurricane surge and wave 
effects by incorporating storm motion, intensity, size and barometric pressure as 
parameters in addition to the Saffir-Simpson 1 to 5 hurricane strength scale (USACE, 
2014).  According to the IPET assessment, hurricane risk reduction planning has 
advanced to include size, strength, motion and track, which affect storm surge. 
The IPET risk assessment exemplifies practicing iteratively developing a 
comprehensive RPM with all stakeholders.  Assessing perceptions associated with a 
hazard is a critical component of an RPM.  Iterating the assessment is also a 
component suggested in this research and also by the NRC (NRC, 2008).  Through 
the course of development, IPET iteratively considered public perceptions associated 
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with living behind protection levees because New Orleans residential and 
infrastructure development advanced without equivalent protection system advances 
(USACE IPET, 2006).   
4.9 Pre-Katrina protection system design 
The IPET comprehensive assessment regarding the pre-Katrina protection 
system design indicated the system “did not perform as a system…a system in name 
only” (USACE IPET, 2006), page I-3.  The NRC review committee repeatedly 
criticized IPET for neglecting to evaluate the protection system as a comprehensive 
system (NRC, 2006; NRC, 2006b; NRC, 2006c).  System design and construction 
evolved over 50-plus years, with multiple stakeholders providing varying resources, 
materials, and design and construction methods (USACE IPET, 2006). During that 
time, levees had subsided (eroded), varying levee heights were approved, and New 
Orleans residents established a false sense of security in a less-than-capable system.   
Katrina arrived, validating to residents of New Orleans the weakest link of a 
“system” breaks the system.  Katrina exposed multiple weak links, with catastrophic 
results.  The storm exceeded design criteria.  Protection components contained 
inconsistent protection levels and construction materials.  City planners neglected to 
develop evacuation and assistance protocols for a city as vulnerable as New Orleans.  
Everyone in New Orleans recognized the city sits lower than sea level and is 
surrounded by water, increasing the vulnerability, according to IPET.  This lack of 
planning acutely impacted the city’s large poor elderly population living in the lowest 
points of the “bowl” (USACE IPET, 2006).     
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4.10 Storm Surge and Waves 
Hurricane Katrina hydraulic forces and water levels exceeded the system 
design criteria.  Surge levels were five or six feet higher than the design levels for the 
southern and eastern sides of the system.  Wave heights approximated the design 
criteria, with the exception of Plaquemines Parish where the waves were significantly 
higher.  Wave periods extended three times longer than the design criteria, leading to 
levee overtopping.  The design criteria assumed 1-foot-high waves.  Katrina delivered 
4-foot-high waves. 
The NRC review committee repeatedly commented IPET should define the 
Standard Project Hurricane (NRC, 2006; NRC, 2006b).  IPET indicated the hurricane 
protection system used four different standard project hurricanes (SPH) (USACE 
IPET, 2006).  Inconsistent storm characterization guided protection system 
development, preventing IPET settling onto one SPH model.  IPET extended 
hurricane modeling incorporating storm motion, intensity, size and barometric 
pressure as parameters, going beyond the Saffir-Simpson Scale of one parameter 
(wind strength) (USACE IPET, 2006).  
4.11 Protection system performance during the storm 
Katrina left 50 major breaches in her wake (USACE IPET, 2006).  According 
to IPET, four of these were due to foundation gaps forming between the levee and 
adjacent soil.  The remaining 46 were due to overtopping waves and erosion from the 
wave speeds (USACE IPET, 2006).  IPET noted the development of gaps as a failure 
mechanism was excluded from the original structure design.  
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Eighty percent of the New Orleans metropolitan area flooded due to breaches 
(2/3), and overtopping (1/3).  Seventy percent of the flooding in Orleans East Bank 
was traced to three foundation failures in that area, according to IPET. 
 Breaches occurred due to inconsistent transitions between protection types 
across the system (USACE IPET, 2006).  Breach vulnerabilities resulted from 
transitions under different management operations, incomplete authorized 
construction, and levee/floodwall city service openings (USACE IPET, 2006).  
4.12  Societal consequences of the storm 
Human casualties were over 1500.  Flood depth correlated to the lowest parts 
of the city, where most poor, elderly and disabled citizens resided, thus these groups 
sustained the largest impact (USACE IPET, 2006).  IPET determined residents unable 
to quickly evacuate are at highest risk. 
Katrina damage exceeded $20 billion.  Residences bore $16 billion of this 
figure, commercial interests $2.4 billion, and infrastructure $6 to $6.7 billion, with 
$2.8 billion of infrastructure to the hurricane protection system (USACE IPET, 2006).   
4.13 Future risks 
The NRC committee repeatedly suggested IPET develop comprehensive GIS 
and geodetic flood inundation maps (NRC, 2006; NRC, 2006b; NRC, 2006c).  IPET 
found inconsistent water level reporting due to subsidence over time, thus changing 
the sea level datums necessary to develop maps, resulting in map delivery delay as 
part of the Risk Assessment – Volume VIII (USACE IPET, 2006).  The review 
committee suggested IPET provide further discussion using the maps regarding risk 
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implications across the region (NRC, 2009).  The committee further suggested IPET 
collaborate with other agencies regarding inundation map development to improve 
consistency, and enable improving understanding future vulnerabilities to enable 
relocation and restoration decision-making. 
The NRC noted IPET advanced the practice of assessing regional risks 
associated with hurricanes (NRC, 2008c; NRC, 2009).  IPET developed a novel 
method of hurricane characterization and inundation predictability (USACE, 2014).  
In addition to technical advanced, IPET considered citizens’ perceptions associated 
with living behind levees, below sea level (USACE, 2014; NRC, 2009).  IPET further 
advanced preparation planning to assist metropolitan areas associated with 
reconstruction, levee restoration, and resettlement (NRC, 2009).   
Katrina elevated comprehensive public perspective regarding risks of living 
behind levees, raising the   priority and value of storm characteristics within levee 
design and construction (NRC, 2009).  The resulting comprehensive risk assessment 
provides guidance to USACE and New Orleans-area stakeholders regarding 
rebuilding the protection system, resettling residential areas, and returning 
commercial opportunities to pre-Katrina levels (USACE, 2014). 
IPET developed risk assessments regarding five areas of the hurricane 
protection system:  pre-Katrina protection system design; storm surge and waves, and 
protection system performance during the storm; societal consequences of the storm; 
and future risks to the New Orleans area (NRC, 2009).  The IPET assessment process 
advanced risk assessment practice regarding predicting hurricane surge and wave 
effects by incorporating storm motion, intensity, size and barometric pressure as 
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parameters in addition to the Saffir-Simpson 1 to 5 hurricane strength scale (USACE, 
2014).  According to the IPET assessment, hurricane risk reduction planning has 
advanced to include size, strength, motion and track, which affect storm surge. 
The IPET risk assessment exemplifies practicing iteratively developing a 
comprehensive RPM with all stakeholders.  Assessing perceptions associated with a 
hazard is a critical component of an RPM.  Iterating the assessment is also a 
component suggested in this research and also by the NRC (NRC, 2008).  Through 
the course of development, IPET iteratively considered public perceptions associated 
with living behind protection levees because New Orleans residential and 
infrastructure development advanced without equivalent protection system advances 
(USACE IPET, 2006).   
4.14 Delta Risk Management Strategy (DRMS) 
The DRMS decisions remain open questions.  Delta management stakeholders 
continue struggling with co-equal goals of water consumption and ecological 
sustainability (NRC, 2011; NRC, 2012a).  Delta construction of conveyance systems 
continues (Delta Landowners, 2014).  The Delta remains a disjointed effort among 
stakeholders with various perceptions misaligned toward closing risk assessment gaps 
(DWR, 2013; Delta Vision Blue Ribbon Panel, 2013; Delta Landowners, 2014). 
The research suggests URS and DWR recognized Delta political sensitivity 
among stakeholders, choosing to limit the risk deliverable to the technical aspects of 
the levee infrastructure (DWR, 2009; DWR, 2011; DWR, 2013).  The lack of Delta 
management collaboration , while much needed, and indeed suggested by the NRC in 
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2008 for conducting comprehensive risk assessments, has yet to occur (Lund J. , et 
al., 2008; NRC, 2012a).   
In addition to the recommended collaboration, the DRMS effort could benefit 
from incorporating social science risk communication and risk perception 
management including an RPM, to provide a comprehensive management plan.  
Originated as a response to Katrina’s devastation in New Orleans, the Delta 
management effort, including DRMS and the other authorized efforts, could benefit 
from a comprehensive risk communication plan similar to IPET.  Indeed, the NRC 
suggested Delta stakeholders use the USACE IPET effort regarding the New Orleans 
hurricane protection system as a model for assessing water sustainability and 
consumption management and associated levee risk management decisions (NRC, 
2012a). 
Utilizing the NRC 2008 iterative risk assessment model as the starting point, 
this research focuses on the DRMS levee risk assessment from the perspective of 
adding value to the stakeholders through inclusion and development of a risk 
perception management plan into the risk assessment for making decisions, including 
whether the assessment provides a reasonable value for the stakeholders.  As shown 
in Figure 3, this particular model is an extension and expansion of the original 1983 
Red Book model and its subsequent 2008 updated model (NRC, 1983; NRC, 2008).   
4.15 Coeur d’ Alene 
Coeur d’Alene represents the difficulties managing the spectrum of perceptions.  
EPA’s assessment regarding remediation indicated possible restoration is achievable 
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(NRC, 2005).  According to Crouch, a dissenting reviewer of the EPA Coeur d’ 
Alene remediation assessment, the plan lacked a proven risk assessment process 
(NRC, 2005).  His critical comments reflect EPA’s evolution away from providing 
transparent risk characterization.  For example, EPA published a risk characterization 
process documenting comprehensive transparency, clarity, consistency and 
reasonableness (TCCR) (EPA, 2000).  EPA published guidance regarding superfund 
site assessments, environmental assessments, and cumulative risk assessments (EPA, 
2003; EPA, 1989; EPA, 1992).  Crouch argued the probabilistic model regarding 
Coeur d’ Alene remediation restoration documented unreliable risk assessments 
which could be independently validated; assumed questionable hypotheses and 
distribution shapes; leading to an incorrect analysis (NRC, 2005). 
Edmund A. C. Crouch, PhD, describes issues with the probabilistic model 
(TPM) for estimating metal loading and effectiveness of the remedial action in 
Appendix F of the Coeur d’Alene superfund document (NRC, 2005).  Dr. Crouch 
specifically questions the TPM author’s assumption of the variability and uncertainty 
distributions as lognormal distributions.  He explains the TPM author’s confused 
uncertainty with time variation.  Dr. Crouch further indicates uncovering 
typographical errors in the analytical equations.  He specifically articulates four 
deficiencies within the remediation analysis:  1. the analysis depends upon an 
untested hypothesis; 2. Issues with the treatment of time variation; 3. Undocumented, 




Regarding the unjustified hypotheses in the analyses, Crouch indicates the 
author neglected providing data or plausible theories regarding the relationship 
between remediated material volume and source material volume for a specific 
remedial effort.  The author postulated the volume of material remediated is 
proportional to the load reduction from a given source and for a remedial action 
without providing data or potential theories supporting this suggested relationship.   
Crouch suggests the TPM authors incorrectly treated value and time variance 
following a remediation by assuming a constant decay rate for all times and all 
remediation scenarios.  The TPM introduced a quantity called relative loading 
potential (RLP) defined as the leaching rate of metal from contaminated source 
material.  Dr. Crouch suggested the assumption of a constant decay rate 
misrepresented the total mass of metal available for leaching.  He indicated a constant 
decay rate left little room for a variable decay rate dependent upon the quantity of 
available leachable metal.  TPM authors indicated a constant the decay rate of the 
annual average loading for all remediation processes across a variety of remediation 
methods, including no remediation.   
Dr. Crouch quantified the discrepancies between the TPM and reasonable logic 
clearly.  He articulated the small numbers provided by the TPM and questioned the 
validity of those values through references to the effective mass of the contaminated 
material available for leaching pre and post remediation, along with the respective 
change mass. 
Coeur d’ Alene lacked a technically valid risk assessment process (NRC, 2005).  
Critical NRC comments reflect EPA’s evolution away from providing transparent risk 
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characterization (EPA, 2000; NRC, 2005).  For example, EPA issued the risk 
characterization process documenting comprehensive transparency, clarity, 
consistency and reasonableness (EPA, 2000).  Coeur d’ Alene demonstrates the 
agency shift toward unreliable risk assessments which cannot be independently 
validated (NRC, 2005). 
4.16 Going Forward 
Issues in modern risk assessment cross many engineering disciplines (Crump, 
2003; Harris, 1990; Machina, 1990; McClellan & North, 1994; Suter, 2006).  Failure 
to utilize the updated NRC risk assessment methodology leads to a lack of 
transparency, clarity, consistency and reasonable results (EPA, 2000).  Neglecting 
stakeholder perceptions and communication considerations widen gaps between 
opposing camps associated with complex projects. 
Science and decisions often misalign to meet the epistemic needs within 
decision-making.  Using the 2008 process as a framework for risk analysis, in an 
iterative fashion, with all stakeholders, and extending the analysis to iteratively 
account for risk perception including an RPM, increases risk assessment value from 
the outset.  Increasing value through capturing stakeholder perceptions associated 
with the hazards in early stages of risk assessment contributes to reducing analysis 
paralysis, potentially improving decision-making (Hoch, Kunreuther, & Gunther, 
2001). 
Risk assessment iterations incorporating reviewer recommendations for each 
case did not always result in improved risk assessments.  Fort Detrick continually 
165 
 
cultivated mistrust with community stakeholders because each assessment neglected 
to include prior reviewer recommendations, limited community involvement and 
input, and the contractor conducting the assessment viewed the process as a hurdle to 
overcome instead of a community collaboration (NRC, 2010d; NRC, 2011; NRC, 
2011c).  The DRMS analysis remains incomplete, ultimately becoming a political 
hurdle regarding a scarce resource instead of an assessment of Delta levee system 
health and fragility (CALFED Independent Review Panel, 2008; MWD, 2011).  The 
NEIDL analysis improved to such an extent that it was held up as a model for IPET 
and NBAF (NRC, 2010b; NRC, 2006b).  Coeur d’Alene lessons involve 
comprehensively assessing damage after contamination occurred.  As Crouch 
critically points out, community stakeholders deserve accurate assessments regarding 
futility of mitigation efforts (NRC, 2005).  Some experts, such as Crouch, argue that 
Coeur d’ Alene contamination remains irreparable, suggesting scientists learn from 
















 Risk Communication and Stakeholder Management Chapter 5:
Project management practice suggests developing a communication plan 
utilized throughout the project lifecycle.  According to social science experts, the 
majority of human communication involves nonverbal components, with verbal 
communication limited to seven percent of the total communication pipeline (Daniels, 
Kettl, & Kunreuther, 2006; Fischhoff & Kadvany, 2011).   Evidence in these cases 
suggest risk engineers consider effectively communicating risk information.  The 
cases presented here suggest an integrated, multi-skilled, expanded risk assessment 
process beyond estimating event frequencies and calculating probabilities.  This 
research suggests engineers incorporate social science processes regarding 
communicating technical information into risk assessments; become increasingly 
cognizant of collaborating with social experts regarding communication plan 
development; and thus facilitate improvements in risk assessment stakeholder 
management leading to potential project performance improvements. 
5.1 Risk Communication Principles and Practices 
The cases suggest increasing awareness of nonverbal communication 
components during risk communication plan development, connecting 
communication plans to the risk register, and thus increasing awareness regarding 
human tendencies associated with risk information presentation (Fischhoff & 
Kadvany, 2011; Bureau of Reclamation, 2011; Botzen, Kunreuther, & Michel-­‐Kerjan, 
2014; Morgan, Henrion, & Small, 1990; RAE, 2003).  Independent reviewers 
associated with each case presented in this research suggested using social expertise 
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in communication plan development and dissemination (CALFED Independent 
Review Panel, 2008; NRC, 2010a; NRC, 2009; NRC, 2005; NRC, 2010). 
Experts suggest good communication practice involves iterative, inclusive 
communication (Hoch, Kunreuther, & Gunther, 2001; NRC, 2008).  As the risk 
assessment is developed and iterated, the communication plans also evolve into 
comprehensive communication updates regarding project risks, mitigation 
alternatives, and decisions as the project progresses.  NEIDL demonstrated inclusive 
iterative communication evolution only after the BRP was formed and assigned to 
provide guidance to NIH.  IPET iterated the plans from the outset and throughout the 
levee assessment process.  The remaining four cases demonstrated lack of iterative 
communication, and the resulting associated damage to community relationships. 
Experts suggest engineers carefully consider presenting probabilities and 
associated uncertainties (Kleindorfer, Kunreuther, & Schoemaker, 1993).  According 
to social science experts, small numbers or probabilities tend to cloud human 
cognitive abilities, reducing our limited capability to understand and perceive 
numbers, percentages and ratios less than one (Hoch, Kunreuther, & Gunther, 2001).  
Consulting with social experts informs risk communication plans for engineers 
assessing low-frequency, high-impact risks.     
Experts further suggest using audience-appropriate, practical language, 
providing a balanced, comprehensive response to each concern or groups of concerns 
stakeholders hold (EPA, 2000; Daniels, Kettl, & Kunreuther, 2006; NRC, 2012; 
NRC, 2009).  Social experts collaborating with engineers guiding language, tone, and 
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assessment technical information serves to inform stakeholders, leading to improved 
decisions. 
5.2 Case Risk Communication 
The cases demonstrate the spectrum of risk communication practice.  NIH 
recognized stakeholders needed to feel safe with infectious diseases nearby, changing 
NEIDL communication from defensive in the courts to collaborative within the 
community.  The IPET team developed communication designed to increase 
awareness relative to levee fragility and system sustainability, which sometimes 
instead cultivated stakeholder mistrust and resistance (NRC, 2006c; NRC, 2009).  
NBAF and Fort Detrick project staff neglected to include appropriate communication 
practice, resulting in resentful stakeholder communities (NRC, 2011; NRC, 2012; 
Concerned Citizens, 2008).  DRMS communication succumbed to political pulls 
between competing interests, evidenced by the critical review indicating overlooking 
environmental and water provision goals.  Coeur d’ Alene communication involves 
critical expert review of questionable technical assessment processes, suggesting 
modern stakeholders’ resignation to contamination permanence (NRC, 2005).  
 National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories (NEIDL) 5.2.1
Communication plans associated with the NEIDL project changed from legal 
antagonistic responsiveness into collaborative community public relations efforts.  
The legal communication has been discussed prior in Chapter 3:.  The BRP suggested 
NIH change its communication process through a specific frequency of open forums; 
170 
 
categorically capturing and responding to stakeholder concerns; and incorporating 
expert suggestions into the risk assessment development and review process.    
Although lacking a risk communication plan at the outset, NIH recognized 
providing transparent, clear, communication as a critical component of facility 
success.  Establishing the Community Liaison Committee (CLC) in 2006 contributed 
to the successful completion of the facility, achieving endorsement of the risk 
assessments by independent expert reviewers, the courts, and ultimately the local 
community (BU Press Release, 2014).  The evolution of NEIDL risk communication 
serves as a model for other projects.   
NEIDL risk assessment iterations demonstrate suggested stakeholder 
management communication process improvements.  The NEIDL case exemplifies 
project communication planning concepts, including the concept of an RPM 
associated with stakeholder perception connected with communication management.  
Including communication plans into the RPM concept involves iteratively responding 
to perceptions associated with stakeholder concerns assigned to each risk.  The 
NEIDL risk assessment process became a model suggested to DHS for the NBAF 
facility in Kansas. 
 Interagency Performance Evaluation Taskforce (IPET) 5.2.2
The IPET team employed a risk communication plan to capture stakeholder 
perspectives and concerns.  Although levee issues involved multiple technical 
disciplines, and experts from a wide variety of technical backgrounds, including risk 
communication principles resulted in a comprehensive risk assessment which 
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advanced levee construction and hurricane protection system risk assessment 
methodology (NRC, 2008c).  These expert reviewers noted the comprehensive styles 
and efforts demonstrated by the IPET team.  The IPET case demonstrates stakeholder 
engagement connections between stakeholder perceptions and communication 
planning through an RPM concept associated with stakeholder perception and 
communication management.  Subsequently, IPET became an example for DRMS 
levee evaluation (CALFED Independent Review Panel, 2008; CALFED Independent 
Review Panel, 2007). 
 National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) 5.2.3
The NBAF SSRA relied heavily on providing probability tables containing 
small numbers in decimal formats to show risk event probabilities (Signature Science 
LLC, 2010; Signature Science, LLC, 2012).  Small probabilities reflect incomplete 
communication plans, previously discussed as a source of confusion for decision 
makers (Kleindorfer, Kunreuther, & Schoemaker, 1993).    This communication gap 
contributed to the duplicity of the deficiencies articulated by two independent review 
committees, further reinforcing congressional and public skepticism (NRC, 2010b; 
NRC, 2012).  Expert reviewers suggested DHS and stakeholders collaboratively 
develop the risk assessment to include stakeholders’ concerns regarding conducting 
infectious disease research near susceptible animal populations, instead of simply 
providing tables of small probabilities and numbers inconceivable.  The NBAF 
project combined several risk assessment process communication issues:  ignoring 
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communication presentation effects; neglecting to respond to the technical 
deficiencies described by expert reviewers; and lacking stakeholder involvement.   
 Fort Detrick 5.2.4
The Fort Detrick assessment reflected incomplete communication regarding 
risks associated with potential lab-acquired infections (LAIs), as had occurred in the 
past at Fort Detrick, thus overlooking foreseeable problems and extending into 
incomplete risk characterization and insufficient communication with resident 
stakeholders.  Expert reviewers of the Fort Detrick assessment suggested the Army 
iteratively develop risk assessments, including proven communication practices   
(NRC, 2011; NRC, 2011c).    
The Army instead delivered an incomplete risk assessment work plan from 
which experts were unable to glean useful practical assessment value, noting the 
Army’s reluctance to clearly communicate with public stakeholders, thus widening 
the communication gap between communication stakeholders and Army leadership at 
Fort Detrick (NRC, 2011).   The analysts conducting the risk assessments missed an 
opportunity to collaboratively align with the community, and thus potentially improve 
Army relationships locally.   
Public stakeholders remained unconvinced of the Army’s capabilities to 
construct a safe infectious disease laboratory.  Subsequently, the Army moved 
forward, changing the project plan from constructing a new facility to refurbishing an 
existing facility (NRC, 2011c).   
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 Delta Risk Management Strategy (DRMS) 5.2.5
The issues involving managing, refurbishing, retaining, and restoring the levee 
system are notably complex.  A complex array of stakeholders claims the levee 
system, further complicating the risk communication processes.  The DRMS risk 
assessment deviated into this complex political foray equally focused on water 
consumption and ecological management, thereby exacerbating system frailties and 
the communication regarding the frailties to the stakeholders.  DRMS serves as an 
outstanding example of the policy process disintegrating, changing a technical risk 
assessment into a political battle over competing interests. 
Recall from Chapter 3: the impetus for the Delta assessment was the levee 
system damage in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.  Focusing the risk 
assessment process toward preventing a Delta-version of Hurricane Katrina, 
California stakeholders might have reached a decision regarding levee attention.  As 
the assessment process progressed CALFED reviewers repeatedly communicated 
ecosystem and ecological management as higher priority than assessing levee system 
stability.   
 The DRMS case demonstrates progression from cogent risk assessment plans 
into politicized risk assessment efforts disconnected from the original risk assessment 
intent.  The DRMS assessment remains a disjointed effort of managing a limited 
resource (water) with a propensity of failure from multiple modes, before a resolution 
or agreement can be reached. 
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 Coeur d’ Alene 5.2.6
Coeur d’ Alene bears the effects of earning a profit while irreparably 
damaging the ecological system of the Coeur d’ Alene river and its environment 
when the mining companies dumped mining waste into streams, and smelters belched 
noxious particulates across the hills and into the valleys.  Communication regarding 
environmental remediation assessment of Coeur d’ Alene suggests incompetent 
technical risk assessment, coupled with resignation that remediation is impossible 
(NRC, 2005).  Including Coeur d’ Alene in this research regarding stakeholder 
perception management and communication via an RPM suggests increasing risk 
assessment value through recognizing risks associated with an industry practice, 
capturing stakeholder concerns associated with the practice, and collaboratively 
responding to those concerns using the risk register.   
Neglecting these novel practices reflects analogies to the tobacco industry, the 
hydraulic fracking industry, coal-fired power plant emissions, and other modern 
environmentally sensitive industries demonstrating questionable evidence about 
which community stakeholders can do little.  Coeur d’ Alene serves as historical 
evidence regarding deliberately ignoring and overlooking hazardous outcomes and 
subsequent damages in the face of opposing communication practices. 
 Conclusions Chapter 6:
Engineers solve technical problems, provide technical solutions, and interpret 
technical information for stakeholders’ benefit to aid decision-making.  The literature 
indicates, and these cases demonstrate, stakeholder decision-making reflects social 
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elements extending beyond technical information.  Stakeholder decision-making 
depends upon technical information appropriately connected with stakeholder 
perceptions associated within the risk register.  This research submits capturing 
stakeholders’ perceptions with each risk, and then iteratively developing appropriate 
communication plans.  Our proposed process leads to improved project 
communication plans, improved stakeholder engagement, and successful project 
completion, demonstrated by NEIDL and IPET.  
These cases provide examples of projects initiated from a controversial 
position, such as IPET and NBAF.  Based upon agency experts withholding from the 
public information regarding a prior pathogen release, NEIDL and Fort Detrick began 
from an adversarial community position, thus contributing to negative community 
perceptions and distrust at the outset.  Through collaborative community efforts 
NEIDL demonstrated successful implementation of the RPM by engaging experts to 
help connect risk assessment and communication processes through capturing 
stakeholder perceptions.  Conversely, the agency responsible for Fort Detrick’s new 
BSL-4 facility ignored community perceptions, avoided communication, and moved 
forward with an expansion without regard to local residents’ concerns.  In this 
respect, Fort Detrick represents a subpar example, while NEIDL became a model 
experts subsequently suggested for NBAF. 
NBAF represents a subpar stakeholder engagement process.   The technical risk 
assessment experts avoided addressing the potential of an FMDv release, a primary 
concern held by community stakeholders, and mandated by Congress in 2009.   
Instead, the technical risk assessment provided small numbers, distinct probabilities, 
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and myriads of technical information useful for experts, thus providing questionable 
value for community stakeholders and elected officials.  Ultimately ignoring the 
mandate, federal and state leadership points to economic benefits and potential jobs, 
and the project moves forward without an appropriate risk assessment.  Experts agree 
the technical risk assessment is deficient.  Community stakeholders continue to 
question the potential of an FMDv release.          
Our six cases demonstrate the importance of stakeholder understanding and 
acceptance of a clear risk communication plan.  This was demonstrated in the NEIDL 
project by development of the BRP, leading into the CLC, and expansion of the 
laboratory functionality into open houses, educational opportunities and facility tours 
connected into community relations processes; and in the IPET project by developing 
stakeholder communication plans at the outset of the project utilized throughout the 
levee system assessment project to maintain and improve resident understanding of 
the hazards associated with living below sea level in a storm-prone environment.   
The opposite was demonstrated in Coeur d’Alene by companies and federal 
agencies ignoring evidence of health and environmental damage.  At Coeur d’Alene 
the damage had been permitted through the purchasing of environmental pollution 
rights.  At Ft. Derrick the damage occurred by expanding the laboratory without 
responding to stakeholder concerns.  Stakeholder understanding of the 
communication plan builds trust between government agencies and community 
stakeholders, cultivates collaborative community partnerships, moving projects 
forward as can be seen in the Boston authorities’ approval of the NEIDL and the 
collaborative nature of the New Orleans rebuilding.   
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Our cases demonstrate the spectrum of project stakeholder engagement through 
project management communication plan iterations connecting stakeholder 
perception through an iterative risk assessment.  The RPM concept suggests 
improving risks assessments through including stakeholder perception and 
communication plans using the risk register.  
6.1 Successful Communication and Perception Planning: NEIDL and IPET  
Characteristics of successful comprehensive communication planning include 
collaborative conversations to gather stakeholder perceptions; comprehensive 
community stakeholder involvement insuring representation from all stakeholders; 
clear articulation regarding risks and mitigation efforts using audience-appropriate 
language; providing progressive iterations via public forums throughout the risk 
assessment process to inform stakeholders and gather their feedback throughout the 
process; experts providing clear connections between the risk(s) and decision(s) at -
hand throughout the process, including audience-appropriate language documenting 
risk assessment changes and decisions associated with each iteration;  agency 
responses reflect each stakeholder concern.  These elements, developed 
collaboratively between technical and social experts, reflect sharing ideas, concerns 
and progress exchanged to achieve stakeholder understanding, thus improving 
stakeholder engagement and risk communication. 
NEIDL and IPET demonstrated successfully connecting the communication 
plan to the risk assessment through stakeholder perceptions.  Risk assessment process 
178 
 
similarities within both projects resulted in improved project stakeholder engagement 
and acceptance, and increased risk assessment value. 
 NEIDL 6.1.1
NIEDL demonstrated community collaboration when community groups 
separated via lawsuits ultimately reconnected through the BRP and CLC open 
stakeholder forums.  NIH charged the BRP with responding to each concern raised 
by stakeholders via seven open forums during which several thousand concerns 
were captured and categorized.  NIH captured all stakeholder comments during the 
forums and generated responses for each.  NRC expert reviews discussed NIH’s 
ability to capture and respond to each stakeholder concern.  NRC experts repeatedly 
noted risk assessment improvements with each iteration, commenting on how the 
final risk assessment contained all NRC technical improvement recommendations, 
in addition to stakeholder perceptions.  The final review further elaborated 
regarding NIH responsiveness to community perceptions, indicating the 
comprehensive communication and perception management improvements, and 
increased risk assessment value, enabling stakeholder decision-making.  NRC 
experts commended NIH deliberate inclusion of perception management and 
communication planning.  As NIH iteratively included perceptions, and responded 
to stakeholder concerns, public perceptions evolved from a fearful position fighting 
against the laboratory into an informed position, supporting the laboratory opening 
and approvals.   
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BRP recommendations and activities provided to NIH throughout the NEIDL 
project process informed the CLC and community public relations processes.  NIH 
developed a comprehensive communication plan, including conducting open houses 
and educational tours designed to appeal to all ages and understanding levels.  The 
communication plan evolved into a public relations plan, complete with CLC input 
and approval, leading to community acceptance of laboratory research 
opportunities. 
Beginning with the BRP, evolving into the CLC; developing public outreach 
and educational communication elements, including opening the laboratory to the 
public; these components demonstrate NIH progressive communication and 
stakeholder perception management practices.  The BRP actively encouraged NIH 
to capture stakeholders’ perceptions throughout the risk assessment process.  Expert 
reviewers throughout the process noted agency responsiveness to community 
concerns.  The agency comprehensively addressed every comment and concern, to 
the fullest extent.  Experts suggested DHS use the NEIDL risk assessment process 
as that agency began developing the NBAF risk assessment. 
Currently the NEIDL project is approaching full licensure of BSL-4 research, 
earning community support for the Boston authorities to approve licensing.  
Beginning from a position of mistrust, NIH and BU collectively increased 
stakeholder risk assessment value, leading to increased laboratory value within the 
community. The magnitude and relationship between these pieces remains an 
opportunity for further research into the novel notion of improved stakeholder 




From the outset, the IPET team hurricane protection system assessment around 
New Orleans was developed as a community collaborative conversation.    The final 
review of the risk assessment noted the team’s capture and response to all 
stakeholder concerns and comments received during the iterative process.  The final 
risk assessment and subsequent expert review noted community residents’ 
perceptions changed as residents began to appreciate they live below sea level and 
the implications associated with that risk.   
Throughout the IPET assessment process, healthy respect for the levee system 
and for storm potential replaced stakeholders’ false sense of security.  This 
perception change was noted in the final risk assessment and subsequent expert 
reviews.  Facilitating these systemic perception changes, the IPET team developed 
continuous, transparent, clear communication plans throughout the levee 
assessment process.   
IPET demonstrated progressive communication and perception practices by 
designing the risk assessment to capture and include stakeholder perceptions 
associated with a false sense of public security.  As the IPET team articulated the 
risks hazards associated with living behind levees, the team’s communication plans 
iteratively captured and responded to stakeholder perception changes, and enabled 
residents to broaden their understanding regarding choosing to live in a hazard-
prone zone behind antiquated levees.  The IPET process and report became the 




As the IPET team’s risk assessment managed their communication processes, 
community perceptions regarding local hazards evolved into understanding the risks 
associated with the levee system.  Stakeholder engagement improved as 
communication plans developed, improved and included all stakeholders, through 
the risk register and communication plans.  Although arduous throughout the 
process, the value of the New Orleans levee system assessment increased, 
demonstrated by the advancements in hurricane prediction technology and 
stakeholder perception management processes for large metropolitan hazard-prone 
areas.  
6.2 Unsuccessful Communication and Perception Planning:  Fort Detrick, 
NBAF and DRMS 
Unsuccessful communication and perception planning reflects concepts 
opposite of success:  independent, disconnected efforts; little or no collaborative 
communication or collaboration regarding the assessment process; nonresponsive to 
stakeholder concerns; overlooking or ignoring stakeholder perceptions associated 
with risk(s); lack of communication planning regarding high-impact risk(s); few 
progressive practices regarding stakeholder engagement or communication planning 
included in the risk assessment design process.  Although different from traditional 
measures of project success or failure, poor communication and stakeholder 
perception management reflect low risk assessment value for decision-making.   
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 Ft. Detrick 6.2.1
NRC experts reviewed the risk assessment work plan, noting the lack of 
community communication.  Expert reviewers expressed concern regarding the lack 
of responses to community concerns regarding laboratory safety and reporting 
processes, given past history of LAIs at that facility.  Although the Army conducted 
open public forums and received comments, NRC experts noted the lack of 
documentation of the comments and lack of response planning in an effort to 
collaborate with the local community.  Experts noted the Army demonstrated 
overlooking stakeholder perceptions when the contractor viewed the assessment as 
a hurdle instead of an opportunity to collaboratively develop a risk perception plan 
and community communication plan.  Experts also noted the lack of a 
comprehensive communication plan, evidenced by lack of available documentation 
regarding a technical and communication risk assessment plan.   Expert reviewers, 
and also the local community, questioned the Army’s plans regarding building new 
facility and also expanding existing facility from a safety perspective, based upon 
historical LAIs and lack of reporting oversight.  Demonstrating a lack of 
progressive communication or perception practices, the Army thrust the laboratory 
expansion concept on the local community with little opportunity for input or 
feedback. 
 NBAF 6.2.2
Community stakeholders’ website reflects distrust regarding state and federal 
authorities’ capability to coordinate appropriate responses to a possible FMDv 
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outbreak.  Community stakeholders echo the GAO concern regarding possibly 
underestimating the potential subsequent economic impact of an FMDv release.   
As stated prior, GAO published the U.S. has been FMDv disease-free since 1929, 
and estimated economic impacts associated with potentially losing this disease-free 
status at $50B or more.  Kansas residents independently voiced concerns regarding 
potential loss of “FMDv-free” status.  Expert independent reviewers specifically 
noted DHS and USDA habitually neglected to address these concerns within the 
risk assessments, in addition to noting risk assessment technical deficiencies.  
Requested by Congress, GAO and community stakeholders, USDA and DHS have 
yet to publish their estimates of potential economic impact responding directly to 
address this specific concern.   
Agencies responsible for NBAF neglected iterative risk communication 
planning throughout the process to improve stakeholder engagement, evidenced by 
opposing messages on each organization’s sponsored website, and documented 
within the expert reviews.  From the evidence, Kansas residents and Kansas 
officials remain at odds regarding the safety, responsiveness, and disease-
progression prevention mitigation methods should a release of FMDv occur.  
Agency efforts fail to capture and address stakeholder concerns; neglect 
collaborative communication methods with stakeholders to capture their 
perceptions regarding FMDv release; and fail to include public perception 
management into the risk analysis and assessment.  Instead, agencies paid double 
for identical risk assessments, with duplicative potential hazards, and duplicative 
technical deficiencies in the assessments.  Analogous to Fort Detrick, DHS and 
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elected Kansas officials thrust NBAF concept and construction on the local 
community with little opportunity for input, feedback, reinforcing stakeholder 
perceptions associated with poor agency performance. 
 DRMS 6.2.3
The DRMS levee assessment suffered from a lack of collaboration, evidenced 
by the legislature mandating levee hazard assessments and technical sustainability; 
and the Municipal Water Board criticizing the assessment for neglecting to include 
water availability and Delta environmental ecologic sustainability.  Thus two 
agencies described different, and opposing, agendas and processes for the levee 
assessment at the outset.   
The DRMS assessment focused on levee breaches, neglecting and overlooking 
public perceptions regarding ecologic concerns and water availability concerns.  The 
risk assessment engineers missed a potential opportunity to expand the assessment to 
include addressing public perceptions.  Lack of communication planning evidenced 
by a missing constructed communication plan of levee breaches for public 
consumption, in appropriate language designed to seek public understanding and 
feedback.  Instead, assessment feedback was limited to technical experts and the 
Municipal Water Board, although comprehensive public stake in Delta water 
resources remains a politicized topic throughout California. 
The risk assessment engineering team demonstrated few progressive practices 
regarding stakeholder engagement or communication planning.  The engineers missed 
opportunities to collectively draw all stakeholders into the conversation regarding 
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validity and potential inclusion of the co-equal, yet opposing, water availability and 
management goals.  Instead, these co-equal and opposing goals of water availability 
and management continue to separate stakeholders who should be collaboratively 
working together to solve their water dilemma.  
6.3 No Communication & Perception Planning:  Coeur d’ Alene 
Ignoring evidence coupled with no stakeholder management plans resulted in a 
hazardous Superfund Site which will likely never achieve sufficient environmental 
remediation in Coeur d’ Alene.  Mining interests overlooked environmental and 
health detrimental evidence as vegetation and marine life suffered and died.  Citizens 
developed symptoms from what we now recognize as environmental contamination 
exposure.  Sloppy regulation practices at the time included purchasing pollution 
rights, which we recognize today as substantially immoral, and illegal.  Coeur d’ 
Alene serves as a clear bellwether to evaluate the present evidence balanced against 
obvious environmental and health concerns; ignoring the evidence serves no 
purposes, or stakeholders, long-term, and instead causes much harm. 
Environmental perception progression associated with Coeur d’ Alene serves to 
warn ecological scientists and risk assessors regarding moving forward in the face of 
detrimental evidence, and to proceed with caution, including all stakeholders, and 
evaluating the evidence, as well as including stakeholder perceptions.  Coeur d’ Alene 
reflects a contaminated memorial to poor perception management practices, which 
should be completely avoided going forward. 
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6.4 Future Research:  Stakeholder Engagement RPM 
Modern risk assessments are often limited to technical information developed 
by technical experts for technical experts.  Modern project complexity includes 
multiple stakeholders and their perceptions; multiple impacts beyond those contained 
in the traditional risk register development; and complex communication elements 
across varied social and traditional media outlets.  As the technology of conducting 
risk assessments evolves, our engineering practice should likewise expand to 
encompass stakeholder engagement and communication planning practices. 
Risk probabilities typically are difficult to comprehend by lay community 
stakeholders, leading to community stakeholders’ shifting the assessment focus from 
expert judgments to NIMBY-related concerns.  Some could argue community 
stakeholders simply don’t understand the assessments.  The probabilities contained 
within engineering technical risk assessments demonstrated in these cases suggests 
community stakeholder misunderstanding, decreasing stakeholder engagement.  As 
the engineering teams developed communication plans, engaging stakeholders in the 
data-gathering and feedback process loops, stakeholder engagement increased to the 
point of project success and acceptance.  Using social science theories, expanding risk 
assessment practice beyond technical information to encompass comprehensive 
stakeholder management and risk communication practice serves public and project 
interest. 
NEIDL and IPET demonstrate increasing risk assessment value to stakeholders by 
including perceptions and communication planning through each hazard identified in 
the risk register.  Presented through the lens of stakeholder engagement and risk 
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communication, Fort Detrick, NBAF and DRMS connect reducing risk assessment 
value, ultimately leading experts to repeatedly question the risk assessment processes.  
Coeur d’Alene demonstrates risk engineering community consider including 
perceptions within mitigation plans, as Crouch’s critical assessment of the 
remediation plan unknowingly serves this research as the data outlier.   
Engineers possess deep knowledge and expertise providing computer-
generated technical risk assessments for large complex projects.  The conclusions 
presented by these cases indicate engineers possess and sufficiently utilize technical 
skills and tools within risk assessments.  Expanding risk registers of complex projects 
to include stakeholder perceptions associated with each hazard, and designing 
communication plans to improve sharing technical risk assessment and analysis 
information increases project stakeholder engagement, thus increasing risk 
assessment decision-making value.  This research connects expanding engineering 
risk assessment to include perception management into communication plans through 
risk registers using a Risk Perception Management (RPM) Plan. 
Community resistance to a project signals the initiation of an RPM.  The RPM 
provides a tool for engineers to understand the genesis of resistance using a data-
driven process instead of an emotional-driven process.  Taking additional project time 
to capture stakeholder concerns with each item in the risk register seems 
counterproductive.  Considering NEIDL demonstrated the use of an RPM, that 
project demonstrated the benefits associated with the process.  The RPM enables 
cultivating trust between an agency and its public constituents.  This research shows 
building stakeholder confidence by connecting stakeholder perceptions into the risk 
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register and developing communication plans based upon those perceptions, affects 
project, and potentially agency, success.    
6.5 Final Thoughts 
This research suggests a process to increase risk assessment decision-making 
value within federal agencies.  The developed process depends upon agency 
willingness to include all stakeholders across multiple agencies as necessary; to 
engage stakeholders iteratively; to capture stakeholder perceptions connected to each 
risk register hazard; to plan risk communication considering stakeholder perceptions; 
and thus improve the risk assessment process.  The cases in this study benefit from 
broader, cross-disciplinary risk assessment, including all stakeholders, iterating the 
risks and options, extending quantification beyond probabilities, and improving risk 
assessment practice by considering stakeholder perceptions and risk communication 
through the novel concept of an RPM. 
The literature provides a comprehensive discussion regarding extending risk 
assessment beyond numbers, into presenting risk quantifications in a manner valuable 
for decision-making.  We suggest, along with social scientists, the presentation 
method affects the decision-making process and choice perceptions.  Social science 
experts recommend including communication strategies and stakeholder perceptions 
into the risk assessment process, enabling valuable decision-making and 
comprehensive stakeholder participation.  A recent published brief regarding 
community perceptions of perceived flood risk in New York City specifically 
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suggests changing communication strategies to modify public perception, thus 
reducing risk of loss (Botzen, Kunreuther, & Michel-­‐Kerjan, 2014). 
Risk assessment implies both the action of technical assessment, or 
development of a tangible deliverable, depending upon the context.  As a verb, risk 
assessment extends into capturing and modifying the process employed to conduct an 
understanding of the hazards and their consequences, options available to mitigate the 
risks, and contingency plans if the hazards occur.  A risk assessment deliverable 
enables decision-making.  The risk engineering assessment process considered in this 
study informs stakeholder management, resulting in enabling stakeholder decision-
making.  The cases presented here suggest extending risk assessment beyond 
probabilities and into stakeholder perception and communication management, as 
elements of the risk register.  Connecting perceptions and planning communication 
via the risk register represents a difference from project communication planning 
practice.   
Our six cases demonstrate increasing risk assessment value associated with 
broadening engineering risk assessment processes beyond technical expertise.  
Incorporating stakeholder perceptions into risk communication planning serves to 
improve stakeholder engagement.   We introduce the Risk Perception Management 
(RPM) plan as a tool to facilitate improving stakeholder engagement, and thus 
increase risk assessment value.   
We recognize probability, uncertainty, and variability form the foundation of 
engineering risk assessments.  Social experts indicate stakeholders struggle to 
perceive small probabilities.  Social experts also suggest stakeholder perceptions 
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regarding hazards inform stakeholder understanding regarding risk uncertainty and 
variability, extending risk quantification into risk communication.  Thus, stakeholder 
perceptions inform risk communication.  Improving stakeholders’ understanding of 
risks associated with complex projects adds value to the risk assessment and decision-
making processes by increasing stakeholder engagement and producing more 
comprehensive risk assessments.  Prescribing specific social and technical processes 
to capture stakeholder perceptions depends directly on the risk register of the project.  
We suggest a process algorithm for the RPM process: 
• Risk Perception Management Plan Process 
o Begin with Risk Register, Stakeholders, and social science experts 
o Capture stakeholders’ perceptions regarding each risk within the 
register 
§ All perceptions are valid and credible at this stage 
§ Collaborate with social scientists  
o Stakeholder perceptions inform risk analysis communication 
o Collaboratively develop mitigation plans informed by stakeholder 
perceptions 
o Collaboratively design communication plans informed by stakeholder 
perceptions   
o Iterate the process as the risk assessments evolve 
o Update the communication plans according to stakeholder perception 
and engagement changes	  
 
Employing the RPM at the beginning of risk assessments broadens project risk 
management to include: 
• Collaborating between risk engineers and social scientists early in the 
process 
• Including social expertise to capture stakeholder perceptions 
• Collaboratively developing and delivering associated risk communications 





Characteristics of successful comprehensive communication planning include 
collaborative conversations to gather stakeholder perceptions; comprehensive 
community stakeholder involvement insuring representation from all stakeholders; 
clear articulation regarding risks and mitigation efforts using audience-appropriate 
language; providing progressive iterations via public forums throughout the risk 
assessment process to inform stakeholders and gather their feedback throughout the 
process; experts providing clear connections between the risk(s) and decision(s) at-
hand throughout the process, including audience-appropriate language documenting 
risk assessment changes and decisions associated with each iteration;  and agency 
responses reflect each stakeholder concern.  Developed collaboratively between 
technical and social experts, these elements reflect sharing ideas, capturing concerns, 
and achieving stakeholder understanding, thus improving stakeholder engagement 
and risk communication.  Experts continually criticize engineering risk assessments 
which exclude stakeholder perceptions of risk probability, uncertainty, and 
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